13 Dec 2013 | News
Gay rights activists chant slogans against a Supreme Court ruling criminalising gay sex in Bangalore, India (Image: Abhishek Chinnappa/Demotix)
A furor broke out in the Indian news media and social media on December 11, 2013, as news of a Supreme Court judgment made its way through the country. The court had upheld the constitutionality of Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code, which reads: “Unnatural offences — whoever voluntarily has carnal intercourse against the order of nature with any man, woman or animal, shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.” The Penal Code is a legacy of the rule of the United Kingdom, where homosexuality was made legal in 1967.
The section had been previously challenged by Naz Foundation, a NGO that works in the area of HIV and sexual health. In 2009, the Delhi High Court had ruled that the section was in violation of Acts 21, 14 and 15 of the Constitution of India, which protect citizen’s rights to personal liberty, equality, and from being discriminated against. Some of the arguments that swayed the Court essentially reasoned that 377 has been repeatedly used to abuse gay, LBGT [lesbian, gay, bisexual & transgender] and even health workers by authority figures, and by its very existence it allowed the gay community to be targeted and ostracized by society large. The logic was that even though Section 377 only focused on the ‘act’ of unnatural carnal behavior between men, women or men and women, essentially, due to their sexual activity, it is the gay community that had been unfairly targeted by it. The Court also felt that 377 did not need to cover ‘consensual sexual acts between adults on the ground of public morality’ and nor did it distinguish between the public and private sphere. Therefore, it concluded that public morality was different from constitutional morality, which the Section was in violation of.
What followed was jubilation from gay rights activists who thought that the judgment, though limited only to Delhi, was the start of a progressive new India that would possibly champion gay rights and their freedom of expression. “Homosexuality is not a crime!” screamed the headlines in India’s most popular English magazine, bringing a smile to India’s small LGBT population of about 25,00,000 people.
However, only days later the judgment was challenged in the Supreme Court, which has given its decision only 5 years later. In a huge setback to LGBT rights, the Court has upheld Section 377 as constitutional, thereby making homosexual intercourse illegal. The reasoning of the Supreme Court of India, in a nutshell, is that the language of the Section, while may seem unfair to a certain community, certainly does not single them out. In fact, the court feels that many other non consensual situations involving the ‘act’ but different parties like young children, men and women and so on, are protected by the Section. That it is misused by authorities does not make it unconstitutional. A final nail in the coffin was the Court’s reasoning that instead of erring on the side of judicial overreach, the Court would rather wait for Parliament to legislate the Section away. Its judgment read: “After the adoption of the IPC in 1950, around 30 amendments have been made to the statute, the most recent being in 2013 which specifically deals with sexual offences, a category to which Section 377 IPC belongs. The 172nd Law Commission Report specifically recommended deletion of that section and the issue has repeatedly come up for debate. However, the Legislature has chosen not to amend the law or revisit it. This shows that Parliament, which is undisputedly the representative body of the people of India has not thought it proper to delete the provision.” It ended up saying the abuse of this Section – “used to perpetrate harassment, blackmail and torture on certain persons, especially those belonging to the LGBT community” – might be a factor for the Legislature to weigh while considering amending Section 377.
Therefore, the Supreme Court has firmly put legislating back in the corner of the legislators, and in turn earned the wrath of a section of India’s middle class. In an article titled ‘Justice Denied’, commentator Pratap Bhanu Mehta has slammed the judgment writing, “But the court does not seem to realise that hiding behind Parliament’s omissions is not a neutral stance; it upholds the constitutionality of an evil law. In the name of deference to an assortment of petitioners, it gives aid and succour to the reactionary elements of a religion rather than its best exemplars… Even if it were upheld by Parliament, it would infringe on basic rights and possibly the basic structure. The court’s job is to take a stand on constitutionality. It did not do its job on the occasion that warranted it.”
The criticisms continue. In Kafila, Siddharth Narain has presented a detailed analysis of what he considers “narrow and blindfolded interpretation of the law, ignoring the momentous changes in society and notions of morality that India is witnessing.” Further, according to Narain, “the Court also said that there were ‘only 200 persons’ prosecuted under section 377 in the last 150 years, ignoring the fact that these are 200 recorded judgments of the High Courts and Supreme Court, which is only a fraction of the unreported cases at the trial level. Further this does not take into account the impact of having the law on the statute book, and the threat of use of the law, that LGBT persons face on an every day basis.”
Even the present government has jumped into the debate. The Finance Minister, P. Chidambaram has said that, “in 2013, to say everyone should have same sexual orientation is absurd,” and that the “government should file curative petition, ask for matter to be reviewed by bench of 5 judges.” Even the Congress President, Sonia Gandhi made a statement that, “Delhi High Court had wisely removed an archaic, unjust law… I hope the Parliament will address this issue and uphold the constitutional guarantee of life and liberty to all citizens of India, including those affected by this judgment.”
However, there are those who support the Supreme Court’s decision to put the onus on the legislators. Member of Parliament Rajeev Chandrasekhar thinks that, “the issue of legalising same sex relationships is best protected by a proper law in Parliament that explicitly protects these relationships and not be based on ‘interpretative’ of an old statute! The appeal of the High court decision was filed Muslim Law board, Christian clerics and a BJP MP who have opposed this and not the judge/Supreme Court!”
Meanwhile, social media in India is abuzz with people changing their profile pictures to black in solidarity of the LGBT community also has users putting up a picture kissing someone of the same sex, with the tag #gayforaday. Protests have been arranged in New Delhi and people have already started petitions and strategies to lobby parliamentarians to amend the Section to be reflective of a modern Indian society that gives even its sexual minorities the equality and dignity they deserve.
However, the sad truth is that with elections looming, political parties including the ruling Congress Party is unlikely to take up the issue in parliament. As a DNA news report explains, “there is no consensus within the Congress, party sources said, as it is aware that a step in favour of gay rights can increase its unpopularity as most of India, especially religious groups cutting across various religions, are totally against it and see it as a sin. There is also no denying the fact that gays and lesbians have a very thin population in India and no action in their favour will hardly reflect in the elections.” As news of the Supreme Court judgment broke, various religious parties and Godmen with huge followings rejoiced. Baba Ramdev, much in the news for his massive following and political ambitions declared upon hearing the verdict that, “the court has respected sentiments of millions of Indians by declaring homosexuality a crime.”
