Thank you for your letter of 1 November about the Coalition Government’s policy on freedom of expression.

This Government rejects censorship and surveillance that undermines people’s rights to express themselves, organise or communicate freely. We are proud to stand up for freedom of expression and privacy. Britain will always be on the side of those aspiring to greater political and economic freedom anywhere in the world, whether this is on or off the internet.

In the UK, we are striving for a model for internet governance where governments, industry and users of the Internet work together. Our obligations under the Human Rights Act, underpinned by our international treaty obligations, are central. As you know, these protect freedom of expression, association and assembly from undue interference from the government or other public bodies.  International human rights conventions rightly set very high thresholds for any action by the state to suppress or control the free flow of information. Any action we take will be in accordance with these obligations.

I would like to address some specific issues you raise.

We believe that parents should be provided with wide tools to enable them to voluntarily block harmful and inappropriate content. Active choice is the preferred approach, with parents given a choice as to whether or not to activate parental controls when switching on a new internet enabled device or connecting to a new internet connection for the first time. It is important to distinguish between government encouraging people to make more use of existing protections as a matter of choice, and the government deciding what people can and cannot do online. Our plans do not prevent access to legal material, but seek to make it much clearer that protections exist, and to encourage their use. The position of Claire Perry regarding the default filtering of adult content is not the position of this government.

You referred to the Prime Minister’s statement to Parliament earlier this year in the wake of recent disturbances in the UK.  Let me be clear. The Prime Minister did not suggest that social networks should be closed down. The government has not and is not seeking any new powers in this area. We recognise the enormous benefits that social networking brings, not least in the valuable part it played in helping citizens avoid trouble spots and in galvanizing community clean up efforts. Social networking itself was not the root cause of the disturbances, but, as our courts have recognised, did offer an enhanced means of communication to some individuals’ intent on inciting or facilitating widespread criminal behaviour.  In light of this our law enforcement agencies, the network providers and social media organisations are looking at ways they can enhance co-operation to prevent the networks being used for criminal behaviour, in accordance with, and in order to uphold UK law.

Finally you raised concerns about powers of surveillance and access to personal information online. It is of course the responsibility of government to maintain capabilities to investigate crimes and to protect individuals where they are threatened by criminals, terrorism or foreign powers.  The use of covert surveillance by the authorised government agencies, for example the acquisition of communications data and the interception of communications, is regulated by the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA).  RIPA’s strict safeguards, including independent oversight, ensure that such surveillance is, and will continue to be, fully consistent with our obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights.

As I outlined at the London Conference on Cyberspace (LCC), the UK’s approach to the future of cyberspace has at its heart a simple proposition: behaviour that is unacceptable in the offline world is also unacceptable online. This emphatically includes the curtailing of human rights. Human rights are universal, and apply with equal force online as they do offline. The UK will continue to take a lead role in ensuing these principles are upheld.

Scottish football seems to be embroiled in an endless battle to overcome the sectarian undertones that stain it. Although it has been claimed that the propensity of sectarian discrimination is a myth unsupported by evidence, the popular perception is that a problem exists and that more action is required to eradicate it.

The Scottish government this week publishes its amended Offensive Behaviour at Football and Threatening Communications (Scotland) Bill. If passed, two new criminal offences will be created. The first relates to offensive or threatening behaviour likely to incite public disorder at certain football matches. The second is “Threatening Communications” which will criminalise recorded exchanges that contain threats of serious violence or threats intended to incite religious hatred. Anyone convicted under the bill faces a maximum of five years imprisonment.

The proposals are a direct response to the escalation of sectarian incidents towards the end of the last football season and most profoundly, the sending of suspected parcel bombs to Celtic Manager Neil Lennon, Paul McBride QC and former MSP Trish Godman.

At its Stage One reading on 23^rd June, Community Safety and Legal Affairs Minister Rosana Cunningham, explained that such incidents represent “some of the most shameful behaviour and incidents that have been seen in many years. Those scenes were broadcast and reported on repeatedly and seen throughout the world, and the disorder, the bigotry, the threats and, ultimately, the bullets and bombs through the post have shamed not only Scottish football but Scotland itself.”

