Who nominated Vladimir Putin for the Nobel Peace Prize?

Press briefing after the talks between Putin and Merkel - Berlin

There was much raising of eyebrows yesterday when it was announced that Russia’s “International Academy of Spiritual Unity and Cooperation” are putting forward Vladimir Putin as a Nobel Peace Prize nominee. But who are the International Academy of Spiritual Unity and Cooperation.

A source suggests to Index that they are “a typical pseudo cultural organisation” that gets budgets for loyalty to Putin and is ruled by ex-Soviet nomenclature. But judging by this list of presidents, vice presidents, and Heroes of the USSR, they are very, very important people indeed. (Source)

Composition of the Management Board and the Academy
The President
Trepeznikov Shilov

First Vice-President
Gennady Zgersky,

First Vice-President
Alexander Leonidovich Manilow

First Vice-President
Topchiy Sergei Stepanovich

First Vice-President
Paul P. Petrik,

First Vice-President
Taras Shamba Myronovych,

The first vice-president
Sergei K. Kamkov.

Vice – President
Viktor Gorbatko – twice Hero of the Soviet Union (astronaut), B

Vice – President
Mikhail Tikhomirov – Advisor to the President of the Russian Olympic Committee

Vice – President
Aliyev Phase Gamzatovna folk poet of Dagestan,

Vice – President
Sergey Makarov

Vice – President
Malik – Ohanjanian Rafael Gegamovich – Branch Manager in Armenia

Vice – President
Todash Guinn, Head of the Representation in Japan

Vice – President
Yankovskaya Ludmila – Head of Representation in Ukraine

Vice – President
Bishop Vissarion – Head of Mission in Abkhazia, head of the Orthodox Church in Abkhazia,

Vice – President
Stoyan Topalov – Head of Representation in Bulgaria

Members of the Presidium

Sergei Shamba Tarasovich – Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Abkhazia.
Glebov Vladimir Vladimirovich – Academician of the Academy of Architecture.
Dadaev Gadzhievich Felix – People’s Artist of the USSR.
Antoshkin Nicholas T. – Hero of the Soviet Union.
Bepko Yegorov – Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary (MFA).
Yuri Dubinin – Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary (MFA).
Primakov Yevgeny Primakov – Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary (MFA), President of the Chamber of Commerce of the Russian Federation.
Peter A. Makarov – Project Manager CNNS Russia.
Kabzon Iosif Davidovich – People’s Artist of the USSR.
Rogozhkin Nicholas E. – Deputy. Minister for the Interior Ministry, Interior Troops Commander of the Russian Federation.
Ivan Sergeyev – Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary (MFA).
Alexander Golubev Titovich – Chairman of the RAF veterans’ organization.
Kuz’kina Galina – a journalist, deputy. chief editor of the magazine “Our Power.”
Valentin A. Prikhodko – gene. Director of the “Pride of Russia”.
Sergei Baburin, rector of the institute.
Novozhylov Valery Yu – Major – General of the Russian Federation Ministry of Internal Affairs of explosives.
Zalikhanov Michael Chukkaevich – Hero of the Soviet Union, deputy of the State. Duma
Samvel Samvel Grigoryan – Academician of the AHP.
Valentina Tereshkova – the pilot – cosmonaut.
Arthur N. Chilingarov – the hero of the Soviet Union, Hero of the Russian Federation, the deputy of the State. Duma.
Mesenzhnik Jacob Z. – Academician of the Academy of science and business.
Mikhail Vinogradov – Head of Federal Agency for Industry.
Aydarov Letcho Ayubovich – gene. manager of the “Larakas” in Moscow.

Is Vladimir Putin changing his tune on human rights?

Press briefing after the talks between Putin and Merkel - Berlin

Image Gonçalo Silva/Demotix

Russian president Vladimir Putin hit the headlines around the world after an interview with the Russian First Channel and the Associated Press on 4 September. His statements on Syria were given much attention, with early reports saying it meant Russia might support military intervention. In fact, Putin did not state that clearly, but pegged it to “conclusive evidence of the use of chemical weapons” by the Assad regime.

Close consideration of Putin’s recent public statements shows the same approach applied to other topics, including several human rights issues that Russia has been criticised about lately. Despite a noticeable change of the tone he prefers to give vague comments rather than well-articulated attitudes.