12 Dec 2013 | Digital Freedom Reports, Europe and Central Asia, European Union, Index Reports, News, Politics and Society
As Ukraine experiences ongoing protests over lack of European integration, Index’ new report looks at the EU’s relationship with freedom of expression (Photo: Anatolii Stepanov / Demotix)
Index on Censorship’s policy paper, Time to Step Up: The EU and freedom of expression, looks at freedom of expression both within the European Union’s 28 member states, which with over 500 million people account for about a quarter of total global economic output, but also how this union defends freedom of expression in the wider world. States that are members of the European Union are supposed to share “European values”, which include a commitment to freedom of expression. However, the way these common values are put into practice vary: some of the world’s best places for free expression are within the European Union – Finland, Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden – while other countries such as Italy, Hungary, Greece and Romania lag behind new and emerging global democracies.
This paper explores freedom of expression, both at the EU level on how the Commission and institutions of the EU protect this important right, but also across the member states. Firstly, the paper will explore where the EU and its member states protect freedom of expression internally and where more needs to be done. The second section will look at how the EU projects and defends freedom of expression to partner countries and institutions. The paper will explore the institutions and instruments used by the EU and its member states to protect this fundamental right and how they have developed in recent years, as well as the impact of these institutions and instruments.
Outwardly, a commitment to freedom of expression is one of the principle characteristics of the European Union. Every European Union member state has ratified the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR); the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and has committed to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. To complement this, the Treaty of Lisbon has made the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights legally binding which means that the EU institutions and member states (if they act within the scope of the EU law) must act in compliance with the rights and principles of the Charter. The EU has also said it will accede to the ECHR. Yet, even with these commitments and this powerful framework for defending freedom of expression, has the EU in practice upheld freedom of expression evenly across the European Union and outside with third parties, and is it doing enough to protect this universal right?
Within the European Commission, there has been considerable analysis about what should be done when member states fail to abide by “European values”, Commission President Barroso raised this in his State of the Union address in September 2012, explicitly calling for “a better developed set of instruments” to deal with threats to these perceived values and the rights that accompany them. With threats to freedom of expression increasing, it is essential that this is taken up by the Commission sooner rather than later.
To date, most EU member states have failed to repeal criminal sanctions for defamation, with only Croatia, Cyprus, Ireland and the UK having done so. The parliamentary assembly of the Council of Europe called on states to repeal criminal sanctions for libel in 2007, since then little action has been taken by EU member states. There also remain significant issues in the field of privacy law and freedom of information across the EU.
While the European Commission has in the past tended to view its competencies in the field of media regulation as limited, due to the introduction of the Charter of Fundamental Rights into EU primary law, the Commission is looking at a possible enhancement of its role in this area.
With media plurality limited across Europe and in fact potentially threatened by the convergence of media across media both online and off (and the internet being the most concentrated media market), the Commission must take an early view on whether it wishes to intervene more fully in this field to uphold the values the EU has outlined. Political threats against media workers are too commonplace and risks to whistleblowers have increased as demonstrated by the lack of support given by EU member states to whistleblower Edward Snowden. That the EU and its member states have so clearly failed one of the most significant whistleblowers of our era is indicative of the scale of the challenge to freedom of expression within the European Union.
The EU and its member states have made a number of positive commitments to protect online freedom, including the EU’s positioning at WCIT, the freedom of expression guidelines and the No-Disconnect strategy helping the EU to strengthen its external polices around promoting digital freedom. These commitments have challenged top-down internet governance models, supported the multistakeholder approach, protected human rights defenders who use the internet and social media in their work, limited takedown requests, filters and others forms of censorship. But for the EU to have a strong and coherent impact at the global level, it now needs to develop a clear and comprehensive digital freedom strategy. For too long, the EU has been slow to prioritise digital rights, placing the emphasis on digital competitiveness instead. It has also been the case that positive external initiatives have been undermined by contradictory internal policies, or a contradiction of fundamental values, at the EU and member state level. The revelations made by Edward Snowden show that EU member states are violating universal human rights through mass surveillance.
The Union must ensure that member states are called upon to address their adherence to fundamental principles at the next European Council meeting. The European Council should also address concerns that external government surveillance efforts like the US National Security Agency’s Prism programme are undermining EU citizens’ rights to privacy and free expression. A comprehensive overarching digital freedom strategy would help ensure coherent EU policies and priorities on freedom of expression and further strengthen the EU’s influence on crucial debates around global internet governance and digital freedom. With the next two years of ITU negotiations crucial, it’s important the EU takes this strategy forward urgently.
While the European Commission has in the past tended to view its competencies in the field of media regulation as limited, due to the introduction of the Charter of Fundamental Rights into EU primary law, the Commission is looking at a possible enhancement of its role in this area.
With media plurality limited across Europe and in fact potentially threatened by the convergence of media across media both online and off (and the internet being the most concentrated media market), the Commission must take an early view on whether it wishes to intervene more fully in this field to uphold the values the EU has outlined.
Political threats against media workers are too commonplace and risks to whistleblowers have increased as demonstrated by the lack of support given by EU member states to whistleblower Edward Snowden. That the EU and its member states have so clearly failed one of the most significant whistleblowers of our era is indicative of the scale of the challenge to freedom of expression within the European Union.
Where the EU acts with a common approach among the member states, it has significant leverage to help promote and defend freedom of expression globally. To develop a more common approach, since the Lisbon Treaty, the EU has enhanced its set of policies, instruments and institutions to promote human rights externally, with new resources to do so. Enlargement has proved the most effective tool to promote freedom of expression with, on the whole, significant improvements in the adherence to the principles of freedom of expression in countries that have joined the EU or where enlargement is a real prospect. That this respect for human rights is a condition of accession to the EU shows that conditionality can be effective. Whereas the eastern neighbourhood has benefitted from the real prospect of accession (for some countries), in its southern neighbourhood, the EU has failed to promote freedom of expression by placing security interests first and also by failing to react quickly enough to the transitions in its southern neighbourhood following the events of the Arab Spring. The new strategy for this region is welcome and may better protect freedom of expression, but with Egypt in crisis, the EU may have acted too late. The EU must assess the effectiveness of some of its foreign policy instruments, in particular the dialogues for particular countries such as China.
The freedom of expression guidelines provide an excellent opportunity to reassess the criteria for how the EU engages with third party countries. Strong freedom of expression guidelines will allow the EU to better benchmark the effectiveness of its human rights dialogues. The guidelines will also reemphasise the importance of the EU, ensuring that the right to freedom of expression is protected within the EU and its member states. Otherwise, the ability of the EU to influence external partners will be limited.