Although conceived as emergency legislation to be pushed through in time for the start of the current football season, First Minister Alex Salmond dropped this proposal in light of criticism and readmitted the bill to the Justice Committee for proper consideration. The Committee published its official report on 6 October and supported the creation of both new offences by a narrow majority. A further challenge to the bill from all opposition parties and Independent MSP Margo MacDonald was deflected last week. The Labour led motion, arguing that the government had failed to make its case, was defeated 64-53 when put before an SNP majority Parliament.

Despite the government maintaining the legislation is “proportionate, justified and in line with human rights law”, the proposals represent a significant threat to the right to freedom of expression.

The first concern centres around the broad definition of offensive “behaviour”. Section one provides that a person commits an offence if:

“in relation to a regulated football match (a) the person engages in behaviour of a kind described in subsection (2) and (b) the behaviour—(i) is likely to incite public disorder, or (ii) would be likely to incite public disorder.”

The “behaviour” referred to in subsection (2) is much wider in scope than that of a sectarian character and includes expressing hatred based on colour, nationality, disability and sexual orientation (s.1(4)). In this light, although the Lord Advocate’s Guidance states that the singing of national anthems will not be prosecuted “in the absence of any other aggravating, threatening or offensive behaviour”  by the letter of the law singing the adopted Scottish National Anthem “Flower of Scotland” may infringe the legislation given its anti-English sentiment. Distinct from these grounds, the definition includes behaviour that is merely “threatening” (s.1(2)(d)) or the catch-all, “other behaviour that a reasonable person would be likely to consider offensive” (s.1(2)(e)). These last sub-sections could include an infinite number of scenarios and remove any requirement for the “behaviour” to be discriminatory in nature.

This “behaviour” will amount to a criminal offence if it is “likely to incite public disorder” or “would be likely to incite public disorder”. This may seem to safeguard free speech by providing a robust hurdle to overcome. However, section 1(5) makes it clear that hypothetical public disorder is sufficient to contravene the legislation. Specifically, it includes circumstances where public disorder may occur if it were not for the fact that “persons likely to be incited to public disorder are not present or are not present in sufficient numbers.” There is no lower limit on the number of people required. Therefore, at least theoretically, a joke made between two individuals could amount to an offence under the proposals. Such a joke made privately between friends would not incite public disorder but it is not hard to imagine how the same remark shouted in a pub full of Rangers or Celtic supports would.

The definition of “regulated football match” is equally wide and open to abuse. Offensive behaviour at a football match for the purpose of section one includes not only behaviour within the ground but also journeys to or from the match (s.2(2)(c)). Consequently, jokes and banter between friends whilst driving down the motorway on route to the game may technically breach the law. The ambit of the “regulated football match” will extend to “any place (other than domestic premises) at which such a match is televised” (s.2(3)). Therefore aside from obviously covering pubs, hospitals and retail shops selling televisions may also be caught, again demonstrating the act’s potentially broad application.

The second new offence of “Threatening Communications” denotes recorded communications that are threatening and either likely to cause fear and alarm or stir up religious hatred (Section 5). Online conduct is clearly included within the reach of “threatening communications”. Section 5(6) does offer a defence if the communication was reasonable. However, no guidance is provided on what is meant by “reasonable”. The Internet Service Providers Association has noted that this part of the act “needs to be fully justified to ensure that the balance between freedom of expression and protection of users is found.”

Of particular unease is the potentially wide interpretation of “stir up religious hatred”. Many of the harmful freedom of expression implications associated with the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 (which does not apply in Scotland) are relevant in this context. In particular, the bill risks making it an offence to offend satirise or mock religion. In a plural society it is important that a doctrine based on faith and not fact should be open to criticism. There seems little to justify singling out of religion for special attention at the expense of other at least equally worthy causes such as protection from racial hatred.

However, arguably, the most alarming aspect of the bill is the potential for a five year prison sentence to be imposed for committing either offence (s.1(6 and s.5(7))). This risks creating an atmosphere where people are afraid to speak about religion (or otherwise) including perhaps, discussing the merits of this very act. It is convenient to argue that in reality the law would not be applied draconically but should an uncomfortable situation arise the government may find it preferable for these uncomfortable situations to just to disappear.