For instance, his reply to criticism on the law that bans “homosexual propaganda” was aimed to show Putin is tolerant to representatives of LGBT community, all the while referring to them as “such people”.

“I work with such people; sometimes I award them with medals and orders, we have absolutely normal relations, and I see nothing special about it,” said Putin in the interview without going into details on who “such people” are and what kind of “work” with Russia’s president they are involved in.

The same seemingly pleasant, but otherwise void impression was given by Putin during his meeting with a presidential Council on Development of Civil Society and Human Rights. During the meeting on 4 September Vladimir Putin put aside his macho-style image of a firm ruler.

“He suddenly appeared to be a different person, a constructive and attentive politician who is open to ideas and ready to consider them,” Andrey Yurov, a Russian human rights defender who is a member of the Council told Index. “He was listening carefully to suggestions about reforming of penal and judiciary systems, adjustments to internet regulations and public control of the state bodies, and reacted with comments like ‘Oh, this is interesting’, ‘We really need to look into that’ or ‘We might need to create a working group on this’. He did not say ‘yes, we will definitely do it’ to any of our suggestions, but at least he did not say a firm ‘no, we won’t do it’ to anything.”

Vladimir Putin even admitted the notorious NGO “foreign agents” law might need to be re-assessed. The law, adopted a year ago, forced all non-governmental organisations that receive funds from abroad to register as “foreign agents” if they are involved in “political activities”. The problem with the law, as many experts and civil society groups have pointed out, is its extremely broad definition of what constitutes a political activity. During the meeting with human rights defenders President Putin said it might be re-defined and narrowed.

“It is difficult to say if it marks a reboot of an attitude of the state towards the civil society and whether any real steps are to follow. But it was a constructive conversation between a rational politician and civil society. Perhaps it has to do with the G20 summit in St. Petersburg; Putin needs to show he is an open leader and he is in touch with civil society of his country,” recons Andrey Yurov.

Yury Dzibladze, the president of the Centre for the Development of Democracy and Human Rights, does not believe Putin’s statement signal any change.

“There are no signs of real improvement of the situation with human rights and civic freedoms inside the country. Criminal cases against political opponents are on-going; inspections of NGOs in line with the ‘foreign agents’ law continue. The rhetoric might change, but it only means the authorities want to improve their image abroad, not alter the situation in Russia itself. It might be connected with the G20 summit and up-coming winter Olympics they do not want foreign politicians to boycott,” said Yuri Dzhibladze.

Russia: Rolling back free expression

(Photo illustration: Shutterstock)

(Photo illustration: Shutterstock)

The situation for freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and association in Russia has deteriorated since the re-election of Vladimir Putin in March 2012. The main issues of concern are  repression against Russian NGOs, strict anti-blasphemy laws, increasing limits on digital freedom, the banning of “homosexual propaganda” and the re-criminalisation of libel.

Amendments to the law on Non-Governmental Organisations, adopted in July 2012, forced all NGOs that receive funds from abroad to register as “foreign agents” (a highly charged phrase, synonymous with “spy”) if they are involved in “political activities”, the latter term being very broadly defined. During March 2013, dozens of NGOs in Russia were inspected to determine whether their activities comply with current legislation. This potentially endangers the activities of NGOs in Russia including those working on freedom of expression and human rights groups.

Freedom of religious expression has been compromised through anti-extremism legislation that allows selective implementation of its ambiguous definitions. An anti-blasphemy law that provides for prison terms or fines for offending religious feeling was passed by Russia’s parliament in April 2013.

The attitude of the authorities to whistle-blowers has been highlighted through the authorities’ posthumously trial of lawyer Sergei Magnitsky. Magnitsky investigated cases of corruption among high-ranking Russian officials; he died in prison in 2009 in pre-trial detention and no one has ever been charged with his death.

Freedom of expression in the LGBT community has been restricted after the State Duma adopted a law prohibiting the promotion of homosexuality. Similar laws were previously introduced at the regional level in 11 administrative entities of the Russian Federation, including the second largest city St. Petersburg.