Headline recommendations
• After recent revelations about mass state surveillance the EU must develop a roadmap that puts in place strong safeguards to ensure narrow targeted surveillance with oversight not mass population surveillance and must also recommit to protect whistle-blowers
• The European Commission needs to put in place controls so that EU directives cannot be used for the retention of data that makes mass population surveillance feasible
• The EU has expanded its powers to deal with human rights violations, but is reluctant to use these powers even during a crisis within a member state. The EU must establish clear red lines where it will act collectively to protect freedom of expression in a member state
• Defamation should be decriminalised across the EU
• The EU must not act to encourage the statutory regulation of the print media but instead promote tough independent regulation
• Politicians from across the EU must stop directly interfering in the workings of the independent media
• The EU suffers from a serious credibility gap in its near neighbourhood – the realpolitik of the past that neglected human rights must be replaced with a coherent, unified Union position on how to promote human rights
Recommendations
- The EU has expanded its powers to deal with human rights violations, but is reluctant to use these powers even during a crisis within a member state. The EU must establish clear red lines where it will act collectively to protect freedom of expression in a member state
- The EU should cut funding for member states that cross the red lines and breach their human rights commitments
Libel, privacy and insult
- Defamation should be decriminalised in line with the recommendations of the Council of Europe parliamentary assembly, and the UN and OSCE’s special rapporteurs on freedom of expression.
- Insult laws that criminalise insult to national symbols should be repealed
Freedom of information
- To better protect freedom of information, all EU member states should sign up to the Council of Europe Convention on Access to Official Documents
- Not all EU institutions, offices, bodies and agencies are acting on their freedom of information commitments. More must be done by the Commission to protect freedom of information
Media freedom & plurality
- The EU must revisit its competencies in the area of media regulation in order to prevent the most egregious breaches of the right to freedom of expression in particular the situations that arose in Italy and Hungary
- The EU must argue against statutory regulation of the print media and argue for independent self-regulation where media bandwidth is no longer limited by spectrum and other considerations
- Member states must not allow political interference or considerations of “political balance” into the workings of the media, where this happens the EU should be considered competent to act to protect media freedom and pluralism at a state level
- The EU is not doing enough to protect whistleblowers. National states must do more to protect journalists from threats of violence and intimidation
Digital
- The Commission must prepare a roadmap for collective action against mass state surveillance
- The EU is right to argue against top-down state control over internet governance it must find more natural allies for this position globally
- The Commission should proceed with a Directive that sets out the criteria takedown requests must meet and outline a process that protects anonymous whistle-blowers and intermediaries from vexatious claims
The EU and freedom of expression in the world
- The EU suffers from a credibility issue in its southern neighbourhood. To repair its standing in the wider world, the EU and its member states must not downgrade the importance of human rights in any bilateral or multilateral relationship
- The EU’s EEAS Freedom of Expression guidelines are welcome. To be effective, they need to focus on the right to freedom of expression for ordinary citizens and not just media actors
- The guidelines need to become the focus for negotiations with external countries, rather than the under-achieving human rights dialogues
- With criticism of the effectiveness of the human rights dialogues, the EU should look again at how the dialogues fit into the overall strategy of the Union and its member states
The European Union contains some of the world’s strongest defenders of freedom of expression, but also a significant number of member states who fail to meet their European and international commitments. To deal with this, in recent years, the European Union’s member states have made new commitments to better protect freedom of expression. The new competency of the European Court of Justice to uphold the values enshrined in the European Convention of Human Rights will provide a welcome alternative forum to the increasingly deluged European Court of Human Rights. This could have significant implications for freedom of expression within the EU. Internally within the EU there is still much that could be done to improve freedom of expression. It is welcome that that the EU and its member states have made a number of positive commitments to protect online freedom, with new action on vexatious takedown notices and coordinated action to protect the multistakeholder model of internet governance. Increasing Commission concern over media plurality may also be positive in the future.
Yet there are a number of areas where the EU must do more. The decriminalisation of defamation across Europe should be a focal point for European action in line with the Council of Europe’s recommendations. National insult laws should be repealed. The Commission should not intervene to increase its powers over national media regulators, but should act where it has clear competencies, in particular to prevent media monopolies and to help deal with conflict of interests between politicians and state broadcasters. Most importantly, discussions of mass population surveillance at the European Council in October must be followed by a roadmap outlining how the EU will collectively take action on this issue. Without internal reform to strengthen protections for freedom of expression, the EU will not enjoy the leverage it should to promote freedom of expression externally to partner countries. While the External Action Service freedom of expression guidelines are welcome, they must be impressed upon member countries as a benchmark for reform.
Externally, the EU has failed to deliver on the significant leverage it could have as the world’s largest trading block. Where the EU has acted in concert, with clear aims and objectives for partner countries, such as during the process of enlargement, it has had a big impact on improving and protecting freedom of expression. Elsewhere, the EU has fallen short, particularly in its southern neighbourhood and in its relationship with China, where the EU has continued human rights dialogues that have failed to be effective.
New commitments and new instruments post-Lisbon may better protect freedom of expression in the EU and externally. Yet, as the Snowden revelations show, the EU and its member states must do significantly more to deliver upon the commitments that have been agreed.
Full report PDF: Time to Step Up: The EU and freedom of expression
This article was posted on 12 Dec 2013 at indexoncensorship.org
11 Dec 2013 | Asia and Pacific, Japan, News, Politics and Society
Saul Takahashi reports for Open Democracy
(Photo illustration: Shutterstock)
As if it ever needed repeating, the people of Japan were once again treated to a reminder of how secretive and arbitrary their government can be during the nuclear disaster in Fukushima 2011. Government foot-dragging and reluctance to divulge information meant that people remained exposed to high doses of radiation for over a month after the meltdown with potentially grave health consequences. Now, what is easily the most right wing government Japan has seen in decades has forced through parliament a bill to classify “special secrets” that would essentially give the executive carte blanche to withhold information on a massive scale, not seen since the period of militarism directly leading up to, and during, World War 2.
The law, known as the Designated Secrets Bill, was hurriedly rammed throughthe more powerful lower house on 26 November, and then passed through the upper house in equally speedy fashion on 6 December. It gives unrestricted power to the executive to designate a broad range of information as national secrets. There are no effective checks or balances, no truly meaningful opportunity for the involvement of any independent body, and no effective way to ensure that the executive is not abusing its power. Only the barest of outlines of information regarding what sort of information has even been designated as secret will be disclosed to the public. The bill would violate the right of people’s right to access information, severely punish whistleblowers, and have a chilling effect on journalism, civil society organizations, and the actions of concerned citizens.
