17 May 2018 | Events
[vc_row][vc_column][vc_single_image image=”100419″ img_size=”full”][vc_column_text]Celebrate daring artists who stage Shakespeare expressly to challenge political authority.
Shakespeare’s texts have been used time and again to bypass censorship and challenge authority. This panel discussion celebrates the daring of radical theatre makers across the world, who have performed Shakespeare and created work expressly for the purpose of holding ‘the mirror up to nature’ and challenging political landscapes.
There will also be the opportunity to put your questions to the panel on the night #JoinTheDebate
[/vc_column_text][vc_row_inner][vc_column_inner width=”1/4″][vc_single_image image=”100423″ img_size=”full” add_caption=”yes”][vc_column_text]Director and actor in Mi Minor – This experimental theatre production accused by government officials and pro-government media of being the ‘rehearsal’ for the 2013 Gezi Park protests in Istanbul. The resulting campaign forced him and the creative team to leave the country[/vc_column_text][/vc_column_inner][vc_column_inner width=”1/4″][vc_single_image image=”100421″ img_size=”152×115″ add_caption=”yes”][vc_column_text]The University of Warwick academic is writer of three drama-documentaries on the history of multicultural Shakespearean acting in Britain and America. Howard’s Ira Aldridge documentary was given a reading in the Sam Wanamaker Playhouse in 2017[/vc_column_text][/vc_column_inner][vc_column_inner width=”1/4″][vc_single_image image=”90098″ img_size=”152×114″ add_caption=”yes”][vc_column_text]Journalist and editor of the Index on Censorship Magazine – Edited Staging Shakespearean Dissent edition[/vc_column_text][/vc_column_inner][vc_column_inner width=”1/4″][vc_single_image image=”100422″ img_size=”152×114″ add_caption=”yes”][vc_column_text]Theatre director and creative producer whose work focuses on uncovering stories from within situations that are hard to access due to conflict, occupation and censorship. She has worked in countries including Afghanistan, Yemen, Palestine, Lebanon, Haiti, Syria and the UK.[/vc_column_text][/vc_column_inner][/vc_row_inner][/vc_column][/vc_row][vc_row][vc_column width=”1/4″][vc_single_image image=”80231″ img_size=”full” add_caption=”yes”][/vc_column][vc_column width=”3/4″][vc_column_text]The chair of the panel is the award-winning journalist and broadcaster – Visiting professor of journalism at Kingston University, and presenter of Front Row on Radio 4 and Newswatch on BBC1[/vc_column_text][/vc_column][/vc_row][vc_row][vc_column][vc_column_text]
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ISSUE: VOLUME 45.01 SPRING 2016
Plays that protest, provoke and slip by the censors
Index on Censorship marked the 400th anniversary of William Shakespeare’s death in 2016 by creating a special issue of our award-winning magazine, looking at how his plays have been used around the world to sneak past censors or take on the authorities – often without them realising. Our special report explores how different countries use different plays to tackle difficult themes.
Browse the issue
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Index on Censorship magazine has compiled a reading list of articles from the magazine archives covering the censorship of theatre.[/vc_column_text][/vc_column][/vc_row]
16 May 2018 | Campaigns -- Featured, Canada, Statements
[vc_row][vc_column][vc_single_image image=”100413″ img_size=”full” add_caption=”yes” alignment=”center”][vc_column_text]Twelve press freedom, media rights, and civil liberties organizations from around the world were granted leave to intervene last month in support of Ben Makuch, a national security reporter for VICE News in Toronto, who received an order from the RCMP to hand over all communications with an alleged Islamic State fighter. The production order came after Makuch published a series of articles in 2014. VICE and Makuch have been fighting to quash the production order ever since, but it has been upheld in two lower court decisions.
The coalition argues that the protection of confidential journalistic material from compelled disclosure is a fundamental condition of freedom of the press. Without it, the vital watchdog role journalists play in a democratic society is undermined, as sources risk being deterred from sharing information of public interest with members of the press.
“If the appeal court’s ruling is allowed to stand, it will be easier for Canadian police to obtain notes and recordings from journalists, which is why we have chosen to intervene in this Supreme Court case,” said Margaux Ewen, RSF North America Director. “As one of the world’s strongest democracies, Canada must set a positive example of protecting journalists’ sources, not a negative one, by ensuring that journalists operate without government interference in their reporting. ”
“The outcome in this case will send an important signal about press freedom to other countries“, said Joy Hyvarinen, Head of Advocacy at Index on Censorship. “ It is extremely important that Canada’s courts ensure the protection of journalistic sources and safeguard press freedom.”
