The perils of academic publishing

Academic book reviewing is becoming more dangerous. Pan your peers at your peril. If you express sincerely-held negative views about a book, you may find yourself defending your criticisms in court. This kind activity is poorly paid, and many academics even do it for nothing. Perhaps they should question whether benefits outweigh possible losses. Many are unaware of the risks they are taking given current libel laws.

A recent case in France, described here in the Times Higher Education, though, went the way of the critic. Law academic and libel tourist Karine Calvo-Goller lost her attempt to prosecute a journal editor for publishing a scathing review of one of her books about the International Court. Calvo-Goller’s complaint was that the review contained factual errors and could harm her professionally. The journal editor, law professor Joseph Weiler, stood his ground and refused to remove the online version of the review on the grounds that that would have compromised academic freedom and intellectual integrity. Thankfully the review was deemed within the limits appropriate to academic criticism freedom of expression.

Factual errors or presumed factual errors occur frequently in reviews and are usually unintentional or a question of interpretation. Most journals can publish corrections and come-backs in subsequent issues, though it is difficult for a slighted author not to appear tetchy in the subsequent exchanges. The idea that academic book reviewers should be prosecuted for sincere mistakes or strong opinions is a bit like threatening boxers with charges for throwing punches in the ring. If we are going to have a lively academic environment we need to accept that from time to time blows will land below the belt. Anyone who persistently aims low, though, does themselves as much or more damage than their opponent.

The FT on "unfree speech"

The Financial Times leader today cuts right to the heart of the debate about privacy sparked by Sir Fred Goodwin seemingly bizarre injunction, which it is alleged prohibits the press from identifying the former RBS chief as a “banker”:

Super-injunctions, which forbid journalists from reporting that they have been granted, as well as preventing disclosure of the information that is their subject, have become increasingly popular. They are a menace to democracy and should be scrapped.

It is clear that there is a balance to be struck between the right of an individual to a private life, and people’s right to be appraised of matters that are of public interest. But of late, driven by a series of rulings based on Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, the pendulum has swung too far in favour of greater privacy.

Sections of the press have done themselves no favours by intrusive reporting of private matters whose disclosure is not in the public interest. That is regrettable. But it does not alter the fact that the public has a right to be able to make informed choices about those whose actions make an impact on their lives. Information is the life-blood of democracy. Too often, super-injunctions are a tool used to thwart this, protecting the rich and powerful by enabling them to gag the press

The piece goes on to suggest the need for a properly drafted privacy law. Of course, the fear could be that a statute privacy law could be even harsher on the press than the current situation is.

The FT on "unfree speech"

The Financial Times leader today cuts right to the heart of the debate about privacy sparked by Sir Fred Goodwin seemingly bizarre injunction, which it is alleged prohibits the press from identifying the former RBS chief as a “banker”:

Super-injunctions, which forbid journalists from reporting that they have been granted, as well as preventing disclosure of the information that is their subject, have become increasingly popular. They are a menace to democracy and should be scrapped.

It is clear that there is a balance to be struck between the right of an individual to a private life, and people’s right to be appraised of matters that are of public interest. But of late, driven by a series of rulings based on Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, the pendulum has swung too far in favour of greater privacy.

Sections of the press have done themselves no favours by intrusive reporting of private matters whose disclosure is not in the public interest. That is regrettable. But it does not alter the fact that the public has a right to be able to make informed choices about those whose actions make an impact on their lives. Information is the life-blood of democracy. Too often, super-injunctions are a tool used to thwart this, protecting the rich and powerful by enabling them to gag the press

The piece goes on to suggest the need for a properly drafted privacy law. Of course, the fear could be that a statute privacy law could be even harsher on the press than the current situation is.

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