The government has repeated the mantra that the bill is necessary because Japan is a “heaven for spies” due to a lack of espionage and state secrets legal infrastructure. They would have the people believe that the government lacks the power to keep information confidential, and that Tokyo is full of foreign agents who freely collect sensitive secrets. Nothing could be further from the truth – the government already designates a wide range of information as confidential –410,000 pieces of information have been designated so since a sweeping government policy was implemented on this in 2009.
In addition, in response to a question in parliament, Prime Minister Abe admitted that the government was aware of five cases of “leaks of important information by civil servants” over the past fifteen years. Five cases over fifteen years can hardly be described as a “heaven”. The truth, as even the government admits, is that this bill is intrinsically connected with another bill adopted by parliament in November, establishing a National Security Council much along the lines of the US body by the same name. Indeed, the Secrets bill specifically provides for the sharing of designated secrets with foreign governments, who are apparently more trustworthy than Japan’s own people.
Constitutional infringement
There are four categories of information listed in the bill that could potentially qualify for designation as a secret – defense, diplomacy, “designated dangerous activities”, and prevention of terrorism – but they are worded in an extremely broad manner. Seemingly any kind of information related to defense could qualify, as well as any “important security related information” in the area of foreign relations, any information related to official efforts in the area of counter terrorism, and any information related to “activities potentially harmful to national security”. The possible designations of particular information as ‘secret’ are essentially infinite; though there is a principled maximum period of sixty years (already extremely long) stipulated in the amended bill, there are also categories of information – almost equally sweeping – which it is possible to designate secret with no time limit. The role envisioned for parliament is extremely limited, to the extent that it would most probably be meaningless.
The bill does state that, in applying the law, the government should “fully take into account” journalistic reporting “aimed at ensuring the peoples’ right to access information”. These provisions are “vague” to say the least, and appear to grant the government leeway to decide which reporting is “aimed at ensuring” this right. But punishments for the revealing of secrets are severe – up to ten years imprisonment for civil servants or persons subcontractors dealing with secrets. Persons who obtain secrets through illegal means are also subject to up to ten years imprisonment, and persons who “incite” the revealing of secrets are subject to up to five years imprisonment. Persons who reveal secrets through negligence can also be subject to imprisonment, as are persons who “incite” or conspire to divulge secrets.
It is worth pointing out that the right to access information is not only a vital element of the right to freedom of expression, but also a fundamental human right guaranteed by the Japanese constitution. Article 21 states that “freedom of…speech, press, and all other forms of expression are guaranteed” and, in accordance with developments in international law, this article has been interpreted by the Japanese courts to include the right to access information. The same article also states that the government must “refrain from violating fundamental human rights in an unreasonable manner” in applying the law, begging the question as to what “unreasonable” means in this new environment.
Even worse, article 21 goes on to say that reporting by the media will not be punished “insofar as those activities are aimed solely at ensuring the public interest and are not based on illegal or clearly unreasonable methods”. There is no definition of what the “public interest” means in this context, and just how the government will ascertain this. The government has even stated that some bloggers and other social media activists may not fall under the definition of “media” in this article, indicating that even the above pathetic safeguards would not apply.
As one could imagine, public outcry regarding the bill has been intense with near-daily demonstrations and criticism from human rights organizations, including the Japanese Bar Association, former prominent conservative MPs, academic societies, journalist societies, and prefectural and local councils. Unusually for a country that is used to being under the radar of international scrutiny, the bill was also the target of harsh criticism from human rights actors in the United Nations. The UN Human Rights Council Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression together with the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Health issued a statement criticizing the sweeping provisions of the bill, and the lack of protection for whistle blowers. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights also expressed similar concerns.
Government responses to these concerns have been a shining example of evasion, vagueness, and a condescending ‘shut up and trust us’ mentality – indeed, the fact that the government opened the bill to public comment for only two weeks, as opposed to the normal practice of a full month, shows the contempt in which it holds views it does not agree with. One NGO filed a request for the minutes of the meetings of a government panel that had discussed the provisions of the bill – minutes that date back to 2008. In an insult to the notion of government accountability, the documents the NGO was provided with were almost completely redacted, i.e. blacked out.
A new chilling effect
In one telling response to the obvious question of what would entail a “clearly unreasonable method” of reporting, Minister Masako Mori, the female Cabinet member charged by Prime Minister Abe to steer the bill through parliament seemingly for no reason other than placing a woman in front of the cameras would give the bill a ‘soft’ image, gave the example of the infamous Nishiyama case of 1972. Takichi Nishiyama, a former journalist for Mainichi Shimbun, a major Japanese broadsheet, was arrested for obtaining information from a Japanese Foreign Ministry secretary (with whom, it later came to light, he had been having an affair) regarding a secret agreement between Japan and the US surrounding the return of Okinawa to Japanese sovereignty. Though the agreement that had been made public by the two governments had stated that certain expenses totaling USD 4 million would be paid by the US, this was an outright lie, and the secret agreement specified that the costs would be footed by the Japanese.
For his efforts in exposing government deception of the people, Nishiyama was convicted in 1978 of inciting a civil servant to reveal confidential information. 30 years later, declassified US government documents confirmed Nishiyama’s allegations – and yet his name is used by the government as a good example of ‘bad’ journalism. Tellingly, Mori has declared that subjects of intense public debate, such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) economic agreement currently being negotiated behind closed doors with the United States and other countries, could be designated as secrets. And government reassurances have been unable to quell fears that with such broad provisions in the bill, important information regarding nuclear safety could be designated as secret as well.
Perhaps most important in all of this is the chilling effect that the law would have on people accessing or publishing any sort of information. With the opaque phrasing of the law persons will have no idea as to whether information they are accessing or publishing is in fact a designated secret. The Japanese Bar Association notes that, under the provisions of the bill, it is entirely plausible that people could be accused and tried without them or their lawyer being told exactly what information they are accused of having revealed. Unsurprisingly, government assurances that persons who accidentally come across or reveal secrets would not be punished are not convincing – and logic indicates that, even if they ended up not being punished, such persons would be subject to investigation.