The compatibility of a five year prison sentence with the European Convention of Human Rights is a further concern as Article 10 requires any interference with freedom of expression to be proportionate. And in any event, even if the offence could be enforced by the police, which is doubtful, there is the additional unfortunate consequence of the law making criminals of many young people.

Nevertheless, all the above omit one overarching point — the legislation is completely unnecessary. Simply put, the bill aims to legislate over issues already covered by existing laws. A person committing any offence under this act could currently be prosecuted for breach of the peace. In Scotland breach of the peace only requires a “disturbance to the community” Mark Harris v HMA [2009] HCJAC 8 and being a common law offence is not subject to a maximum sentence. More notable however is section 38 of the Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010 which only came into force on 6 October 2010 and provides that:-

“A person commits an offence if:-(a)A behaves in a threatening or abusive manner; (b)the behaviour would be likely to cause a reasonable person to suffer fear or alarm, and (c)A intends by the behaviour to cause fear or alarm or is reckless as to whether the behaviour would cause fear or alarm.”

In October Stephen Birrell was sentenced to eight months imprisonment in contravention of this act after posting various sectarian remarks on a Facebook page entitled “Neil Lennon Should be Banned”. This presumably is the exact kind of offence the government would envisage being governed by the new legislation. Yet Birrell’s conviction only demonstrates that further legislation is not required. In times of deep cuts, government funds and resources would be better spent on matters not already on the statute book.

Following the recommendations made by the Justice Committee, the government is expected to publish its amended bill this week. Amendments are likely to extend the ambit of “offensive behaviour” to explicitly include age and gender discrimination, add a legislation review clause and include a specific free speech provision. Whilst the recognition of the threat the legislation poses to freedom of expression is welcomed, a genuine respect for free speech would take account of the problems outlined above. New additions only complicate an already opaque bill.

Recent events show that Scottish football is not without its problems off the pitch. Perhaps it’s Rangers’ and Celtic’s failure to address the issues that has moved the Scottish government to act. Nevertheless, the reactionary nature of the legislation has left notable gaps. Gaps create uncertainty. Uncertainty may lead to the silencing of free and open debate. And this is the chilling effect that the Offensive Behaviour at Football and Threatening Communications (Scotland) Bill risks creating.

David Paton is a member of the steering group of and editor for the Scottish Human Rights Law Group

In a 2009 edition of Index on Censorship magazine Seth Finkelstein examines how indiscriminate blocking systems can be a source of censorship

Obscenity online is posing some of the greatest challenges to free speech advocates and censors. Seth Finkelstein explains why

When people talk of a topic such as obscenity, they almost always treat it as an intrinsic property, as if something either is, or isn’t, obscene (just as a woman is or isn’t pregnant). But in fact, in the US, definitions vary from state to state – enshrined in law as “community standards” — which means that obscenity is a geographic variable, not a constant. Something cannot be legally adjudicated obscene for all the world, but only within a particular community. And standards can vary widely between, say, cities such as New York or San Francisco, versus Cincinnati or Memphis.

This has profound implications for obscenity on the Internet and for censorship.

In the case of  Nitke v. Ashcroft, in which I served as an expert witness, a court tried to grapple with these difficulties and found them daunting. In 2001, Barbara Nitke, an American photographer known for her erotic portraits of the BDSM [bondage, domination, sadomasochism] community, filed a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the Communications Decency Act — a federal statute that prohibits obscenity online.

Nitke argued that the Internet does not allow speech to be restricted by location. Yet anyone posting explicit material risks prosecution according to the standards of the most censorious state in the country. Nitke claimed that this violated her First Amendment rights. She lost the case in 2005: the court ruled that she had presented insufficient evidence to convince the judges of her argument.

The question of definitions is also fundamental to government attempts to censor obscene material online. The most popular method of attempting regulation of obscenity is secret blacklists in the shape of “censorware”, often relying heavily on purely algorithmic determinations.

