Inna Lillahi wa inna ilaihi raji’un. I am informing all brave Muslims of the world that the author of The Satanic Verses, a text written, edited, and published against Islam, the Prophet of Islam, and the Qur’an, along with all the editors and publishers aware of its contents, are condemned to death. I call on all valiant Muslims wherever they may be in the world to kill them without delay, so that no one will dare insult the sacred beliefs of Muslims henceforth. And whoever is killed in this cause will be a martyr, Allah Willing. Meanwhile if someone has access to the author of the book but is incapable of carrying out the execution, he should inform the people so that [Rushdie] is punished for his actions. Rouhollah al-Mousavi al-Khomeini.”
On 14 February 1989, 25 years ago today, the supreme leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran handed down a death sentence not just on British author Salman Rushdie, but on anyone associated with the publication of his novel the Satanic Verses.
It’s always worth writing down exactly what happened. A medievalist tyrant decided a novelist and his editors and publishers should die, because he was offended by a book he could not claim to have read.
Rushdie went into hiding. Hitoshi Igarashi, the novel’s Japanese translator, was murdered. Because he had translated a novel.
The controversy did not begin with Khomeini – he merely attempted to capitalise on it. No, the first countries where the book stoked the ire of Islamists were South Africa and India, both countries whose divide-and-rule laws (the Indians’ law inherited from British colonial law, the South Africans’ in a diabolical league of its own) meant it paid to promote communal grievance.
Khomeini’s fatwa seems, in hindsight, a desperate bid to distract the people of Iran, and the rest of the Muslim world, from the fact that his reign, about to end, had been a disaster. Iranians had hoped their 1979 revolution would deliver them from the oppression of the Peacock Throne. Instead they just found their oppressors had simply grown beards.
The disaster was not entirely of Khomeini’s own making, perhaps. He could not be blamed for having the equally psychopathic Saddam Hussein as a neighbour, but nonetheless, he had sent hundreds of thousands of Iranians to their death, promised martyrdom as they marched into Saddam’s poisoned gas during the Iran-Iraq war that raged for almost the whole of the 1980s.
The Iran Iraq War ended in 1988. Neither side could legitimately claim victory. The Islamic Republic had not swept all before it. And Khomeini needed something new to establish his Shia theocracy as the leader of the Islamic world. He found it in harnessing the mounting anger over Rushdie’s book.
In Britain, this was the moment for political Islam. Young second generation South Asian Islamists exploited their parents’ folk memories of anti-Muslim violence during the torturous period before and after partition in 1947 (the subject of Rushdie’s great work, Midnight’s Children) to mobilise Muslims against Rushdie.
Inayat Bunglawala of the Muslim Council of Britain wrote in 2007:
So on February 14 1989, when the Iranian Islamic leader, Imam Khomeini delivered his fatwa calling for Salman Rushdie’s death, I was truly elated. It was a very welcome reminder that British Muslims did not have to regard themselves just as a small, vulnerable minority; they were part of a truly global and powerful movement. If we were not treated with respect then we were capable of forcing others to respect us.
Yusuf Islam, formerly known as cuddly hippy musician Cat Stevens, told a television audience at the time that he felt Rushdie deserved to die. Some on the British right were pleased, seeing the death sentence as comeuppance for a man who was a vicious critic of the racist establishment.
Khomeini is dead and Rushdie is a knight of the realm (though some, such as Shirley Williams, considered that elevation in 2007 unwise). But it is perhaps on those grounds only that victory can be claimed for free speech. As Kenan Malik has suggested, writing for Index on Censorship, we live still in the “shadow of the fatwa”.
Religious sensitivity has become an excuse for threats. “Offence” is something to be taken greedily, and then pumped back out with a mixture of aggression and self pity.
And the shadow of that fatwa does not only fall on Islam. Every zealot of every creed will now offer up special pleading for their right to be protected from mockery, debate and challenge with the line “You wouldn’t say that about Islam.” What they mean, always, is “We want you to be scared. We want you to be as scared as Salman Rushdie was when he received that threat. We want you to be so scared that you will never question our literalism, our version of events. Truth is ours and ours alone.”
Rushdie’s friend, the late Christopher Hitchens, wrote that the fatwa represented “an all out confrontation between the ironic and the literal mind: between every kind of commissar and inquisitor and bureaucrat and those who know that, whatever the role of social and political forces, ideas and books have to be formulated by individuals”.
Palestinian Arab Idol winner Mohammad Assaf says he has been banned from performing at the World Cup opening ceremony this summer — and that Shakira is boycotting.
