This article was originally published on Agentura.ru

On 7 February, 2011 the Guardian’s Moscow correspondent Luke Harding was expelled from Russia. According to the Guardian, the journalist flew back to Moscow from London, but was refused entry when his passport was checked on his arrival. After spending 45 minutes in an airport cell, he was sent back to the UK on the first available plane with his visa annulled. Harding was given no reason for the decision, although an airport official working for the Border Service of the FSB, told him: “For you Russia is closed.” The Guardian believes that Harding’s forced departure comes after the newspaper’s reporting of the WikiLeaks cables, where he reported on allegations that Russia under the rule of Vladimir Putin had become a “virtual mafia state”.

Harding’s expulsion is the latest example of the tactics adopted in the 2000s by the FSB in dealing with foreign journalists.

The 1990s under Yeltsin was a period of remarkable openness in Russia when journalists were free to explore areas that had long been off-limits. Under Putin, the FSB returned to KGB methods to deal with foreign journalists, using the threat of withholding visas and access to the country as leverage in an effort to influence their coverage.

In May 2002 Nikolai Volobuev, then the chief of the FSB’s counterintelligence department, said 31 foreign journalists had had their press passes revoked because they were “conducting illegal journalist activity”.  Eighteen of those were refused entry into Russia and had their visas blocked for five years. Since then this method has become common practice. According to the Center for Journalism in Extreme Situations, based in Moscow, more than 40 journalists were refused entry to Russia between 2000 and 2007.

In July 2006 Russian authorities refused an entry visa to the British journalist Thomas de Waal. The Russian Federal Migration Service explained that de Waal’s application had been denied under a 1996 security law. The explanation might be that de Waal wrote extensively on the war in Chechnya: In 1993-1997 he had worked in Russia covering the North Caucasus, and he co-authored the book Chechnya: A Small Victorious War. In 2003, he testified as an expert witness for the defense at the extradition trial in Britain of Chechen rebel leader Akhmed Zakayev.

In June 2008, British journalist Simon Pirani was refused entry to Russia, although he had a valid visa in his passport. Pirani, who writes about trade union issues, was told by Russian authorities he was deemed a security threat.

Natalia Morar, a Moldovan citizen who works for the independent Russian weekly New Times, and who had lived in Moscow for six years, was refused re-entry to Russia in December 2007 after a business trip to Israel. Morar had reported on corruption and written articles critical of high-level FSB officials.

She was forced to fly to Moldova, where she was told by Russian embassy officials that she posed a threat to Russian national security. In February 2008 she arrived at Domodedovo airport in Moscow with her Russian husband, Ilya Barabanov (who also works with New Times), whom she had married since she had last been refused entry. But she was stopped at passport control and told that her status had not changed, despite her marriage. Although she has continued to work for New Times covering corruption issues, her job has become increasingly difficult without access to Russian sources of information.

Meanwhile, the security services closed the doors of their press offices. By the mid-2000s the Federal Protection Service responded only to requests for filming or photographing inside the Kremlin. Military intelligence has no press office at all, the foreign intelligence service refuses to comment on anything that happened after 1961, and the FSB’s Center for Public Communications has tended not to answer media requests even under the threat of legal prosecution.

On April 24, 2008, then FSB director Nikolai Patrushev approved the plan to counter “the ideology of terrorism”. The plan outlined a set of guidelines for the secret services for 2008-2012. Among the measures included in the plan was a special training course, known as “Bastion”, for journalists covering terrorism. The course, established by the security services, seems to be a sort of brainwashing for journalists, aimed at limiting journalistic coverage of scenes of terrorist attacks and counterterrorism operations. Interior Ministry officials said that if a journalist had not attended the courses, he or she may be not allowed access to the area, as the number of press accreditations is limited and priority will be given to graduates of Bastion. The plan signed by Patrushev confirmed this. According to the document, the security services are required “to develop the order of accreditation of journalists who passed the courses and to establish a special diploma that would become the grounds for a journalist’s accreditation with the operations staff during the counterterrorist operation.” This requirement is at odds with the Russian media law, in which there is no mention of the course as a prerequisite for journalistic accreditation.

In 2009 the Directorate of Assistance Programmes (which includes the Centre for Public Communications) was given new powers. On 15 July Alexander Bortnikov, director of the FSB, expanded the list of FSB generals allowed to “initiate petitions to conduct counterintelligence measures that restrict the constitutional rights of citizens”. Under Bortnikov’s direction, these generals now have the authority to order wiretapping, surveillance, and the searching of premises.

The list, first established in 2007, was originally limited to heads of counterintelligence sections, the department of economic security, and the border guards, as well as FSB leadership. The order signed by Bortnikov in 2009 significantly expanded it to include the FSB Directorate for Assistance Programs. According to the law, the FSB may carry out counterintelligence measures under the following conditions: There is information regarding signs of intelligence and other activity by foreign states’ se cret services or by individuals aimed at damaging Russia’s security.