Censorware is software that is designed and optimised for use by an authority to prevent another person from sending or receiving information.

This fundamental issue of control is the basis for a profound free speech struggle that will help define the future shape of worldwide communications, as battles over censorship and the Internet continue to be fought.

The most common censorware programmes are huge secret blacklists of prohibited sites, and a relatively simple engine that compares sites attempting to be viewed with some of the blacklists. There are some more exotic systems, but they have many flaws and are beyond the scope of this article (though I’ll note that software that claims to detect “flesh tones” typically has a very restrictive view of humanity). While blacklists related to sexual material garner the lion’s share of attention, it’s possible to have dozens of different blacklists. For example, “hate speech” is another contentious category.

Note I do not use the word “filter”. I believe once you concede the rhetorical framework of “filters” and “filtering”, you have already lost. This is not a matter of mere partisan politics. Rather, there’s an important difference in how the words used may channel thought about the issue. To talk of a “filter” conjures up a mental image of ugly, horrible, toxic material that is being removed, leaving a clean and purified result — eg a coffee filter or a dirt filter. One just wants to throw the ugly stuff away. Now consider if we have wide-ranging disagreements on the differences between what is socially valuable erotica, tawdry but legal pornography, and illegal obscenity – how could a computer programme ever make such artistic distinctions?

Crucially, censorware blacklists do not ordinarily encompass legal matters such as community standards or even the criterion “socially redeeming value”. They do not take into account geographic variation at the level of legal jurisdictions. There is no due process, no advocacy for the accused, no adversary system. Everything is done in secret. Indeed, examining the lists themselves is near impossible, since they are frequently hidden and/or encrypted.

In 1995, I was the first person to decrypt these blacklists, and found they were not just targeting commercial sex sites, but some had also blacklisted feminism, gay rights, sex education and so on. While this was a revelation in general, especially to various interested parties who were touting censorware as a saviour in complicated politics, I was not personally surprised. I viewed it as an inevitable historical outcome when censorminded people are given free reign to act without accountability.

I was eventually forced to abandon the decryption research due to lack of support and rising legal risk. But the lessons of what I, and later others, discovered, have a direct bearing on current debates surrounding national censorware systems. Although ordinarily promoted as covering only obscenity and other illegal material, without checks and balances there can be no assurance against mission creep or political abuse. When there’s no ability to examine decisions, the relatively narrow concept of formal obscenity can become an expansive justification for wide-ranging suppression.

There is much more of an interest in sex than in rebelling against dictatorships

Blocking material that is considered obscene also has wider repercussions for free speech – and its regulation. If a control system can actually prevent teenagers in the West from getting sex-related content, it will also work against citizens in China who want to read political dissent. And inversely, if political dissenters can escape the constraints of dictatorial regimes, teenagers will be able to flout societal and parental prohibitions. It’s worth observing that those who argue that the Chinese freedom-fighters are morally right, while teenagers interested in sex are morally wrong, are not addressing the central architectural questions.

There is, in fact, much more of an interest in sex than in rebelling against dictatorships. So it’s conceivable that there could be a worst of both worlds result, where authoritarian governments could have some success in restricting their citizens’ access to information, but attempts to exclude masses of sexual information are ultimately futile.

Furthermore, there is an entire class of websites dedicated to preserving privacy and anonymity of reading, by encrypting and obscuring communications. These serve a variety of interests, from readers who want to leave as little trail as possible of their sexual interests, to dissidents not wanting to be observed seeking out unofficial news sources. The many attempts by dictatorial regimes to censor their populations have spurred much interest in censorware circumvention systems, especially among technically minded activists interested in aiding democratic reformers. Sometimes, to the chagrin of those working for high-minded political goals, the major interest of users of these systems is pornography, not politics. But that only underscores how social issues are distinct from the technical problem.

Recall again the importance of how the debate is framed. If the question is “Resolved: Purifiers should be used to remove bad material”, then civil libertarians are already at a profound disadvantage. But if instead the argument is more along the lines of “Resolved: Privacy, anonymity, even language translation sites, must not be allowed, due to their potential usage to escape prohibitions on forbidden materials”, then that might be much more favourable territory for a free speech advocate to make a case.

