The twelfth of June is the anniversary of the disputed Iranian presidential election. The ensuing events of last summer challenged assumptions about the political impact of the media, especially the internet, on Iranian society.

Prior to the protests a lot was said about the importance of the internet as a “free space”, where opposition discourse was thriving, especially in the context of its limited manifestation in the offline world. The Persian blogosphere was hailed as one of the most vibrant non-English speaking communities where youth, women, homosexuals, and religious and ethnic minorities were expressing and to some extent mobilising themselves. Occasionally, the internet also played a “fourth estate” role — that is, the ability to create an independent institution making the authorities accountable for their actions. There were a number of secretly recorded amateur videos documenting the wrongdoing of some Iranian officials — the subsequent wide coverage of those videos made it very hard for the Iranian officials to deny the incidents.

These two political functions of the internet — a “free space” and a “fourth estate”, also played important roles in the aftermath of the election. The internet became the backbone of the green movement, as severe restrictions were imposed on the movement’s offline activities. Citizens used their mobile phones and became the eyes and ears of the international media whose correspondents had been expelled from Iran. The videos documented the participation of Iranians in street protests and the brutality of force used against them by the authorities, resulting in the widespread practice of adding the postfix “revolution” to social media platforms like Twitter and YouTube.

However, the green movement was not simply allowed to use the internet for its own end. The Iranian authorities tried to stop the “Twitter revolution” by waging an active war against internet freedom. The authorities went beyond simple internet content filtering by tampering with internet connections and mobile phone services, by jamming satellite broadcasting, and by hacking and attacking opposition websites. They also monitored online dissenters and used the information obtained to intimidate and arrest them. They threatened service providers in Iran to remove ‘offensive’ posts or blogs and more significantly, they tried to fill the information void created by these measures with misinformation.

There has been a sense of disappointment amongst the supporters of the Twitter revolution. We should try to make sense of its shortcomings.

Social and conventional media need each other
It became clear that social media (staffed by citizen journalists) and conventional media needed each other to function. Given the government’s severe restrictions on access to the internet and its infiltration of the social media’s platforms with fake content, its audience was limited. Citizen journalists relied on conventional media to take the best of their content and reach a larger audience, while the latter needed the former to continue their news cycles in the absence of correspondents on the ground.

Twitter and Facebook: Bridging rather than mobilising
Facebook and Twitter were more influential in mobilising diaspora Iranians showing solidarity rather than mobilising street protests inside Iran. Owing to their knowledge of context and language, diaspora Iranians were also able to connect the outside (mainly the media) to the inside. Both the platforms were filtered before the election and remained inaccessible in Iran during the protests.

Do not underestimate the basics
In the days after the disputed election, the Iranian authorities shut down many of the news websites set up by supporters of Mousavi and Karoubi and other opposition groups by arresting the technical teams involved in their maintenance, initiating intense Denial of Service (DOS) attacks and hacking. The opposition clearly took having access to secure hosting and capable technical support for granted and did not expect these incidents to occur. Its lack of preparation meant that many of them struggled to get back online and to remain online in the following months.

Knowing how to operate safely online is important
There have also been a number of reports that activists were presented with copies of emails exchanged with other activists during their interrogation and were arrested for their online activities. Many of them were also asked to provide the credentials of their Facebook accounts and were questioned extensively on their relationships with friends on their list. The Iranian authorities used this fear for further power projection by claiming that the Iranian Police has access to all the emails and SMS messages exchanged in Iran and can monitor them. All of these tactics have created fear and self-censorship among the ordinary internet users and activists in Iran, a fear that is perpetuated by a lack of knowledge of the very basics of information security.

There will be more limitations on the internet
The Iranian authorities used to consider the development of the internet in Iran as an enabler for economic development. During the Rafsanjani and Khatami presidency, the government invested heavily in expanding the internet infrastructure, resulting in a high growth rate of internet users. However, this has now changed and Ahmadinejad’s government has allocated 500m US dollars in this year’s annual budget (2010-11) to “counter the soft war”. This effectively means imposing more restrictions on opposition movement’s use of the internet. The fifth economic plan devised by his government does not have any indicators for increasing the internet penetration rate in Iran, contrary to the past two economic development plans. This indicates that the Iranian government is not interested in increasing the number of internet users in Iran, at least not for the next five years.

The internets reach is limited
Internet users in Iran are predominantly middle and upper middle class and internet access remains limited among the less affluent sections of Iranian society. Mousavi has stated numerous times that the Green Movement should try to reach out to the working class and bring it on board.

But the internet is the only available media option
The internet is the only media space that is available to the green movement as other forms of media are heavily controlled by the government and it is not possible to launch a newspaper, radio or TV station inside Iran. Satellite broadcasting of political TV stations based outside Iran will be subjected to heavy jamming. The short wave radio broadcasted from outside is also losing its audience significantly, as highlighted in a recent audience survey by the BBC World Service.

The green movement should think “small media”
The green movement and its supporters inside and outside Iran need to go beyond the common perception and prescribed use of the internet (like YouTube, Twitter and Facebook) and come up with new and innovative solutions. Mousavi himself has encouraged the green movement to embrace “small media”, which relies on offline social networks for further distribution of information. He is reminding the Green Movement of the lessons learned from the 1979 and Constitution Revolutions as both used small media to mobilise support and achieve their aims.  Small media has four main characteristics:

- It is distributed and is therefore not prone to blockage
- It produces sharable information products
- It relies on highly resourced and networked individuals to reproduce sharable information products
- It uses the social networks of highly resourced individuals to distributed sharable products to less resourceful individuals

Leaflets and cassette tapes were widely used in 1979 revolutions. These days the digital equivalents of them will be CDs, DVDs, memory sticks, email, Bluetooth on mobile phones, peer to peer file sharing etc. The green movement only has the internet but it has to change its approach towards it by going beyond its widely prescribed uses. It is time to replace the Twitter revolution with small media discourse.

Mahmood Enayat is a doctoral student at the Oxford Internet Institute, University of Oxford. He is also the Director of Iran at the BBC World Service Trust, where he is responsible for managing the Iran media development project

On day two, it dawned: someone over there could get hurt if the regime decided to crack down on bloggers, activists, and anyone having a Twitter handle. On day three, Twitter and Iran speed-trained thousands of people in complex computing techniques to circumvent censorship and cyber surveillance such as proxies, anonymisers, and Virtual Private Networks.

On day four, the first tweets about arrested Iranians bloggers and journalists came through. The Twitter and Iranian revolutions are happening side by side. But veteran Twitterers, who lived and tweeted through the uprising in Burma, the war in Gaza, riots in Madagascar, and the Karachi and Bombay suicide attacks, fear what will come next if large-scale repression takes place in Iran. With Twitter, we share the days of fellow men and women all over the world. We see (videos, photos), we hear, we feel, we look over their shoulders. But when policemen, floods, bombs and bullets strike, we are powerless to help. Let’s hope we will not experience that feeling for Iran through Twitter.

The fact that Iran’s protesters are clinging to Twitter as the last channel to reach out to the world should prompt Twitter users to ask a few question about web censorship and filtering in Iran. Western Twitterers often assume than the Iranian government knows nothing about technology and relies on tight police surveillance. In fact, the Iranian regime is extremely tech savvy. Starting in the 1990s, enormous funds where invested into new technologies by the Shia clergy. Shia sacred scriptures and religious material were scanned and digitised, and clergymen and seminarians were trained to blog. The Iranian government is a world leader in web censorship. The weekly meeting at the Tehran Ministry of the interior, to set the agenda for blocking and filtering the Internet, is hardly a secret.

But what lies at the core of the Iranian Internet censorship system, or any government filtering policy, nowadays? Filtering and surveillance software. Who manufactures those? Western companies.

The software of US companies Secure Computing and Websense has been used to filter the Internet in Iran as well as in authoritarian regimes in North Africa and the Middle East. Secure Computing management has vigorously denied licensing its use when confronted, accusing Iran of “illegal use of its software”. There is nothing wrong or illegal with selling network security software to business companies, schools, libraries, as those companies do. But selling filtering software to governments means that any regime or government, nowadays, can monitor, censor, and even cut off communications on the web with a few clicks. It is also of course illegal for US companies to do business with Iran. Isn’t it time to confront American and European software companies on their contracts with foreign governments and the part they play in censorship in Iran, and worldwide?

Claire Ulrich is a contributor to Le Monde weekend supplement, and editor of Global Voices in French

However, the upcoming Iranian elections have led to the Iranian press having one of its most open periods. This is thanks to the controversial presidential debates held on national television. The fact that politicians such as Mousavi and Karoubi have openly accused the Ahmadinejad government of acting irresponsibly in its foreign policy, as well as denouncing its management of the problem of corruption, has emboldened many in the Iranian press. When publications such as the conservative pro-Mohsen Rezai Ayande News, or the pro-Rafsanjani Shahab News hear powerful candidates such as Mehdi Karroubi asking the president on national television about what happened to $300m which went missing during his term as mayor of Tehran, they feel that this gives them enough leeway to criticise Ahmadinejad without fear of being punished.

Another important factor which has led to an impressive array of open discussions and criticism in the Iranian press of candidates, especially Ahmadinejad, is the behaviour of his supporters. A notable example was when Hossein Shariatmadari, the editor of the right-wing publication Keyhan, said after Benazir Bhuto’s assassination that the same could happen to Ayatollah Khatami. Many reformist politicians considered this a direct threat and declared open season on Ahmadinejad. The very fact that that the president has been such a divisive figure, who has alienated his own right-wing supporters, has emboldened many in their criticism of the government prior to the elections.

The elections have had a very positive impact on the Iranian press and its ability to exercise more freedom in its writing. Whether such openness continues after the elections depends on who is elected, and how threatened the authorities feel by the possibility of a velvet revolution.

Meir Javedanfar is the coauthor of The nuclear sphinx of Tehran: Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and The State of Iran