In the early hours of 5 December, the government announced in response to mounting pressure that it would create two ‘independent’ bodies to oversee implementation of the law and ensure that there was no abuse. However, of these two bodies, only one is truly independent – a panel of legal experts which will advise the PM in creating guidelines regarding the designation of secrets, and which will receive an annual report on implementation of the law. However, it appears that the PM will only provide this panel with a simple outline stating the number of pieces of information that had been designated secret by category. Beyond that, there is no clarity as to how this panel would operate, and how much power it would actually have. It would be child’s play for the government to appoint a panel of government cronies to rubber stamp a one page note.
Calling the other body to be created “independent” is an insult to one’s intelligence. The “oversight committee for information retention” will monitor application of the law and ensure that there is no abuse, and is clearly the more powerful body of the two. However, it will be made up of undersecretaries (the highest ranking civil servants) from the Foreign and Defence Ministries – the two ministries that will undoubtedly be designating the largest number of secrets. Unsurprisingly, no one in Japan expects any kind of serious oversight from this body.
Many opposed to the bill have pointed out strikingly similar language in legislation from darker times, in particular the infamous National Defence and Public Security Act of 1941, which was used by the government to jail opponents of the war effort. The Japanese experience from those days is that government secrets lead to more government secrets, and then to war. To use a phrase the generation that remembers the 1930s often uses to describe the creeping nature of militarism – the jackboots come closer and closer.
This article was originally posted on 10 Dec 2013 at opendemocracy.net. It is reposted here with Creative Commons permission.
9 Dec 2013 | News, Religion and Culture, Russia
(Photo illustration: Shutterstock)
Olga Khvostunova of Interpreter Magazine reports on media ownership in Russia
Recent history of the Russian media shows how the media system was preconditioned by the country’s political development. In the 1990s the Russian media system underwent major transformations following the collapse of the Soviet Union. The media were introduced into new realities: the market economy, the end of ideological control of the Communist Party, political pluralism, the development of new public institutions, et al. Fascinated by the seemingly ideal Western model of the press, Russian media borrowed most of its characteristics: freedom of speech, private ownership of the media outlets, similar legislation, distance from the state, public influence, and a watchdog role.
Still, development of the new Russian media system in the direction of the Western ideal was constrained by the deeply rooted cultural and professional traditions of Russian journalism. “For centuries, journalism as a social institution in Russia has been developing free from economic considerations while the role of the economic regulator has been carried out by the state which in turn secured the paternalistic foundation in journalism… [In the 1990s] the state, while liberating the economic activity in the media, was not ready to relax control over the content. This has produced practically unsolvable tension for the media themselves trying to function both as commercial enterprises and as institutions of the society.” [Ivanitsky]. The role of the state in the Russian media system has been and remains dominant.
After the new Law on Mass Media was adopted in 1991, thus effectively establishing guarantees for independence of the media and the freedom of speech, the first stage of privatization of the media market followed. In the early 1990s, as the country was going through an acute financial crisis, state funding of the media was cut manifold, which, in its turn, led to drastic cuts in circulation numbers and staff. As some scholars note, a whole generation of Soviet journalists were forced to change profession. At the same time, numerous private media companies were created driven by the forces of the free market; many old media outlets were privatized, reformatted and re-purposed.
Despite the fact that Russian political and social institutions underwent major formal changes during the transition period, there was no systemic change in the informal practices. As the new elites were fighting for redistribution of power and economic wealth, the country’s transformation reminded more of the “democratic civic masquerade” [Gross] rather than presented real change. The “masquerade” could also be observed in the media system. Creation of formal procedures of interactions between the media and the state did not destroy traditional informal relations between journalists and officials.
As the country acquired relative political and economic stability by mid-90s, the second stage of the media privatization began under President’s Yeltsin “polycentric” political model. “Polycentric” model was based on the balance of various power centers—oligarchs, industrial-financial groups, and regional state administrations. During this period the media enjoyed relative freedom and independence from the state, however, the new owners and managers of the media enterprises used them quite instrumentally—to manufacture favorable public opinion. Both political and business elites saw the media as weapons to gain political capital. On various occasions, business elites would barter the loyalty of their privatized media for economic and political perks. As Boris Berezovsky, one of the owners of ORT (Public Russian Television, now renamed to Channel One) of the time acknowledged, he “never got financial profits from ORT… Political profits were endless, economic—none.” [Resnyanskaya].
During this period the struggle among the elite clans was often reflected in the media in the form of “black” and “grey” PR, and kompromat wars. The elites seemed to recognize the advantages of the media in this struggle and aspired for converting these advantages into concrete benefits and moves in the power play. But the media could provide even more leverage for political purposes. Election campaigns—national, regional and local—would be impossible to win without the support of the media. The struggle for political power culminated in 1996 presidential elections, in which the incumbent President Yeltsin went to the runoff with the leader of the Russian Communist Party Gennady Zyuganov. In this historical standoff, Yeltsin managed to win by a small margin.
Much of the credit for this victory is attributed to the new liberal Russian media outlets that actively endorsed the incumbent president, despite his health problems and a much publicized alcohol addiction. Among these media were NTV, Russia’s first independent TV-channel that was considered one of the most objective and highly professional television networks in 1994-96, and Kommersant, one of the first business dailies in Russia. At the time NTV was a part of MediaMost media holding owned by an influential Russian oligarch Vladimir Gusinsky; and Kommersant Daily belonged to another influential oligarch and advisor to President Yeltsin—Boris Berezovsky. Thus, the media played a crucial role in the drive of the public opinion in favor of Yeltsin and in his eventual victory.
The third stage of the evolution of the media system in Russia started with Vladimir Putin’s rise to power in 2000. The new Russian president transformed the country’s political system from “polycentric” to “monocentric” under the slogan of increasing stability and security—the issues that brought him substantial public support. By building the so-called “power vertical” Vladimir Putin eliminated all alternative political forces and established control over the government, the parliament, the judiciary, and the media system to secure stability of the new regime. In early 2000s various state agencies took financial or managerial control over 70 percent of electronic media outlets, 80 percent of the regional press, and 20 percent of the national press [Vartanova]. As a result, Russian media continued to be used as tools of political control but now these “tools” were no longer distributed among competing political parties and businesses, but remained concentrated in the hands of a closed political circle that swore loyalty to President Putin.