In examining this problem, it’s important not to get overly bogged down in a philosophical dispute I call the “control rights” theory versus the “toxic material” theory. Many policy analysts concern themselves with working out who has the right to control whom, and in what context. The focus is on the relationship between the would-be authority and the subject. In contrast, a certain strain of moralist considers forbidden fruit akin to a poisonous substance, consumption of which will deprave and corrupt. It is the information itself that is considered harmful.

Adherents of these two competing theories often talk past one another. Worse, “control rights” followers sometimes tell “toxic material” believers that the latter should be satisfied with solutions the former deem proper (e.g. using censorware only in the home), which fails to grasp the reasoning behind the divide of the two approaches.

This article originally appeared in Index on Censorship magazine’s issue on obscenity, “I Know it When I See it”  (Volume 38, issue 1 2009). Click here to subscribe to Index on Censorship

The UK government’s dropping of blocking plans are to be welcomed, says Peter Bradwell. But there are questions over what happens next with online copyright

This week the government announced that they are dropping sections 17 and 18 of the Digital Economy Act. These gave the Secretary of State the power to allow courts to issue injunctions to “block” access to sites involved in copyright infringement. These were broad powers, covering any “location on the internet which the court is satisfied has been, is being or is likely to be used for or in connection with an activity that infringes copyright”.

This move follows a report from Ofcom, also published yesterday, into the feasibility of those website blocking powers. They deemed the powers unworkable for reasons including the ease of circumvention, the breadth of the powers and the difficulty of reconciling the needs of rights-holders for speedy, broad powers with the “due process” interests of site owners and the broader public.

This is undoubtedly good news. The provisions set up somewhat vague and broad powers, as a rule website blocking is a very problematic intervention (you can read the briefing Open Rights Groups sent to Ed Vaizey setting out our concerns here).

But we are left in an uncertain situation regarding whether website blocking will remain a feature of the government’s copyright policy. There are other blocking powers. And there is a danger of a website blocking scheme operating through a more “efficient” process that minimises proper oversight.

Last week the High Court granted to the first injunction, under section 97A of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, forcing BT to try to block access to a website called Newzbin.

This court ruling, alongside yesterday’s decision on the Digital Economy Act, has already led to calls for a more efficient “voluntary” blocking scheme. There is a risk that the Newzbin case is cited as a broad precedent permitting read across to other cases. With rights-holders concerned that going through protracted court cases is a restrictive burden, this may add up to a renewed focus on the previously discussed “voluntary” scheme.

It does not seem reasonable to take short-cuts with due process simply because proper oversight seems cumbersome. Internet Service Providers play a critical role in providing a platform for great economic and social innovation, and through which people express themselves culturally and politically.

The limits, defined in law, on the extent to which ISPs can be held liable indirectly for what happens on their networks are extremely important. So are the policies ISPs themselves adopt regarding what content and information to prioritise or restrict. An impact on freedom of expression and innovation is inevitable when those boundaries are redrawn. Any mandate to take decisions about what we are allowed to see and do needs to be very carefully managed.

With “efficient” blocking schemes there is a risk that a rigorous and clear legal framework is bypassed. The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the UN Special Rapporteur Frank La Rue share similar concerns.

This is not to deny the rights of copyright holders to enforce their rights. They should do so within a proportionate and effective framework.

It is good news that the government has dropped the blocking provisions from the Digital Economy Act. But the question is what happens next. Hopefully the government will decide that the need for proper due process and oversight makes further rights-holders’ demands for a speedy scheme unworkable.

It is worth noting some unambiguously good news. The government yesterday also announced it’s response to the Hargreaves Review of intellectual property, and published the Intellectual Property Office’s new IP crime strategy. Both signal a welcome shift towards putting evidence at the heart of policy. This is quite a breath of fresh air for copyright policy. It should help take website blocking off the copyright enforcement menu. For now, it is one blocking mandate dropped and two still in play.