Media Freedom

Russia continues to be one of the most dangerous countries in the world for journalists. According to the Committee to Protect Journalists, 54 reporters have been killed in Russia since 1992, with 16 cases still unsolved. Impunity remains a significant problem for journalists: on-going threats of violence are rarely investigated properly by the authorities. The killers of Natalia Estemirova, Abdulmalik Akhmedilov, Khadzhimurad Kamalov and other prominent investigative reporters have never been prosecuted; nor have the organisers of Anna Politkovskaya’s murder.

In July 2012, criminal libel was reintroduced by the State Duma into the criminal code after being decriminalized in November 2011. Defamation laws are used to silence the press. Dmitry Muratov, the editor-in-chief of Novaya Gazeta, says courts are used as a censorship instrument in Russia. His newspaper lost three libel appeals in just one week in November 2011, all issued by the Department of Presidential Affairs after they published investigative journalism into federal budget spending.

Other legislative challenges to media freedom in Russia include a law on high treason that endangers Russian journalists who work for the international media, as it prohibits providing information to foreign countries, and a law that forbids the media from using obscene words. Another draft law will classify media outlets that receive more than 50 per cent of their revenues from abroad as “foreign agents”.

The genuine diversity of media ownership in Russia is questionable. Opinion polls by the Levada Centre show that 69 per cent of Russian citizens consider the three state-owned TV channels to be the primary source of their information. Most of the other national media outlets are either co-owned by the state, or belong to oligarchs who have relationships with the Kremlin. Several top managers and editors recently were fired or resigned from their positions in Kommersant and Gazeta.ru in protest against their owners’ intrusion into editorial policies. Several independent online publications critical of the authorities were closed down by their owners.

The lack of independent political and investigative reporting is not likely to be rectified by the launch of a new channel “Public Television of Russia”, scheduled for May 2013. While the new channel has been described as a public service broadcaster “equally independent from the state and advertising”, it will in fact rely on government funding. Furthermore, its CEO is appointed directly by the President of Russia, casting further doubts over its editorial independence.

Digital Freedom

As internet use grows in Russia, the authorities have introduced new restrictive laws that challenge free expression online and allow filtering and blocking of content. Federal Law No. 139-FZ, adopted in July 2012 created a blacklist of sites with “harmful” information under a pretext of child protection. The law suggested broad and ambiguous definitions that allow extrajudicial censorship of online content. Roskomnadzor, a dedicated state agency, compiles a black list of web-pages that contain child pornography, “extremist materials” and information on suicide or drug use. ISPs are obliged by the law to block all the blacklisted web-pages.

Extensive online censorship is accompanied by surveillance of Russians’ online activities. SORM, a nation-wide surveillance system, operated with Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) technology, allows the state security force not only to control, but even to intrude into the internet traffic of any internet user in Russia without any special permit or court decision.

There was a series of cyber-attacks on the websites of independent Russian media outlets, such as Kommersant, Ekho Moskvy, Bolshoi Gorod, Dozhd’ TV and Slon.ru, during the street protests in May 2012. No one has been prosecuted for these attacks.

Artistic Freedom

As the authorities of the country try to increase its electoral support among more conservative layers of society, they rely more on support of the Russian Orthodox Church. Increasingly close political relationships between  the state and the church account for much of the  persecution of artists and censorship of arts on grounds of “protecting of traditional values”. One of the recent draft laws, adopted by the parliament in the first reading, provides for five years in prison for “insulting believers’ feelings”. Reports talk about increasing self-censorship among artists; several cases of prosecution were noted as well.

In August 2012 Nadezhda Tolokonnikova, Maria Alekhina, and Ekaterina Samutsevich, members of punk group Pussy Riot, were each sentenced to two years imprisonment for organising a “punk prayer” in the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour in Moscow. Despite the group claiming their performance was an artistic act of political protest against President Putin’s regime, they were found guilty of “hooliganism motivated by religious hatred.” In October 2012, Samutsevich was released on probation, but sentences against the other two members of the band were upheld.