Overall, during this period the political discourse in Russia deteriorated, and the public debate in the media was either substituted by the imitative forms1 or squeezed out from the popular media outlets, such as television and dailies with large circulation, to the publications with much smaller readership, like Novaya Gazeta, or to the internet. Under the pressure from the new Kremlin’s elite, in 2001 Boris Berezovsky was forced to sell his share of ORT to Roman Abramovich, another Russian oligarch, who claimed his loyalty to Vladimir Putin. The symbolic culmination of the new elite’s war for media control was the government’s takeover of MediaMost holding (its most valuable asset was NTV) in 2002 by Gazprom Media—a subsidiary of Gazprom, the largest state-owned corporation in Russia.
At the same time, during this period, Russian media became an integral part of the global media community following the process of global convergence and homogenization. “While the media were exercising its policies to make TV less politically engaged, the advertising and media business easily filled ‘empty’ niches of political programming with entertainment content.” [Vartanova] Under the new conditions of the monocentric political system, it was a natural process: the state enjoyed the benefits of controlling the political discourse, and the media welcomed financial inflow from the booming advertising industry in Russia.
One of the key characteristics of Russia’s political system under Vladimir Putin’s rule is informal subjecting of the legislative and judicial branches of power to the executive branch, controlled by the President. This hierarchy helped the President to achieve his goal—to establish control over the entire political process, eliminate possible risks of competition, and restructure the system of checks and balances. By silencing a group of powerful non-conforming businessmen2, Vladimir Putin sent a clear message to the business community to distance themselves from politics and thus established control over corporate Russia. From now on, only those who complied with his political line and demonstrated loyalty and support were allowed to continue their business as usual.
The state learned to utilize a wide selection of political, economic and legal tools to put pressure on and intimidate the media [Vartanova]. Some of them are:
- providing personal privileges or access to closed sources of information; preferential treatment for certain media outlets and journalists;
- acquiring state ownership in media outlets or establishing indirect control through ownership by private companies whose owners are loyal to the state;
- banning access to official events and press conferences, refusal to provide requested information;
- bringing legal suits against media outlets and journalists on the grounds of defamation, libel, et al.;
- penalizing the media and suspending the license;
- using legal sanctions, such as tax or customs legislation, fire safety and sanitary regulation.
Application of these techniques transformed Russian media system into a restricted homogenous field, where only state-controlled media outlets were allowed to operate on the national scale. The regime allowed for limited operations of the independent media (the press and the internet media) to absorb the protest mood3.
Because of the constrained political environment, Russian media were unable to resist the pressure from the state and succumbed to the well-known propaganda and conformism pattern according to which they’ve been operating in the Soviet times. The period of the relative freedom of press ended with Vladimir Putin ascension to power, it was too short for the Russian media to become a strong democratic institution and a watchdog.
It is noteworthy that today’s situation differs from the Soviet times. Russia is no longer a closed country, Russian media are exposed to the free flow of information and the developments of the global media market, and Russian journalists are aware of the media’s role in the free world. Therefore, by choosing to serve as propaganda tools to receive benefits from the state, by abandoning their public duty to report the truth, the majority of the media voluntarily chose to engage in corrupt practices.
Deterioration of the public political discourse is a direct result of the lack of political pluralism and competition. As it happens in all closed regimes, political discourse in Russia transformed from an open political communication into the state’s narrative. As a result, the content of political discourse became flat and dull.
Considering general disillusionment of the Russian citizens in politics and in their own abilities to influence political process or bring about change, public interest shifted from politics to the entertainment segment, which drives the expansion of the entertainment segment. Another reason for this expansion is commercialization of the global media market driven by advertising industry and aimed at stimulating consumption. As mentioned above, the diminishing political discourse created an information vacuum in Russia that, with lack of other alternatives, had been filled with entertainment content. Eventually, this process led to tabloidization of the media and the prevail of the popular media formats that appeal primarily to the mass audience.
Russian Media MARKET and the Global Trends
The outlook of the Russian media market provides an insight into the type of information Russian media produce and the public consumes. It shows that entertainment content has filled the empty niche of the political programming. At the same time, while political and investigative journalism is declining in Russia, Russian media market is booming due to the high inflow of advertising money. Today, Russia ranks ninth in the top-10 media markets in the world, and in 2013 its market growth rate is estimated to be at 12 percent—the highest rate across the top ten media markets (see Table 1).
Table 1. Top-10 Media Markets
-
|
Ranking
(2013, est.)
|
Country
|
Growth Rate
(2012*)
|
Growth Rate
(2012**)
|
|
1
|
United States
|
+4%
|
+3%
|
|
2
|
China
|
+6%
|
+7%
|
|
3
|
Japan
|
+3%
|
+3%
|
|
4
|
United Kingdom
|
+4%
|
+3%
|
|
5
|
Germany
|
-1%
|
0%
|
|
6
|
Australia
|
-1%
|
+1%
|
|
7
|
Brazil
|
+13%
|
+9%
|
|
8
|
France
|
-4%
|
0%
|
|
9
|
Russia
|
+13%
|
+12%
|
|
10
|
Italy
|
-12%
|
-5%
|
Source: Aegis Global Report.
* Compared to 2011; ** Compared to 2012.
According to Aegis Global Report, the high growth rate of the Russian media market is driven by the growth of the advertising market, especially in the premium sector (companies with the annual advertising budget of more than 3 billion rubles, or ~$100,000). Industries, such as medicine and IT, have demonstrated the highest growth of 18 and 13 percent respectively. The 2014 Sochi Olympic Games is expected to give the market an additional boost next year.
Television
The ownership structure of the Russian media market shows that the national media outlets with the highest audience reach are controlled by the state, primarily—television.
Television in Russia is the leading source of information. 99 percent of Russian households have at least one TV-set, and about 94 percent of Russians watch TV on a daily basis [Vartanova]. The core of the TV market consists of 19 federal channels available to more than 50 percent of population. The top-five channels by the audience reach are: Perviy Kanal (Channel One), Rossiya 1, NTV, TNT and Pyatiy Kanal (Channel 5).
Russian television is a mixture of two models—one is state-controlled (major TV channels are either owned by the state or by businessmen and companies loyal to the state); the other model is purely commercial—it provides entertainment content. Regardless of the ownership structure, Russian television is mostly financed through advertising and sponsorship [Vartanova].
The chart below shows that the three main channels—Perviy Kanal (Channel One), Rossiya 1 and NTV—have the highest audience reach: 14.2 percent, 13.7 percent, and 13.5 percent respectively.