“At a time when the press is more threatened than ever, Canada should set an example for press freedom, said Alexandra Ellerbeck, North America program coordinator for the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ). “Undermining the ability of journalists to operate independently and keep their reporting product private sends the opposite message.”
“Protection of journalistic sources is essential to ensure proper investigative journalism, said Media Legal Defense Initiative (MLDI)’s Legal Director Padraig Hughes. “We hope the court will recognise that the risk to investigative journalism where the press are forced to reveal source material to law enforcement is very real, and will have a serious impact on their role as a ‘public watchdog.’”
The Supreme Court’s decision in the VICE case comes at an important time in Canada when journalists’ sources have recently been under threat. At least 13 journalists were under police surveillance in Quebec between 2013 and 2016 in an effort to identify leaks within the police force, prompting the establishment of a Commission of Inquiry which recommended stronger provincial legislation be adopted to protect source confidentiality. In October of last year, Canada’s parliament unanimously adopted the Journalistic Source Protection Act, a federal “shield law” designed to protect sources and whistleblowers. Despite the new legislation, Marie-Maude Denis, an investigative reporter for Radio-Canada, was ordered by a Quebec Superior Court in March to reveal her sources in a Quebec City corruption case. The court applied the shield law, but ultimately ruled that the public’s interest in the outcome of the trial outweighed that of journalistic source protection. Radio-Canada is currently fighting the order to compel Denis’ testimony.
The Journalistic Source Protection Act does not apply in the VICE case.
The coalition comprises Article 19, the Committee to Protect Journalists, Index on Censorship, the International Human Rights Program/University of Toronto Faculty of Law, the International Press Institute, Media Law Resource Center, Media Legal Defense Initiative, PEN Canada, PEN International, Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, Reporters Without Borders, and World Association of Newspapers and News Publishers.[/vc_column_text][/vc_column][/vc_row][vc_row][vc_column][vc_basic_grid post_type=”post” max_items=”12″ style=”load-more” items_per_page=”4″ element_width=”6″ grid_id=”vc_gid:1526545460052-055aac87-916b-7″ taxonomies=”6534″][/vc_column][/vc_row]
16 May 2018 | Campaigns -- Featured, Statements
The West Yorkshire Police force do not know their law.
Malicious Communications Act 1988 has no provision whatsoever for “insulting or abusive” messages.
Individuals can be prosecuted for sending messages that are “grossly offensive” or for messages that the sender knows to be false but sends anyway for the purpose of causing annoyance.
“This police force needs to develop a sense of humour and pursue actual crime rather than trying to use the law to cover their own embarrassment. These comments by the West Yorkshire Police again show how problematic this section of law is in dealing with social media and it is time to see the ‘grossly offensive’ element scrapped,” Jodie Ginsberg, CEO of Index on Censorship, said.
16 May 2018 | Campaigns -- Featured, Digital Freedom, Digital Freedom Statements, Russia, Statements
[vc_row][vc_column][vc_column_text]We, the undersigned 53 international and Russian human rights, media and Internet freedom organisations, strongly condemn the attempts by the Russian Federation to block the internet messaging service Telegram, which have resulted in extensive violations of freedom of expression and access to information, including mass collateral website blocking.
We call on Russia to stop blocking Telegram and cease its relentless attacks on internet freedom more broadly. We also call the United Nations (UN), the Council of Europe (CoE), the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the European Union (EU), the United States and other concerned governments to challenge Russia’s actions and uphold the fundamental rights to freedom of expression and privacy online as well as offline. Lastly, we call on internet companies to resist unfounded and extra-legal orders that violate their users’ rights.
Massive internet disruptions
On 13 April 2018, Moscow’s Tagansky District Court granted Roskomnadzor, Russia’s communications regulator, its request to block access to Telegram on the grounds that the company had not complied with a 2017 order to provide decryption keys to the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB). Since then, the actions taken by the Russian authorities to restrict access to Telegram have caused mass internet disruption, including:
- Between 16-18 April 2018, almost 20 million internet Protocol (IP) addresses were ordered to be blocked by Roskomnadzor as it attempted to restrict access to Telegram. The majority of the blocked addresses are owned by international internet companies, including Google, Amazon and Microsoft. On 30 April, the number of blocked IP addresses was 14.6 million. As of 16 May 2018, this figure is currently 10.9 million.