He said at a press conference earlier this week that he was supposed to sing at the show kicking off the FIFA World Cup in Brazil, but that because of some “countries” or “groups” — no one was specified — his record company was told this won’t happen after all. He also said that Colombian superstar Shakira, who sang the 2010 World Cup anthem “Waka Waka,” has refused to perform at the ceremony because of it.
Assaf rose to fame last year when he won the regional singing competition Arab Idol, and was especially lauded for his performances of traditional Palestinian music:
In the process, he gained some high-profile fans. FIFA President Sepp Blatter visited Palestine last summer, and said he would invite Assaf to sing at this summer’s World Cup
It was reported then that Assaf and Shakira might sing together in Brazil, but now it appears both will be staying away from the festivities.
Assaf, a former wedding singer, has become somewhat of Palestinian hero; when his victory was announced, people in Gaza and Ramallah poured onto the streets in celebration.
In addition to singing patriotic Palestinian songs, Assaf has made political statements on a number of occassions: “We are searching for our rights, for peace, unity and the end of the occupation and illegal Israeli settlements,” he said to the New York Times in December.
But Assaf’s popularity, which has made headlines abroad, has also drawn criticism.
In an email complaining to Secretary of State John Kerry, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said that Palestinian children are “educated to hate Jews, while Palestinian officials continue to call for their deaths.” He also included a link to one of Assaf’s performance of ali al-keffiyeh, a Palestinian folk song.
“We are not aware of the Arab Idol. Details concerning the official ceremony are still being defined,” a FIFA representative said to PolicyMic in response to his comments.
It remains to be seen whether this will become yet another controversial issue FIFA and the organising committee have to answer to in the 119 days left until the World Cup kicks off.
Kenyan president Uhuru Kenyatta (Image Demotix/David Mbiyu)
In 2010 the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued summons for Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto, among others, for their alleged role in the violence that erupted following the 2007 Kenyan General Elections. The charges include crime against humanity. Nevertheless, in the elections of 2013, Kenyatta was sworn in as president — Ruto his deputy president — after securing 50.51 percent of the vote in a highly contested but generally peaceful election.
This now means that any movement to evaluate the defendants’ criminal culpability implicates the broader state itself. With Kenyatta and Ruto heading the executive branch of government, the implications of the ICC cases cannot be overstated. But while testing the state’s eagerness to confront the legacy of 2007 these cases offer up a further test; the ability of Kenya’s media institutions, journalists and citizens to freely interrogate the proceedings. Will Kenyatta, Ruto and, by extension, the state let such scrutiny happen in public?
Kenyan legislation in this regard is coloured by tragedy. Following the attacks on Westgate Mall in Nairobi in September 2013, the state moved fast to shore up perceived gaps in legislation that could have enabled the attacks to happen. One of these “gaps” referred to the media, ushering in two pieces of legislation: the Kenya Information and Communications (Amendment) Bill (KICA) and the Media Council Bill. The former, an amendment to the 1998 law, creates a Communication and Multimedia Appeals Tribunal under the jurisdiction of the state-controlled Communications Authority. According to free speech group Article 19, the tribunal has the power “to impose hefty fines on media houses and journalists, recommend de-registration of journalists and make any order on freedom of expression”.
While raising concerns for media bodies looking to cover the ICC cases of Kenyatta and Ruto among others, the Commission for the Implementation of the Constitution (CIC), have pointed out a number of more systemic issues. The 2010 constitution drafted to address the political and ethnic divisions that led to the violence of 2007 established robust protections for freedom of expression. KICA potentially undermines these protections, as CIC explained in a statement:
“Clause 7 of the Bill creates a Communications Authority of Kenya…with some of its board members appointed through a process that solely involves the National Executive and the National Assembly…These clauses violate the provisions of Article 34(3) of the Constitution by leaving the Body responsible for licensing broadcasters under the control of two arms of government, the Executive and the National Assembly.”
Any information deemed too sensitive to be in the public domain during the individual cases draws out KICA as a potential tool for the state to restrict the media’s ability to analyse the cases in an unobstructed manner.
The punitive measures outlined in KICA are not to be sniffed at. According to Charles Onyango Obbo of the Daily Nation: “The Sh20 million penalty against a media house that violated several provisions of the new Bill or the Code of Conduct for the Practice of Journalism, is again among the highest a tribunal can hand out in Africa.” A further provision states that media houses will face punitive measures if 45 percent of their coverage is not deemed “local”. The is a potential hindrance for media bodies looking to analyse the ICC cases – how local is The Hague?
Clause (37) of KICA goes on to state that the tribunal may “accept an anonymous complaint concerning an issue of public interest”. This inability for media bodies to identify its accusers opens the process up to manipulation. Can the tribunal determine that protecting Kenyatta and Ruto is in the public interest? When members of the tribunal are selected at the discretion of the National Executive, it is a possibility.