All three TV channels are controlled by the state: the majority share of Channel One belongs to Rosimuschestvo (the Federal Agency for State Property Management). Other shareholders include National Media Group (controlled by the structures of Yuri Kovalchuk, Chairman of the Board of Rossiya Bank, one of the largest banks in Russia, and Vladimir Putin’s personal friend; and Roman Abramovich, owner of Chelsea football club and Putin’s ally). Rossiya 2 is a part of VGTRK (All-Russia State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company) which is owned by Rosimushchestvo. NTV is also controlled by the state through Gazprom Media. TNT and Pyatiy Kanal that come respectively fourth and fifth in the top TV channels by audience reach, are also controlled by the state. TNT belongs to Gazprom Media, while Channel 5 is controlled by National Media Group.
Top TV Channels Audience Reach, 2012-2013
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Print Press
According to the recent Report of the Russian Guild of Press Publishers, the total circulation of print media outlets in Russia is around 7.8 billion copies, including 2.7 billion copies of national dailies, 2.6 billion—of regional copies, and 2.5 billion—of local press copies. Similar to the television segment, the press market is divided between the two media models: quality dailies and weeklies that are mostly business oriented and have relatively small readership; and popular newspapers and magazines that are inclined to tabloidization.
For the last five years, the share of print press has been steadily decreasing. In the first half of 2013, the circulation of national newspapers and magazines went down by 7.5 percent, while its market share shrank by 6 percent. The main reasons for that were the recession following the 2008 financial crisis, growth of the share of internet media, ban of advertising alcohol beverages (since January, 2013) and the expected ban of advertising tobacco products (projected to come into force in 2014). Tobacco and alcohol companies were among the major contributors in the print market profits.
The structure of the print press market is much more diverse in terms of ownership, but publications with entertainment content, glossy fashion magazines, tabloids, et al. are dominating the market.
The results of 2012 TNS survey on the audience reach of the Russian publications presented in Table 2 reveal a number of current trends: 1) the newspaper with the largest audience reach in Russia is a classified daily (Iz Ruk v Ruki); 2) it is followed by Metro—a freesheet daily intended primarily for commuters; 3) the third is Rossiyskaya Gazeta, an official source of political information provided by the state; owned by Rosimushchestvo; 4) out of top ten outlets, only two newspapers provide quality political/business content—Kommersant (8th) and Vedomosti (9th), while other newspapers cover entertainment sector.
It is noteworthy that Izvestia, a well-known, respected Soviet brand, was acquired by the National Media Group in 2011. The new owners pronounced it to become a state-controlled competitor of Kommersant and Vedomosti. Izvestia covers Russian politics, but as one of its owners and editor-in-chief Aram Gabrelyanov told in an interview,4 his newspaper has three forbidden topics: the president, the prime minister, and the patriarch. Another detail that needs to be mentioned is that even though Kommersant gained its reputation of the first independent quality daily in Russia, in 2006 it was acquired by Alisher Usmanov, head of Metallinvest Management Company. Mr Usmanov was ranked 1st in the Forbes’ Top-200 Richest Businessmen in Russia in 2013, and openly supports Vladimir Putin. In the context of the Russian political system, such ownership suggests that Kommersant’s coverage of politically sensitive issues can be managed by application of the so-called “administrative resource,” a.k.a. pressure from the Kremlin.
Table 2. Top Dailies in terms of Audience Reach* (All-Russia)
|
Newspaper |
Audience Reach (thousands of people)
|
%
|
| 1 |
Iz Ruk v Ruki (From Hand to Hand) |
3242.9
|
5.4
|
| 2 |
Metro |
1932.1
|
3.2
|
| 3 |
Rossiyskaya Gazeta |
1060.3
|
1.8
|
| 4 |
Moskovsky Komsomolets |
1048.1
|
1.7
|
| 5 |
Sport-Express |
523.9
|
0.9
|
| 6 |
Sovietsky Sport |
418.9
|
0.7
|
| 7 |
Izvestia |
334.9
|
0.6
|
| 8 |
Kommersant |
219.9
|
0.4
|
| 9 |
Trud (Labor) |
196.9
|
0.3
|
| 10 |
Vedomosti |
134.6
|
0.2
|
Source: TNS Russia, NRS, 2012
* Komsomolskaya Pravda did not participate in this survey, but according to the public data, its daily circulation is around 655,000 copies, Friday edition—2.7 million.
Table 3 provides evidence that the Russian readers lack interest in political issues. All top ten weeklies with the largest audience reach in Russia are popular publications with mass appeal (i.e. Argumenty i Fakty, Komsomolskaya Pravda, Moya Semiya) and tabloids (i.e. Zhizn, Express Gazeta). Weeklies that provide serious analysis of the current political issues are scarce on the market. Few examples are Kommersant-Vlast, Expert, and the New Times, but the first two magazines are owned by the oligarchs who openly support the President. Kommersant-Vlast is produced by Kommersant Publishing House that, as mentioned above, is owned by Alisher Usmanov. Expert is a part of Expert Media Holding that is owned by Oleg Deripaska’s Basic Element and a Russian state corporation—Vnesheconombank.
Table 3. Top Weeklies in terms of Audience Reach* (All-Russia)
|
Newspaper |
Audience Reach (thousands of people)
|
%
|
| 1 |
Argumenty i Fakty (Arguments and Facts) |
6389.3
|
10.6
|
| 2 |
Komsomolskaya Pravda |
5287.1
|
8.8
|
| 3 |
Teleprogramma |
4890.1
|
8.1
|
| 4 |
777 |
4399.0
|
7.3
|
| 5 |
Orakul (Oracle) |
2230.7
|
3.7
|
| 6 |
Moya Semiya (My Family) |
1806.0
|
3.0
|
| 7 |
Moskovsky Komsomolets (MK + TV) |
1744.6
|
2.9
|
| 8 |
Zhizn (Life) |
1710.1
|
2.8
|
| 9 |
MK Region |
1532.2
|
2.5
|
| 10 |
Express Gazeta |
1250.4
|
2.1
|
Source: TNS Russia, NRS, 2012
At the same time the audience preferences across Russia differ from those of the population of the large cities. Table 4 shows this difference for Moscow audience. Moskovsky Komsomolets is the second most popular newspaper in Moscow. Even though the newspaper has a mass media appeal and tends to tabloidization, sometimes it publishes sharp political commentaries. The newspaper is owned by its editor-in-chief Pavel Gusev, who also holds several official positions, such as head of the Moscow Union of Journalists, member of the Presidential Human Rights Council, and member of the Russian Public Chamber. Still, private ownership of the newspaper allows for certain freedom in terms of political discourse.