Peter Bradwell is a campaigner with Open Rights Group and the author of Private Lives, a new pamphlet about attitudes to privacy

The UK’s Minister for Communication, Culture and the Creative Industries, Ed Vaizey MP, has been hosting roundtable discussions for some months about how to develop policy for the creative industries. These primarily involve copyright holders, ISPs and Internet companies such as Google. The item that has risen to the top of the roundtables’ agenda is a possible website blocking scheme for sites that allegedly facilitate copyright infringement.

Yesterday, leaked documents detailing some of the substance of the discussions were sent to James Firth’s blog, and published by Open Rights Group.

At issue are the rules that will govern what people are allowed to do and see online. But the proposals leaked yesterday are a long way from providing the kind of legal process necessary to guarantee against a misdirected and dangerous blocking scheme that will have a material effect on rights to freedom of expression and access to information.

The documents describe a “voluntary” blocking process involving “expedited” court procedures with slimline legal oversight, no definition of or evidence for the exact problem being addressed, and no consideration of the technical considerations and consequences of trying to block websites.

Exactly who would make the decisions in the proposed “expert body” and council about what requires blocking is unclear, as is the role of the court in rubber-stamping those decisions.

This concerns more than just the rights of “sites that facilitate infringement” or those running them. Copyright holders should have the ability to enforce their rights. But that has to happen in a proportionate way, aimed at a clearly identified problem, involve proper due process and be considered in an open and accountable way.

This is the only way to ensure that some people do not have too much power to block access, that it is only the right sites that are blocked, and that there is a robust, democratic and clear framework for deciding what qualifies for the measures.

Where there is a danger of too much power being given to some interests over what is accessible, and where there are dangers that the wrong content is blocked, there is a tangible affect on what everybody can see online. These proposals do not provide the necessary safeguards and due process, failing to add up to transparent, necessary and proportionate measures.

The Internet has become one of the primary mechanisms through which people express themselves and organise. The rules that govern the flow of information need to be water tight, fully respecting due process and in doing so respecting everybody’s rights to freedom of expression.

Writers like Evgeny Morozov show us that whilst the Internet offers great potential to extend and entrench our freedoms, at the very same time it can take those freedoms away. That can happen when governments or organisations are given too much power, for instance to block certain kinds of information. In a democratic society, you have to hope that it is the legal framework and an adherence to it that guarantees which of these scenarios we live with.

This is why the UN Special Rapporteur Frank La Rue said he was “alarmed” at measures such as website blocking in his recent report on freedom of expression and the Internet.

Clumsy, quasi-judicial and unaccountable website blocking is dangerous for exactly that reason. One hardly needs to look far to see examples of why a robust, clear legal framework for any website blocking proposals is crucial to ensure that rights to freedom of expression and access to information are not abused.

Internationally, attempts to block access to the Internet are a staple part of attempts to exert repression over their citizens. In the UK Internet blocking seems to have gone “viral” across government, with proposals emerging not only in these copyright discussions but also in the new “Prevent” strategy, where again proper legal processes are absent and definitions about exactly what content law enforcement will have the power to block are extremely broad and vague.

The UK should be taking a lead in developing responsible Internet policies that set an example to the rest of the world. That can only happen through clear, accountable and proportionate processes through which decisions are made about what all of us are allowed to see and do on the Internet.

There is every chance to do so by grounding proposals in simple principles like a duty to follow evidence and a respect for due process and fundamental rights.

So far these roundtables have largely involved only rightsholders and Internet companies. It was only the most recent meeting that involved a consumer rights representative, Consumer Focus (their response to the blocking proposals they discussed is here). We are unsurprised to see proposals that do not properly take these concerns on board.

This is why Open Rights Group joined Index on Censorship, Article 19 and Global Partners in asking for proposals like as the ones leaked yesterday to be made public.

We are now asking people to write to their MPs to ask them to sign EDM 1913, which calls for the government to take on board what the UN have said and reconsider the Digital Economy Act and its many proposed website blocking schemes.

We hope they do. It is not the right to infringe copyright that is at stake, but the principles of freedom of expression that affect everyone.