Anti-extremist laws and articles of the Criminal Code relating to incitement to religious hatred have long been used for censorship of art in Russia. In July 2010 art curators Andrei Erofeev and Yuri Samodurov were fined for organising the Forbidden Art 2006 exhibition in Moscow, after several of the works were claimed by prosecutors to “incite hatred” and “denigrate human dignity.” In December 2012, prosecutors in St Petersburg launched an investigation into an exhibition by British artists Jake and Dinos Chapman after visitors complained it was “blasphemous” and “extremist” for featuring images of a crucified Ronald McDonald and Nazi symbolism.

This article was originally published on 20 Aug, 2013 at indexoncensorship.org. Index on Censorship: The voice of free expression

Europe divided over mass surveillance?

There have been some sharply contrasting political reactions to the US and UK’s mass surveillance programmes in European countries in recent days. Could the US perhaps play divide and rule in managing the fallout from Snowden’s revelations in Europe? Or is there enough common ground between German, UK or even Russian politicians to push for real changes in US (and UK and French) snooping?

(Photo: Gonçalo Silva / Demotix)

(Photo: Gonçalo Silva / Demotix)

At first glance, it seems the issue is being damped down in the UK in contrast to angry and sustained political debate in Germany, and a more nationalist and opportunistic response by Russian politicians.

Last week British MPs on parliament’s intelligence and security committee confirmed that GCHQ, the UK’s signals intelligence HQ, had indeed obtained intelligence from the US Prism programme. But they concluded, remarkably quickly (no long investigation here), that allegations of law-breaking were “unfounded”. Whether the MPs are right or not, their report in fact only concerns part of Prism – the ‘content’ data GCHQ accessed and not the reams of metadata which can be equally or more revealing about individuals’ activities; and it doesn’t touch at all on the so-called Tempora programme by which, according to Snowden, the UK has been accessing massive amounts of data, by tapping into underwater cables, on a scale that goes beyond even US activities.

Meanwhile in Berlin last week, German politicians on the Bundestag’s control committee – were demanding answers on the NSA revelations from interior minister Hans-Peter Friedrich, who admitted he was still trying to get enough information out of the US on the reach of American surveillance. The following day, German journalists grilled Chancellor Angela Merkel’s spokesman for an hour and half about what the German government and security services already knew about US snooping, and how they will stop it.

Merkel has called on Obama to respect German laws though adding, rather curiously, “on German territory” – snooping on Germans on servers in the US or as their communications pass through underwater cables are side-lined by this emphasis. Merkel is also pushing for action at EU level, promising she will demand much tougher EU data protection laws – due to be agreed in the coming months. Germany’s political response seems in a much higher gear than in the UK.

Over in Moscow, some Russian MPs too are emphasising safeguards to protect personal data from US snooping. But with demands for big companies like Google and Facebook to respect Russian laws and pass on user data when requested (just as they have been in the US), this is not a sudden shift to political support for digital freedom in Russia. It is simple political opportunism taking full advantage of the NSA’s activities and revelations to reinforce Russia’s determined attempts domestically and internationally to control, monitor and impede a free and open internet.

But German, British or EU criticism of Russia’s attacks on digital freedom will be ignored and labelled hypocritical unless there is a much stronger condemnation of mass surveillance from European leaders and action to limit future abuses. Nor is this simply about whether intelligence services are operating within the law (and whose laws) important though that is. It is about ensuring laws do not allow the sort of mass surveillance domestically and internationally that the NSA, GCHQ – and it would seem France too – have been carrying out.

Here the report from the MPs on the British intelligence and security committee potentially opens up a vital debate. Incautious language, the MPs say that existing legislation is “expressed in general terms” and that GCHQ itself was right to put more detailed practices into place to ensure compliance with UK human rights law.  Crucially, though a studied understatement, they say that the “complex interaction” between UK human rights laws and security laws needs further consideration – and commit the security committee to investigate further.

So more digging will happen in the UK, in Germany – and too at EU level thanks to the efforts of the European Parliament.

But the UK is clearly as complicit as the US in mass surveillance. And there is growing and sharper questioning in Germany of how much the government and the security services previously knew about US and UK snooping.

So where new revelations and investigations will take European countries in the coming weeks is an open question. And whether we will see a united defence of digital freedom in Europe and an end to mass surveillance is at best unclear for now and, more probably, highly unlikely.

Kirsty Hughes is the CEO of Index on Censorship. She tweets @Kirsty_Index

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