18 Oct 2012 | Uncategorized
Twitter this week announced that it had blocked the account of German far-right group Besseres Hannover.
The small anti-immigrant group is accused of inciting racism and Neo-Nazism, and has been banned under Germany’s strict anti-Nazi laws.
A letter from Hanover police informed Twitter of this ban, and requested that they block the site: the platform complied, and since 25 September, the account has been unavailable. 
It’s important to note the “in Germany” part. Besseres Hanover’s twitter account is still available in the rest of the world, though until today it had not been updated since the ban.
Back in January, Twitter announced that it would be introducing a system where it would comply with national blocking orders while keeping content available outside the relevant jurisdiction.
Interestingly, the blog post announcing this policy specifically mentioned Germany’s anti-Nazi laws:
As we continue to grow internationally, we will enter countries that have different ideas about the contours of freedom of expression. Some differ so much from our ideas that we will not be able to exist there. Others are similar but, for historical or cultural reasons, restrict certain types of content, such as France or Germany, which ban pro-Nazi content.
Until now, the only way we could take account of those countries’ limits was to remove content globally. Starting today, we give ourselves the ability to reactively withhold content from users in a specific country — while keeping it available in the rest of the world. We have also built in a way to communicate transparently to users when content is withheld, and why.
The reaction to this announcement was mixed: some initially screamed “CENSORSHIP!”, but probably the fairest analysis came from EFF’s Jillian C York, who wrote:
Let’s be clear: This is censorship. There’s no way around that. But alas, Twitter is not above the law. Just about every company hosting user-generated content has, at one point or another, gotten an order or government request to take down content. Google lays out its orders in its Transparency Report. Other companies are less forthright. In any case, Twitter has two options in the event of a request: Fail to comply, and risk being blocked by the government in question, or comply (read: censor).
… I understand why people are angry, but this does not, in my view, represent a sea change in Twitter’s policies. Twitter has previously taken down content — for DMCA requests, at least — and will no doubt continue to face requests in the future. I believe that the company is doing its best in a tough situation… and I’ll be the first to raise hell if they screw up.
It’s a realistic view, and I’d be very surprised if Jillian raised hell about today’s case. Twitter is a private company, and while it has a decent record on free speech, it cannot be expected to go to the barricades for every issue. Moreover, Germany is a huge and wealthy market.
Twitter has complied with the law, and been open about it. The German law itself is the problem. Banning far-right views and Nazi-inspired historical revisionism is anachronistic for a modern liberal democracy. And these laws are pointed to as an example when the EU attempts to lecture the world on free speech.
In this case, Germany is censoring a tiny organisation whose main spokesman is a man in a furry outfit called Abschiebär, who appears in videos making Hitler salutes and mocking kebab shop workers. Interestingly, Abschiebär’s videos are still available on YouTube. 
Nonetheless, it’s worth keeping an eye on this development: In our enthusiasm for social media, we often forget that we are communicating on platforms run by private companies. In order to function, private companies must obey the law of the land. The privatisation of social space is going to be a crucial factor in free speech debates.
18 Oct 2012 | Uncategorized
If passed, the UK’s draft Communications Data Bill — also known as the “Snooper’s Charter” — will make room for the blanket storage of information on British citizen’s emails, text messages and internet activity. Companies would have to collect data they don’t currently retain, and the Home Secretary would have the power to request communications equipment manufacturers install hardware to make spying easier.
With these concerns in mind Index hosted a panel on the bill today chaired by trustee John Kampfner, who was joined by Index CEO Kirsty Hughes, Demos’s Jamie Bartlett, Emma Ascroft of Yahoo and Ian Brown from Oxford University.
There was consensus over the bill’s red flags, particularly its broad language and wide extension of surveillance powers to anyone who provides telecommunications operating systems. This would include social networks and domain name registries.
For Yahoo’s Emma Ascroft, it was unclear what consideration the UK’s Home Office had given to jurisdiction boundaries. The broad nature of the bill means the UK would be the first country to extend its jurisdiction, creating a reserve power to “require UK providers to retain data that they could not obtain directly.” The Home Office has acknowledged, Ascroft said, that the UK would be the first country to extend its jurisdiction in this way, but added there will be a “tension” where UK citizens’ data is available to foreign law enforcement authorities. This would, she warned, lead to a “complex patchwork of overlapping laws”.
Of equal concern was them chilling effect the bill could have if passed, as Index CEO Kirsty Hughes described:
It risks undermining anonymity, particularly whistleblowing, if user data can be tracked and comprehensively collected.
But despite conceding no other democracies had gone as far as the UK proposes to go, Jamie Bartlett felt the bill didn’t go far enough. Emphatic that he was “in favour of regulated, transparent and clear powers of surveillance”, he said there were far greater problems posed by the ability of the government to access open source social media content, which is currently not covered by the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA). Writing for Index today, Bartlett said:
This type of widespread, mass social media monitoring needs to regulated, limited, and put on a legal footing.
Yet the fact that the bill is not subject to judicial oversight, combined with the prospect of a backstop power, worried some. For Oxford University’s Ian Brown, the latter went to “the heart of proportionality”, which Index and other rights groups have flagged as one of the bill’s greatest flaws.
“The Home Office has to come out of its comfort zone,” Ascroft concluded, pointing to internal conflict over the bill. “The Foreign Office, justice department, culture department, they all have anxieties.”
While she predicted the bill would be amended, Hughes suggested there was a risk this would not go far enough. “We need the UK’s voice out there defending digital freedom,” she said.
The joint committee on the bill is due to report on 30 November.
Written evidence to the draft bill has been collated here
Index’s own submission is available here
18 Oct 2012 | Europe and Central Asia, minipost, News and features
Fazil Say, a Turkish pianist and composer, was put on trial in Istanbul today (18 October) for insulting Islam in Twitter posts.
The musician is charged with inciting hatred and public enmity, and with insulting “religious values”. He could face 18 months in prison if found guilty.
Say, who has performed with the New York Philharmonic and served as a cultural ambassador for the European Union, has since received death threats, according to his lawyer. The trial has been adjourned until 18 February.
18 Oct 2012 | Uncategorized
Any extension of state powers of surveillance are — rightly — hotly contested. The current Data Communications Bill is no exception. There are problems with this bill — but maybe not the ones you’ve heard of.
Almost universally, it has been labelled the ‘snoopers charter’ by its opponents, representing an enormous encroachment of state spying into the lives of innocent citizens. Journalists are outbidding each other in their vitriol toward it, usually calling on Orwell. One example from many is Index’s Mike Harris in the Independent: “This proposed scale of state surveillance will add the UK to the ranks of countries such as Kazakhstan, China and Iran.”
This, to me, is misleading. Yes, China, Iran, and Kazakhstan use “Deep Packet Inspection”, which this Bill proposes. But we also bug citizens’ homes — far more intrusive. What matters is the way it is regulated. There is a difference between governments that pass surveillance laws through a vote of elected representatives of those that will be monitored, and governments that do not.
Nor is it about mass surveillance by the state. This Bill is asking/demanding/paying communications companies to collect and retain data on the existence of people’s communications for 12 months, so that in the event that a request is made for that information, it is available.
Crucially, the state only accesses this information when a successful application is made through the existing Regulations of Investigatory Powers Act 2000. This does not include the content of a communication — which has to go through a more stringent process of access. In that respect, not so much has changed, because this all happens already, it’s just that rather often, the information the police want is not there. (And in case no-one noticed, little brother is already miles ahead of what Big Brother is doing.)
That is not to say that the bill is perfect. Four changes would improve it considerably.
First: clarity. All infringements on our civil liberties need to be based on some kind of public understanding and consent that the measures being taken are proportionate and necessary. But the Bill is vague, the technology complicated, some specifics necessarily secretive. Is should be far more explicit: this would allow for at least an informed debate about whether the measures proposed are necessary and proportionate.
Second, given the value of the Internet to the economy and society (something RIPA is pledged to defend); and the potential misuse of modern technology – including the difficulty of splitting content from communication — only the very strictest system of oversight and redress will do here. More is needed.
Third, the root of RIPA is that the more serious the intrusion, the fewer agencies can do it, and for fewer purposes. RIPA makes a distinction between content and communications data — the latter being considers far less intrusive, and so much easier to obtain. But when RIPA was passed, communications data used to be mainly be about who you phoned and when. Now it means what websites you visit, where you are, and whom you email. Therefore a new category for this ‘use’ data may need to be created. The authorisation for accesses should be higher than the current bill proposes, but lower than the Home Secretary signing if off, as with content intercept, ideally a warrant from an independent magistrate.
The final problem troubles me most. It is now far easier for the state to access personal information that we citizens happily put into the public domain. Twitter can be mined in real time, open source Facebook groups can be monitored, networks and relationships contructed: all outside the RIPA legislation. None of this is mentioned in the new bill — but I think it is this that worries the public and many journalists. As I argued in #intelligence this type of widespread, mass social media monitoring needs to regulated, limited, and put on a legal footing. The bill is a chance to tackle this tricky problem: otherwise it could make the current furore seem like a minor skirmish.
Jamie Bartlett is Head of the violence and extremism programme at the UK think-tank, Demos, and Director of the Centre for the Analysis of Social Media. Follow him @JamieBartlett
DEBATE: Index’s Mike Harris on the Comms Data Bill and surveillance
In Britain, the government is proposing legislation (the Communications Data Bill) that will grant the Home Secretary the power to blanket retain data on every citizen for an undefined purpose. It won’t require judicial approval — but potentially every text message, every Facebook message, every phone call, every email from everyone in Britain would be stored on behalf of Her Majesty’s Government. If the Bill passes, companies will have to collect data they don’t currently collect and the Home Secretary will be able to ask manufacturers of communications equipment to install hardware such as ‘black boxes’ on their products to make spying easier. This proposed scale of state surveillance will add the UK to the ranks of countries such as Kazakhstan, China and Iran. This total population monitoring would break the fundamental principle that a judge and court order is required before the state invades the privacy of its citizens by holding their personal data.
Read the full article here