Russia’s journalists are obviously not “clients” of the list. They might divulge secrets or names of agents, but only if they are told this information by FSB officers or other officials with access to such material. But to protect well-guarded secrets, the FSB has special units, from its main Counterintelligence Service to the Military Counterintelligence unit, which typically initiate prosecutions after journalists divulge sensitive information in print.

The lawyers and FSB officers we questioned told us that the Directorate of Assistance Programs might have asked for a surveillance permit not to initiate criminal proceedings but to keep a closer eye on journalists. (Previously the chief of the directorate had to request permission from the head of the counterintelligence department to intercept journalists’ correspondence. Now the head of the FSB’s directorate in charge of dealing with journalists is able to carry out an order on his own.) Bortnikov’s order raises another question. FSB units are divided into operational and support units. The first (for instance, counterintelligence or counterterrorism) consist of operatives who recruit agents. Support units include, for example, the FSB’s capital con- struction directorate, department of medicine, human resources, and (it was long believed) its directorate in charge of dealing with journalists.

The ability to order eavesdropping is a method employed by operational units. Responding to our question as to whether the Directorate of Assistance Programmes is an operational unit, the officer on duty at the FSB Center for Public Communications replied,“It is defined by our internal regulatory documents, and nobody will [tell] you.”

See more:

• KGB methods in dealing with public opinion: the emphasis on propaganda efforts focused on cinema and TV, a competition for the best literary and artistic works about state security operatives, and the using the threat of withholding visas and access to the country as leverage in an effort to influence their coverage
• The New Nobility: The Restoration of Russia’s Security State and the Enduring Legacy of the KGB by Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan

Agentura.Ru, February 8, 2011

The post Expelling journalists: a long-established FSB policy appeared first on Index on Censorship.

Andrei Soldatov reveals that the Russia’s Federal Security Service, the successor to the KGB, has granted the same office that responds to journalists requests licence to search their homes, wiretap them and place them under surveillance

Order No 343, signed by FSB director Alexander Bortnikov on 15 July 2009 expanded the list of FSB generals allowed “to initiate a petition to conduct a counterintelligence measures that restrict the constitutional rights of citizens” (i.e. the right to privacy of correspondence and communications, as well as the inviolability of the home). These generals have the authority to order wiretapping, surveillance and searching of premises.

The panel was first established on 14 September 2007. Initially it consisted of heads of counter-intelligence sections, the department of economic security, border guards, and the FSB’s leadership. The July order significantly expanded it to include the Directorate for Assistance Programmes (UPS). This division is in charge of dealing with journalists, and the Centre for Public Communications (the press office of the FSB) is part of it.

There are limited grounds for the FSB to carry out counter-intelligence actions. These include the need to gather information about the activities which pose a threat to Russia; to protect information which constitutes a state secret; to monitor people who provide or have provided the FSB with confidential assistance; to ensure the FSB’s own security, the existence of information regarding signs of intelligence and other activity by foreign states’ secret services and by individuals aimed at inflicting damage on Russian security, and the requests of the secret services of other countries.

Russia’s journalists are not obvious “clients” of the list — no bearers of state secrets, they might divulge secrets or names of agents only if they are given access to state secrets by FSB officers or other officials. The FSB has special units to protect every type of secret from the Directorate of Counterintelligence Support, to transportation, to military counterintelligence, and these departments usually initiate prosecutions after publications.

Lawyers and FSB officers I questioned told me its possible the UPS asked for the surveillance licence not to initiate criminal proceedings, but to keep a closer eye on journalists. Previously the UPS chief had to ask the leadership or the counterintelligence department to intercept journalists’ correspondence, as there is a waiting list for such activities in the FS the leadership might have decided that listening in on a real spy was more important. Now the head of UPS is able just to give an order.

The activities of the UPS have gone beyond the borders appropriate for a press office ever since its formation. When the directorate was established in 1999 it embarrassed many FSB case officers, who were not happy that the name of directorate had revealed what was presumably a confidential term. “Assistance programmes” or “assistance operations,” were known as “active measures” during the Cold War, and were intended to change the policy or position of a foreign government in a way that would “assist” the Soviet position. Thus, the FSB Centre for public communications carried out tasks very similar to those of a psyops unit. It was also known that one of the departments of Centre for Public Communications of the FSB was tasked to monitor publications to determine the authorship of articles written under a pseudonym.

Bortnikov’s order has changed the situation for journalists. In the 1990s monitoring publications and even identifying authors was a legitimate function of the FSB press office. But when, in 1999, the FSB had merged public affairs with propaganda it was already far beyond the limits: it clearly undermined the credibility of information disseminated by the FSB. The power to carry out surveillance marks a new step in the manipulation of media.

FSB units are divided into operational and support units. Some, for instance counterintelligence or counter-terrorism consist of operatives who might recruit agents. Support units include the capital construction directorate, the FSB’s medical department, human resources and, as it was long believed, the press office.

