The controversial Dutch politician has avoided punishment for expressing his views on Islam. But his trials are far from over, writes Sander Zurhake
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I’ve been reflecting over the last ten days on FIFA’s ban on the participation of Iran’s women’s football team in the Olympic games qualifiers, for failing to observe international football dress codes — Iran’s Islamic strip included a headscarf.
Once again the Islamic Republic’s infringement on people’s rights has excluded Iranians from the world community. Despite the obvious enormous disappointment for the team, my first reaction was one of hope.
Ultimately this action is one of many that will lead to greater discontent, pushing citizens to breaking point as an inevitable process for eventual change. And of course despite the ramifications for the individual women, for the leadership — whose limelight has been stolen by the “Arab spring” — it was just an opportunity to pipe up with anti-Western rhetoric and to re-establish its victim stance. Indeed Ahmadinejad didn’t waste the opportunity, ironically adopting the words “dictator” and “extremism” not to describe his own leadership or Iran’s approach, but to describe FIFA. As though Iran’s stance against such behaviour as essentially wrong was well established with the outside world.
The vicious circle persists. Whenever international bodies take a stance against the nation in any context, Iran uses the moment to show how unjust the West is, and no doubt garner support from sympathetic corners.
Despite the fact that the country’s internal political, social and economic health is in disarray and basic issues need tending to, the leadership continues to bury its head in the sand. The perfect demonstration of this bullish determination to follow its own path occured last week week as the government deployed 70,000 members of the country’s moral police to enforce its strict dress code.
As men (for wearing necklaces) and women walking on the pavements of Tehran are stopped, now so too are those in the apparent safety of their cars. The latest directive allows enforcers to force offenders out of their vehicles and confiscate their cars for one week.
The comments of Iranian passersby in this clip reinforce my claim that change can only come once the people’s anger reaches a peak. As my father always said “bashar be omid zende ast” — a somewhat less poetic translation: “one lives in hope.”
In the first week of May, in what was essentially a domestic dispute, a Christian woman by the name of Abeer Fakhry, wanting to divorce her husband, announced her conversion to Islam. It was her only option for legal separation, divorce being a near-impossibility under the Egyptian Coptic church, but the incident turned into an armed battle, injuring scores of people and killing 12 in the Imbaba neighbourhood of Cairo.
A rumour spread that Abeer was being held against her will inside the Mar Mina church, which became the epicentre of sectarian fights. The case echoes the now infamous Kamilia Shehata saga, Shehata’s religious affiliation and whereabouts have remained a matter of speculation for nearly two years.
While accusations of interference by the last remaining members of the Mubarak ranks, by “foreign elements”, or even by imprisoned Mubarak staffers continue, the reality is that the recent violence represents years of sectarian tension. This strain regularly finds an escape valve in the form of violence, first between individuals, then later, escalating to engulf full communities.
The new player in the story is the Salafis, a hardline Islamist group which had, until the January 25 revolution, remained largely out of the public sphere and appeared not to have political ambitions. The Salafis deem the entire political system to be flawed and nursed dreams of a Caliphate through pamphlets they distributed in the aftermath of the revolution. They have, however, emerged in recent months as a political player — campaigning in favour of the constitutional amendments that Egyptians have voted upon in March — as well as an organised force, as demonstrated by their deployment of followers in Imbaba. Their political rhetoric during the Imbaba dispute was shrouded in religious language, they claimed they were acting in defence of Muslim converts being withheld against their will.
Salafis also made the headlines when they took over the Nour mosque in Cairo in April — preventing the regular sheikh from giving his weekly Friday sermon. Only a muscled intervention from the army regained control of the mosque several weeks later.
With fiery declarations and the occasional display of force, the Salafis — in no way a homogenous group — are likely to remain in the public eye. Whether they become a force for destabilisation and sectarian violence remains to be seen.
Conservative politicians in the US must subscribe to a pretty standard set of talking points to pass muster with the party’s base. Big government is bad, taxes should be low, and guns are a God-given right. Lately, serious conservative candidates — including former Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich — have been lining up to establish their credibility as hardliners on a new litmus test: creeping Sharia law (and Sharia law is almost always accompanied in such political discourse by the heavily loaded adjective “creeping“). (more…)