- This mass blocking of IP addresses has had a detrimental effect on a wide range of web-based services that have nothing to do with Telegram, including, but not limited to, online banking and booking sites, shopping, and flight reservations.
- Within a week, Agora, the human rights and legal group, representing Telegram in Russia, reported it received requests for assistance with issues arising from the mass blocking from about 60 companies and website owners, including online stores, delivery services, and software developers. The number of requests has now reached 100.
- At least six online media outlets (Petersburg Diary, Coda Story, FlashNord, FlashSiberia, Tayga.info, and 7×7) found access to their websites was temporarily blocked.
- On 17 April 2018, Roskomnadzor requested that Google and Apple remove access to the Telegram app from their App stores, despite having no basis in Russian law to make this request. At the time of publication, the app remains available, but Telegram has not been able to provide upgrades that would allow better proxy access for users.
- Virtual Private Network (VPN) providers – such as TgVPN, Le VPN and VeeSecurity proxy – have also been targeted for providing alternative means to access Telegram. Federal Law 276-FZ bans VPNs and internet anonymisers from providing access to websites banned in Russia and authorises Roskomnadzor to order the blocking of any site explaining how to use these services.
- On 3 May 2018, Rozkomnadzor stated that it had blocked access to around 50 VPN services and anonymisers in relation to the Telegram block. On the same day, the Russia’s Communications Minister refused to rule out that other messaging services, including Viber, could potentially be blocked in Russia if they do not hand over encryption keys upon request. The minister had previously warned, during an interview on 6 April 2018, that action could be taken against Viber, as well as WhatsApp and Facebook Messenger.
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[/vc_column_text][/vc_column][/vc_row][vc_row][vc_column][vc_column_text]Background on restrictive internet laws
Over the past six years, Russia has adopted a huge raft of laws restricting freedom of expression and the right to privacy online. These include the creation in 2012 of a blacklist of internet websites, managed by Roskomnadzor, and the incremental extension of the grounds upon which websites can be blocked, including without a court order.
The 2016 so-called ‘Yarovaya Law’, justified on the grounds of “countering extremism”, requires all communications providers and internet operators to store metadata about their users’ communications activities, to disclose decryption keys at the security services’ request, and to use only encryption methods approved by the Russian government – in practical terms, to create a backdoor for Russia’s security agents to access internet users’ data, traffic, and communications.
In October 2017, a magistrate found Telegram guilty of an administrative offense for failing to provide decryption keys to the Russian authorities – which the company states it cannot do due to Telegram’s use of end-to-end encryption. The company was fined 800,000 rubles (approx. 11,000 EUR). Telegram lost an appeal against the administrative charge in March 2018, giving the Russian authorities formal grounds to block Telegram in Russia, under Article 15.4 of the Federal Law “On Information, Information Technologies and Information Protection”.
The Russian authorities’ latest move against Telegram demonstrates the serious implications for people’s freedom of expression and right to privacy online in Russia and worldwide:
- For Russian users apps such as Telegram and similar services that seek to provide secure communications are crucial for users’ safety. They provide an important source of information on critical issues of politics, economics and social life, free of undue government interference. For media outlets and journalists based in and outside Russia, Telegram serves not only as a messaging platform for secure communication with sources, but also as a publishing venue. Through its channels, Telegram acts as a carrier and distributor of content for entire media outlets as well as for individual journalists and bloggers. In light of direct and indirect state control over many traditional Russian media and the self-censorship many other media outlets feel compelled to exercise, instant messaging channels like Telegram have become a crucial means of disseminating ideas and opinions.
- Companies that comply with the requirements of the ‘Yarovaya Law’ by allowing the government a back-door key to their services jeopardise the security of the online communications of their Russian users and the people they communicate with abroad. Journalists, in particular, fear that providing the FSB with access to their communications would jeopardise their sources, a cornerstone of press freedom. Company compliance would also signal that communication services providers are willing to compromise their encryption standards and put the privacy and security of all their users at risk, as a cost of doing business.
- Beginning in July 2018, other articles of the ‘Yarovaya Law’ will come into force requiring companies to store the content of all communications for six months and to make them accessible to the security services without a court order. This would affect the communications of both people in Russia and abroad.
Such attempts by the Russian authorities to control online communications and invade privacy go far beyond what can be considered necessary and proportionate to countering terrorism and violate international law.
International Standards
- Blocking websites or apps is an extreme measure, analogous to banning a newspaper or revoking the license of a TV station. As such, it is highly likely to constitute a disproportionate interference with freedom of expression and media freedom in the vast majority of cases, and must be subject to strict scrutiny. At a minimum, any blocking measures should be clearly laid down by law and require the courts to examine whether the wholesale blocking of access to an online service is necessary and in line with the criteria established and applied by the European Court of Human Rights. Blocking Telegram and the accompanying actions clearly do not meet this standard.
- Various requirements of the ‘Yarovaya Law’ are plainly incompatible with international standards on encryption and anonymity as set out in the 2015 report of the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression report (A/HRC/29/32). The UN Special Rapporteur himself has written to the Russian government raising serious concerns that the ‘Yarovaya Law’ unduly restricts the rights to freedom of expression and privacy online. In the European Union, the Court of Justice has ruled that similar data retention obligations were incompatible with the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Although the European Court of Human Rights has not yet ruled on the compatibility of the Russian provisions for the disclosure of decryption keys with the European Convention on Human Rights, it has found that Russia’s legal framework governing interception of communications does not provide adequate and effective guarantees against the arbitrariness and the risk of abuse inherent in any system of secret surveillance.
We, the undersigned organisations, call on:
- The Russian authorities to guarantee internet users’ right to publish and browse anonymously and ensure that any restrictions to online anonymity are subject to requirements of a court order, and comply fully with Articles 17 and 19(3) of the ICCPR, and articles 8 and 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, by:
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- Desisting from blocking Telegram and refraining from requiring messaging services, such as Telegram, to provide decryption keys in order to access users private communications;
- Repealing provisions in the ‘Yarovaya Law’ requiring internet service providers (ISPs) to store all telecommunications data for six months and imposing mandatory cryptographic backdoors, and the 2014 Data Localisation law, which grant security service easy access to users’ data without sufficient safeguards.
- Repealing Federal Law 241-FZ, which bans anonymity for users of online messaging applications; and Law 276-FZ which prohibits VPNs and internet anonymisers from providing access to websites banned in Russia
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- Amending Federal Law 149-FZ “On Information, IT Technologies and Protection of Information” so that the process of blocking websites meets international standards. Any decision to block access to a website or app should be undertaken by an independent court and be limited by requirements of necessity and proportionality for a legitimate aim. In considering whether to grant a blocking order, the court or other independent body authorised to issue such an order should consider its impact on lawful content and what technology may be used to prevent over-blocking.
- Representatives of the United Nations (UN), the Council of Europe (CoE), the Organisation for the Cooperation and Security in Europe (OSCE), the European Union (EU) the United States and other concerned governments to scrutinise and publicly challenge Russia’s actions in order to uphold the fundamental rights to freedom of expression and privacy both online and-offline, as stipulated in binding international agreements to which Russia is a party.
- Internet companies to resist orders that violate international human rights law. Companies should follow the United Nations’ Guiding Principles on Business & Human Rights, which emphasise that the responsibility to respect human rights applies throughout a company’s global operations regardless of where its users are located and exists independently of whether the State meets its own human rights obligations.
Signed by
- Asociatia pentru Tehnologie si Internet – ApTI
- Associação D3 – Defesa dos Direitos Digitais
- Centre for the Development of Democracy and Human Rights
- Committee to Protect Journalists
- Electronic Frontier Foundation
- Electronic Frontier Norway
- Electronic Privacy Information Centre (EPIC)
- European Federation of Journalists
- Glasnost Defence Foundation
- Human Rights House Foundation
- The Independent Historical Society
- International Media Support
- International Partnership for Human Rights
- Internet Society Bulgaria
- International Youth Human Rights Movement (YHRM)
- Interregional Human Rights Group
- Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group
- Mass Media Defence Centre
- Memorial Human Rights Center
- Movement ‘For Human Rights’
- Norwegian Helsinki Committee
- Press Development Institute-Siberia
- Reporters without Borders
- Russian Journalists’ and Media Workers’ Union
- Transparency International
- Transparency International Russia
- Webpublishers Association (Russia)
- World Wide Web Foundation
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