However, the right to order surveillance is the hallmark of an operational unit. When I put it to the duty officer at the FSB Centre for Public Communications that UPS is an operational unit he just said that “it is defined by our internal regulatory documents and nobody will tell you.”

Andrei Soldatov is editor of Agentura.ru. He worked for Novaya Gazeta from January 2006 to November 2008. Soldatov’s book with co-author Irina Borogan, The New Nobility, about the Russian secret services, is published later this year by Public Affairs Books.

The post Russia: FSB press office licenced to spy appeared first on Index on Censorship.

Vladimir Putin is ultimately responsible for last weekend’s oppression of political demonstrations, writes Oksana Chelysheva

There are two Russias nowadays. One is of Putin, with his images on every other bill board, trying hard to crush, scare and harass the other, democratic Russia.

Late Sunday evening I spoke by phone with Ella Poliakova, the chair of Soldiers’ Mothers’ Committee of Saint Petersburg. She had spent almost eleven hours in a police station. She was not detained during last weekend’s violently crushed march of dissent. Ella followed her friend Natalia Evdokimova, the chair of the Human Rights Council of Saint Petersburg, onto a police bus. She told me: “I heard an OMON [the militia of the internal affairs ministry] colonel ordering, “Detain that woman in the red overcoat”. He pointed at Natalia. I immediately rushed to her when she was being taken to the OMON bus.” A few hours later she was charged with resisting the police and participating in an unsanctioned rally.

In Saint Petersburg the march had been crushed even before it started. The OMON detained leading opposition activists, Olga Kurnosova, Nikita Belykh, Maksim Reznik, Leonid Gozman, Ella Poliakova, at the Yabloko party office where a press conference had been held.

Marina Litvinovich, Garry Kasparov’s adviser, called on people coming to the march to keep quiet and walk quietly along the embankment. She was detained but soon escaped from the OMON bus, persuading her guard that she was a tourist on the way to the Hermitage. One Finnish tourist was less fortunate. On the way back from the Hermitage, he found himself detained in the same bus with Nikita Belykh, the deputy leader of the opposition Union of Right Forces.

Many people were beaten with police batons. The dispersal of the March of Dissenters in Saint Petersburg was violent. However, I have heard some apologists for Putin say that it was still not a disaster: people were not killed. No one has been taken into custody.

However, the day before, on 24 November, another protest rally was broken up. It happened in the Ingush town of Nazran. People protested against the unstoppable conveyor of violence that is developing in this republic. The last straw that broke their patience was the murder of a 6-year-old boy by the riot police who stormed the wrong house. To justify the clash, they put a submachine gun on the body of a boy and took pictures of this “rebel”.

The riot police acted on orders from the Ingush president, opening fire at the crowd that was resisting them by throwing eggs and apples. Many people were wounded and around ones hundred detained, according to www.Ingushetia.ru. The webpage was hacked into the same day. The Ingush TV linked the rally in Nazran with the Other Russia and claimed that the protesters received one million rubles from Moscow to hold it. The Ingush prosecutor Yury Turygin was again lying in his comments on the rally. He claimed that there were some 30 participants and only seven people were detained.

Is it unlikely that the methods applied against peaceful protest in one region of the state, which is under total control of its president, won’t be applied in others?

On 24 November, marches, rallies and pickets in support of the Other Russia were held in Moscow, Nizhny Novgorod, Orenburg, Kazan, Astrakhan, Pskov and many other cities. They were also obstructed.

In Nizhny Novgorod the steering committee of the march also failed to reach an agreement with the authorities. The administration of Nizhny Novgorod refused to authorise holding a rally in Gorky Square under the pretext that the square “is not meant for holding public actions”. All the denials were signed by Tatiana Bespalova, the deputy governor of Nizhny Novgorod Region.

In Moscow, after the sanctioned Other Russia rally finished, almost all the people who made speeches were detained, including Garry Kasparov and the human rights activist Lev Ponomaryov.

The same night, Kasparov was sentenced to five days in custody, even though the witnesses from among OMON servicemen gave conflicting testimonies.

There have been a series of detentions all over Russia, including putting people under enforced psychiatric treatment. It happened in Joshkar Ola the day before the march was held there. Artyom Basyrov was stopped in the street and taken to hospital .He was immediately put under enforced treatment.

One of the Other Russia activists in the Moscow region, Yury Chervochkin, was brutally beaten up the day before the march. His situation is grave as he suffered a serious head injury. He is still in coma. A few hours before the assault, he called Kasparov’s office to report that he was being followed by several people from the department to combat organised crime.

Nikolay Andrushenko, a journalist at the local newspaper, Novy Peterburg, was taken into pre-trial detention on 23 November for two months for his article “Why I am joining the march of dissent”.

Who is responsible for this unlawfulness? The OMON chiefs? Sure. The administration of regions and cities that violate all democratic norms? Certainly … The FSB? Of course.

However, first and foremost, the person most responsible is the man at the peak of this pyramid of the Russian vertical of power: Vladimir Putin.

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