Peter Bradwell is a campaigner at Open Rights Group and the author of Private Lives, a new pamphlet about attitudes to privacy

The government has convened an industry working group to examine how to block websites.  Peter Bradwell considers the possible options

The Digital Economy Act, currently undergoing Judicial Review, contained provisions for website blocking in the currently dormant sections 17 and 18. We only have Ed Vaizey’s letter and media reports to go on when considering the new plans. But it appears that in proposing a self-regulatory scheme, the government is taking that bad policy and making it worse.

Lots of people think site blocking, especially in the form now proposed, is a very bad idea. The scheme has been labelled the Great Firewall of Britain and Hadrian’s Firewall on Twitter. Nearly 2,000 people have already written to their MPs about it.

At Open Rights Group we’ve been focusing on two of the many reasons why so many people are concerned. First, it puts decisions about what we are allowed to see in the hands of businesses. In a “self-regulatory” scheme proper democratic accountability and judicial oversight are bypassed.

Second, in practical terms it manages to be both pointless and dangerous. “Web blocking” is superficially attractive. And it is only superficially effective. If the aim is to stop people downloading things they have not paid for, or to improve artists incomes, or to stop sites selling other people’s music, it won’t work. But it will lead to mistakes that see legitimate traffic disrupted. The simple calculation of: “bad thing happening + web blocking = no bad thing happening” falls down at every stage.

Who should judge which sites require blocking? On what grounds? With what democratic and judicial oversight? ISPs and rights-holders can’t answer these questions on their own. Ed Vaizey has at least promised us that “consumer representative groups” would be “involved”. But as things stand, discussions without any such voices continue.

Furthermore, practically it is not easy to ensure only the “right” traffic is blocked, and it is likely that the wrong sites will accidentally be put on the — inevitably secret — block list. In Australia, a dentist and a kennel were apparently placed on a planned list aimed at blocking child abuse images.

Blocking is also easy to circumvent. The people doing anything seriously wrong — for example people selling content they don’t own the rights to — will take about four seconds to find ways to swat away blocking measures and reach their “market”.  Users will still easily find what they want.

Experts including the University of Cambridge security researcher Richard Clayton, EuroISPA, and Dutch and French ISPs have all expressed serious doubts about the effectiveness of blocking. As has Culture Secretary Jeremy Hunt — he recently asked Ofcom to review whether it is workable.

There’s a further reason to be concerned. The last few months have seen compelling debates about the role of technology in facilitating either “people power” or repression of the people. Setting up a self-regulatory blocking scheme in the UK not only creates the mechanisms for unaccountable censorship in the UK, it significantly weakens our ability to complain in good faith about other governments’ censorship.

At best, blocking is a cosmetic measure that allows policy makers to pretend they are doing something proactive whilst bringing no returns for artists and the creative industries. At worst, it is actively dangerous in creating an infrastructure of unaccountable censorship.

You can help by writing to your MP now.

Peter Bradwell is a campaigner at the Open Rights Group

Dear friends,

Yesterday the UK Justice Secretary laid out his plans for the draft defamation bill in the House of Commons. You can read it here. The Deputy Prime Minister, a strong supporter, also sets out his vision for the bill here.

The publication of the draft legislation was the culmination of a campaign Index on Censorship has led for the last 18 months to reform England’s archaic libel laws. The Free Speech Is Not For Sale report co-written by Index on Censorship and English PEN set the framework for a national debate about free expression and reputation. With a third partner, Sense About Science, we signed up 55,000 people, predominantly from the UK and USA, to join our campaign.

When our campaign began no political party in Britain had committed to wholesale reform of these laws since 1945; at the last general election each of the main political parties had done so. Over the past nine months, the coalition government took forward our suggestions. We are now working to improve the bill ahead of its passage through parliament over the next year.

As John Kampfner, our CEO, outlined in today’s Financial Times, English law had been used by the powerful to chill the free speech of NGOs, academics and other citizens around the world. The proposed changes go a considerable way to addressing the imbalance. This will be the first time in a generation that UK libel laws have been looked at anew – and we are confident that it will make a significant difference to free expression across the globe.

We wouldn’t be here without your support.

Thank you.

Jonathan Dimbleby,

Chairman,

Index on Censorship