Another difference is that Novaya Gazeta appears eighth in the top ten most popular newspapers in Moscow. Novaya Gazeta is one of the very few newspapers on the market that produces high standard pieces of investigative journalism. It is owned by the members of the editorial board; minority shares belong to Russian businessman Alexander Lebedev and former Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev.
Table 4. Top Dailies in terms of Audience Reach* (Moscow)
|
Newspaper |
Audience Reach (thousands of people)
|
%
|
| 1 |
Metro |
1164.1
|
11.6
|
| 2 |
Moskovsky Komsomolets |
685.8
|
6.8
|
| 3 |
Rossiyskaya Gazeta |
210.5
|
2.1
|
| 4 |
Sport-Express |
171.8
|
1.7
|
| 5 |
Sovietsky Sport |
167.5
|
1.7
|
| 6 |
Iz Ruk v Ruki |
138.9
|
1.4
|
| 7 |
Izvestia |
119.2
|
1.2
|
| 8 |
Novaya Gazeta |
112.1
|
1.1
|
| 9 |
Kommersant |
110.4
|
1.1
|
| 10 |
Vedomosti |
91.7
|
0.9
|
Source: TNS Russia, NRS, 2012
Radio
Radio is the growing segment of the Russian media market. According to Vartanova, the main reasons for the increase in number of the radio stations are advancements in broadcasting of commercial music, and fragmentation of the audience. Aegis Global Report shows that in 2012 radio segment of the advertising market in Russia increased by 23 percent, but in the first half of 2013 the growth slowed down to 14 percent.
The majority of the Russian radio stations broadcast music and entertainment content. According to 2012 VTsIOM survey, Russkoye Radio is the most popular radio station in Russia, followed by Europa Plus and Autoradio. Out of 15 radio stations that are listed in the ranking, only three broadcast political talk shows: Mayak, Radio Rossiya, and Ekho Moskvy. Mayak and Radio Rossiya are state-owned (Rosimushchestvo), while Ekho Moskvy is owned by Gazprom Media. Still, Ekho Mosvky allows for members of opposition to participate in some its programs and to voice criticisms of the regime.
Table 5. Most Popular Radio Stations
| # |
Radio Station |
Audience Reach
|
| 1 |
Russkoye Radio (Russian Radio) |
14%
|
| 2 |
Europa Plus |
11%
|
| 3 |
Avtoradio |
10%
|
| 4 |
Mayak |
9%
|
| 5 |
Radio Shanson |
8%
|
| 6 |
Radio Rossiya |
7%
|
| 7 |
Dorozhnoye Radio (Road Radio) |
5%
|
| 8 |
Radio Dacha |
4%
|
| 8 |
Retro FM |
4%
|
| 9 |
Hit FM |
3%
|
| 9 |
Dynamite FM |
3%
|
| 9 |
Yumor FM (Humor FM) |
3%
|
| 10 |
Ekho Moskvy |
2%
|
| 10 |
Love Radio |
2%
|
| 10 |
Militseyskaya Volna (Police Wave) |
2%
|
Source: WTsIOM, 2012
Internet
Internet market in Russia shows extremely positive dynamic. In the first half of 2013, internet advertising grew by 30 percent, which is the highest increase across all media.
As the chart below shows, the increase of the internet share has been quite dramatic. In 2007, the share of internet of the Russian media market did not exceed 3 percent, while by 2012 it has amounted to 19 percent. Over the same period, the share of the print press dropped by 9 percent, and radio—by 3 percent, while the share of television decreased by 1 percent.
Structural Change of the Russian Media Market (market percentage)
Source: Aegis Global Report.
However, it’s noteworthy that the share of internet grows not only because new users acquire access to the internet, but also because of the increase in the number of connection points. Today, every fourth internet user in Russia has three or more devices connecting them to the internet. Meanwhile, the number of Russian citizen who have access to internet hardly exceeds 50 percent5. But as shown at the chart below, the average daily reach of popular Russian internet resources (Yandex, Mail.ru, Vk.com) is actually higher than that of Perviy Kanal.
Source: Aegis Global Report
Table 6 shows the most popular websites of the Russian internet (RuNet) by their audience reach. Yandex tops the list, being the most popular Russian search engine and accumulating 34 websites on its platform. Yandex’s primary competitor Mail.ru comes third, but two other websites of the Mail.ru Group (odnoklassniki.ru and Moi Mir) are rated fifth and sixth.
Popular internet media (as opposed to internet search engines and social media) are at the bottom of the Top-15 list. Rbc.ru and Qip.ru belong to a privately owned RBC Holding, while Ria.ru is an internet platform of RIA Novosti, a state-owned news agency. Kp.ru is a part of Komsomolskaya Pravda Holding is owned by ESN Group, associated with a state transportation company—Russian Railways.
Table 6. RuNet’s Most Popular Internet Websites
|
Website |
Operator |
Monthly Audience Reach* (thousands visits) |
| 1 |
Yandex.ru |
Yandex |
29166.2
|
| 2 |
Vk.com |
VKontakte |
29143.3
|
| 3 |
Mail.ru |
Mail.ru Group |
27065.2
|
| 4 |
Google (ru + com) |
Google |
26036.4
|
| 5 |
Odnoklassniki.ru |
Mail.ru Group |
25264.9
|
| 6 |
Moi Mir (my.mail.ru) |
Mail.ru Group |
22830.5
|
| 7 |
LiveJournal.com |
SUP Media |
16139.4
|
| 8 |
Rutube.com |
RuTube |
15096.5
|
| 9 |
Avito.ru |
AVITO |
14552.8
|
| 10 |
Liveinternet.ru |
Klimenko & Co |
11290.8
|
| 11 |
Kinipoisk.ru |
Kinopoisk |
10634.3
|
| 12 |
Rbc.ru |
RBC Holding |
9995.7
|
| 13 |
Qip.ru |
RBC Holding |
9709.4
|
| 14 |
Ria.ru |
RIA Novosti |
9106.6
|
| 15 |
Kp.ru |
Komsomolskaya Pravda |
8823.7
|
Sources: TNS, Tasscom, March 2012
Today, Russian internet is quite diverse in terms of forms of ownership, which allows for greater freedom of expression and variety of information sources.
This article was originally posted on 6 Dec 2013 at interpretermag.com and is reposted here with permission.
Footnotes:
