This shift has profound implications for the UK, the US and any country that claims to be committed to rule of law and the protection of fundamental freedoms.

This isn’t the first time that an Executive has seized the general authority to search through the private communications and papers without individualized suspicion. To the contrary, the United States was founded in large part on the rejection of “general warrants” – papers that gave the Executive (then the King) unchecked power to search colonial Americans without cause. The Fourth Amendment was adopted in part to stop these “hated writs” and to make sure that searches of the papers of Americans required a probable cause showing to a court. Indeed, John Adams noted that “the child Independence was born,” when Boston merchants unsuccessfully sued to stop these unchecked powers, then being used by British customs inspectors seeking to stamp out smuggling.

The current warrantless surveillance programs on both sides of the Atlantic return us to the policies of King George III only with a digital boost. In both, our daily digital “papers” — including intimate information such as who we are communicating with, what websites we visit (which of course includes what we’re reading) and our locations as we travel around with our cell phones — are collected and subjected to some sort of datamining. Then we’re apparently supposed to trust that no one in government will ever misuse this information, that the massive amounts of information about us won’t be subject to leak or attack, and that whatever subsequent measures are put into place to government access to it by various government agencies will be sufficient to protect our privacy and ensure due process, fairness and security.

On that score, at least the UK government is willing to discuss the proposal publicly and allow Parliament to vote on it.  But this puts the onus on the British people to tell their representatives to soundly reject it.  The message to the Executive should be clear: general warrants were a bad idea in 1760, and they are still a bad idea today.

Cindy Cohn is the Legal Director for the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) as well as its General Counsel

The post The return of a bad idea appeared first on Index on Censorship.

Despite an anonymised injunction designed to keep his name and the story of his extra-marital affair out of the tabloids, British footballer Ryan Giggs has found that where there’s the internet, there’s a way…for the story to get out, that is.

Partially in response to the draconian nature of the injunction the footballer obtained, tens of thousands of Twitter users published his name, briefly turning it — along with the name of his alleged mistress — into a Twitter trending topic, with purportedly as many as 75,000 individuals tweeting the name.  We call this public backlash to overbroad censorship attempts the Streisand effect.

The controversial super injunction and anonymised injunction privacy procedures are born of judge’s interpretations of 1998 Human Rights Act which aimed, nobly, at protecting individuals’ privacy, while also protecting their right to freedom of expression. However, the balance here is plainly off. Article 19 argues that super injunctions are a form of prior censorship that is not permitted under international human rights law — including permitted limits to Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

It’s easy to see why. In this case, as in reportedly many others, injunctions have become a tool of powerful public figures to try to stop embarrassing facts from being discussed, and in this instance the injunction process is ironically being used to require Twitter to pierce the anonymity of its customers based on the content of their speech. Particularly in this situation — where very public figures who actively seek public attention much of the time are trying to ensure that the public only learns the heroic, and not the embarrassing, facts about them — these broad super injunctions raise deep concerns.

While the situation raises raises many questions, three issues jump out at us:

Blaming the Platform —- the UK needs Intermediary Protection

In the United States, intermediaries like Twitter are protected by Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996. CDA 230 provides online intermediaries that host speech with protection against a range of laws that might otherwise hold them legally responsible for what their users say and do. In essence, CDA places the responsibility for speech on the individual speaker rather than on the platform.

As Eric Goldman noted in a position paper for an OECD experts workshop on internet intermediaries on the benefits of immunity regimes for internet publishers:

“The United States has seen an explosion of entrepreneurial activity from Internet publishers of reputational information—a process fostered by 47 U.S.C. § 230, which Congress enacted in 1996 as part of the Communications Decency Act. Content originators remain liable for their content, but 230 provides Internet publishers with a powerful immunization for content originated by third parties. With 230’s protection, Internet publishers are developing innovative ways to supply consumers with helpful reputational information, freed from concerns that innovation will increase their liability for user content…”

CDA 230, along with the First Amendment, would protect Twitter (and likely most US Twitter customers) should the footballer attempt to enforce a British judgment here in the US, assuming Twitter is not subject to jurisdiction of the UK courts.

That’s good news, but the failure of the UK to adequately protect intermediary platforms under law raises deep concerns.

It Weakens Courts to be King Canute

It is now painfully clear that the judicial ruling is not stopping the facts about this matter from being spoken and that there is a strong public interest in this gossipy news about very public celebrities. As the English courts themselves recently observed in a similar case:

“The Court should guard against slipping into playing the role of King Canute. Even though an order may be desirable for the protection of privacy, and may be made in accordance with the principles currently being applied by the courts, there may come a point where it would simply serve no useful purpose and would merely be characterised, in the traditional terminology, as a brutum fulmen. It is inappropriate for the Court to make vain gestures.”

Continued insistence on this injunction, and continued efforts to impose liability, run the risk of creating an atmosphere where British court rulings have reduced authority because they are viewed as unrealistic and out of touch with modern technology.

British citizens deserve better and it may fall to the British parliament to change the privacy law in order to fix this problem.

Once Again Twitter’s Policy of Notifying Users is Key

In January, Twitter rightfully received the world’s praise for insisting on notifying its users when the US government demanded information about several Twitter users. Now Twitter’s policy of notifying users may be triggered again, in the event that they receive appropriate legal process requiring them to identify users who republished the information. EFF has called on other service providers to make the same promise to notify users that Twitter has made, so that if a “super injunction” hits any other service providers, users can take steps to protect themselves.

Jillian York is the director of international freedom of expression, and Cindy Cohn is legal director, at the Electronic Frontier Foundation

The post Twitter, free speech, injunctions and the Streisand effect appeared first on Index on Censorship.