In the context of the ICC cases, this has created a perfect storm in terms of media freedom. Media houses face disproportionate measures, while their governance is outlined by a body at the discretion of both the executive and legislative branches of government – the former facing interrogation from both the ICC and the media.
It’s too early to tell what will happen and what powers will be invoked, but there have already been warning signs. A case was thrown out after it was alleged that a key witness had received a bribe from the defendant and questions remain regarding similar allegations in the case against William Ruto. Does this represent a collective desire to withhold information? The acts of alleged bribery are by no means definitive, but to skew proceedings, it would be the place to start.
And the next step? Media bodies must surely be holding their collective breath because, while they have not used them yet, KICA offers just the tools the state may need.
Analysis shows there have been no visible improvements of Belrusian media freedom during in recent years. The state continues to dominate the broadcast media market and preserves tight control over printed publications. State-owned media are used as a tool for government propaganda, while the independent socio-political press faces discrimination. The internet re-shapes the news media market as it provides new opportunities for free flow of information and ideas, but its full-scale development as a free speech domain is hindered by economic peculiarities and attempts of state regulation.
Despite continuous calls for reforms from Belarusin civil society and the international community, media-related legislation remains restrictive and fails to foster the development of pluralistic and independent news media in Belarus. Other laws, such as defamation articles of the Criminal Code, anti-extremist or state secrets legislation are also used to curtail media freedom, restrict access to information and prosecute journalists. Despite the recent talks between Belarus’s Foreign Ministry and the Office of the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, the authorities of the country remain reluctant to discuss any possible legal reforms of the media field with civil society and professional community.
Physical safety of journalists and impunity remain serious problems that have a chilling effect of media freedom in Belarus. The most acute issue is police interference with journalistic activities and arbitrary detentions of reporters during mass street actions.
As Belarus remains one of the least free places in Europe for journalists and the media to operate, immediate reforms of the Belarus media field should be launched to end harassment and persecution of reporters, and eliminate excessive state interference in media freedom.
The European Union and other international institutions must place the issue of media freedom on the agenda of any dialogue with the Belarusian authorities to demand genuine reforms of the media for the country to live up to its international commitments in the field of freedom of expression.
Index on Censorship believes changes are needed to bring the Belarusian media-related legislation and practices of its implementation in line with the Constitution of the country and its international commitments.
Reforms of the Belarusian media field should be launched, including de-monopolising of the electronic media, introducing public service media and creating a competitive media market. The outline of these reforms should result from a dialogue with professional community and civil society of the country.
The practice of arbitrary detention of journalists, including those that cover street actions, should be immediately stopped. All cases of interference of the police and other state officials into legitimate journalistic activity should be investigated, and those responsible should be brought to account.
All forms of economic discrimination against non-state independent press should be eliminated, in particular:
• independent publications should be treated equally by the state system of press distribution and Belposhta subscription catalogues;
• the state has a pro-active duty to protect and promote freedom of expression and so should investigate anti-competitive practices including the charging of unequal prices for paper and the distribution services for publications for different types of ownership.
The Law of the Republic of Belarus “On Mass Media” must be reformed, in particular:
• to allow for independent self-regulation of journalism allowing reporters of both online and offline news media, including freelance journalists, to operate freely;
• registration procedures for new media outlets should be simplified to lift all the artificial restrictions for entering the media market;
• a possibility of extrajudicial closing down of media should be eliminated; the Ministry of Information should not have the authority to impose sanctions on media, including initiating of cases of closure of media outlets.
Six articles of the Criminal Code providing for criminal liability for defamation should be abolished:
• Article 188 “Libel”
• Article 189 “Insult”
• Article 367 “Libel in relation to the President of the Republic of Belarus”
• Article 368 “Insulting the President of the Republic of Belarus”
• Article 369 “Insulting the representative of the authorities”
• Article 369–1 “Discrediting the Republic of Belarus”
Equal and full access to information should be ensured for all journalists of both online and offline media. The institute of accreditation should not be used to restrict the right to access information. In particular, the existing ban for cooperation with foreign media without an accreditation should be lifted as it contradicts the Constitution of Belarus and its international commitments in the field of freedom of expression.
Several provisions of the Presidential Decree No 60 of 1 February 2010 on regulating the internet should be dropped in line with the recommendations in ‘Belarus: Pulling the Plug’ policy paper, along with various other edicts related to the implementation of the decree. In particular, owners of websites should be free to register them at any domain and host them in any country. News websites should not be black-listed and blocked.
