03 Feb 14 | Digital Freedom, Egypt, News and features
(Image: Aleksandar Mijatovic/Shutterstock)
Statement: Egyptian authorities must stop their attacks on media freedom from Article 19, the Committee to Project Journalists, Index on Censorship and Reporters Without Borders. PDF: Arabic
The wording of proposed anti-terrorism legislation in Egypt has been leaked, sparking concern amongst opposition activists over upcoming government censorship. The legislation could allow for social networking sites such as Facebook to be barred, if they are deemed to be endangering public order.
Al Sherooq, an Arabic-language daily newspaper, reported on the news, stating that ant-terrorism legislation “for the first time includes new laws which guarantee control over ‘terrorism’ crimes in a comprehensive manner, starting with the monitoring of Facebook and the Internet, in order of them not to be used for terrorism purposes”.
According to Al Sherooq, the document is now being circulated around Cabinet for approval, and will build upon the country’s new constitution, recently approved with 98% support. The constitution includes provisions for emergency legislation at points of crisis.
The law is ostensibly designed to improve the ability of the military government to provide security, against a backdrop of rising violence and terrorism attacks. It lays out proposed punishments for those involved with designated terrorism offences, and for inciting violence. It would also establish a special prosecution unit and criminal court focused on convicting terrorists.
The leaked document also shows how broadly terrorism will be defined, as it includes “use of threat, violence, or intimidation to breach public order, to violate security, to endanger people”. It is also defined “as acts of violence, threat, intimidation that obstruct public authorities or government, as well as implementation of the constitution”.
Commentators were quick to note that Facebook would be high on the list of potentially barred sites, as it is frequently used by members of the Muslim Brotherhood and other opposition groups, to co-ordinate protests.
YouTube has also recently been used by jihadist groups; one video posted recently showed a masked man firing a rocket at a freight ship passing through the Suez.
“What worries me most is the level of popular support for these laws,” said Mai El-Sadany, an Egyptian-American rights activist. “If you look at how much support the referendum won, and also recent polling about the terrorism laws, there is definitely a sense that people want peace and stability.”
“But Egypt now is like America after 9/11,” she added. “People are believing the lies the government are telling them. There is the same sentiment of fear, with a legitimate basis, but human rights abuses and loss of civil liberty are a possibility.”
Since Morsi’s deposal in July 2013, terrorists group have attempteed to kill the interior minister, bombed the National Security heaquarters in Mansoura and Cairo, shot down a military helicopter in the Sinai Peninsula, fired a rocket at a passing freighter ship in the Suez canal, and assassinated a senior security official. A group calling itself Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (translated as “Supporter of Jerusalem”) has claimed responsibility for most of the attacks.
The constitutional referendum result has already been used by the regime to demonstrate Sisi’s credibility. However, critics say that any media channels supportive of the opposing Islamist agenda were all shut down after the military coup, and that voters suggesting they might vote against the referendum were threatened by government officials, suggesting Sisi’s mandate may be questionable.
There was also a notable lack of support for the referendum in the south of Egypt as opposed to the north.
Recent polling data suggests that the terrorism legislation could be popular, with 65% of Egyptians having heard about possible new laws, and 62% approving of it. Polling results also showed significantly more support amongst degree-educated Egyptians as opposed to less educated people.
An earlier form of the legislation has already been used to arrest dozens of activists and journalists, including several employees of Al Jazeera. Viewership of the Qatar-based network has reduced as support for the Muslim Brotherhood has declined. The Muslim Brotherhood’s activities in Egypt have been funded by Gulf states.
It is thought the new definition of terrorism could be used to indict the detained Al Jazeera journalists. To date, it has been unclear under what legislation they could be prosecuted.
Political analyst and blogger Ramy Yaccoub, from Cairo, criticised the leaked legislation voraciously via his Twitter account: “This is becoming ridiculous,” he tweeted. This was followed by: “There needs to be an international treaty that governs the sanctity of private communication.”
There is currently no agreed timeframe for the Egyptian legislative process, so it is unclear how long it will take for the laws to come into force.
The wording of the legislation has been translated into English and is available here.
This article was posted on 3 Feb 2014 at indexoncensorship.org
31 Jan 14 | Digital Freedom, News and features, United Nations
(Image: Pseudopixels/Shutterstock)
If you live in Cuba, Iran or Sudan, and are using the increasingly popular online education tool Coursera, you are likely encounter some access difficulties from this week onwards. Coursera has been included in the US export sanctions regime.
The changes have only come about now, as Coursera believed they and other MOOCs — Massive Open Online Courses — didn’t fall under American export bans to the countries. However, as the company explained in a statement on their official blog: “We recently received information that has led to the understanding that the services offered on Coursera are not in compliance with the law as it stands.”
Coursera, in partnership with over 100 universities and organisations, from Yale to the Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology to the Word Bank, offers online courses in everything from Economics and Finance to Music, Film and Audio — free of charge. Over four million students across the world are currently enrolled.
“We envision a future where everyone has access to a world-class education that has so far been available to a select few. We aim to empower people with education that will improve their lives, the lives of their families, and the communities they live in,” they say.
But this noble aim is now being derailed by US economic sanctions policy. People in Cuba, Iran and Sudan will be able to browse the website, but existing students won’t be able to log onto their course pages, and new students won’t be allowed to sign up. Syria was initially included on the list, but was later removed under an exception allowing services that support NGO efforts.
Amid clear-cut cases of censorship, peaceful protesters being attacked and journalists thrown in jail, it is easy forget that access — or rather lack of it — also constitutes a threat to freedom of expression. Lack of access to freedom of expression leads to people being denied an equal voice, influence and active and meaningful participation in political processes and their wider society.
In these connected times, it can be a simple as being denied reliable internet access. Coursera is trying to tackle this problem. They “started building up a mobile-devices team so that students in emerging markets — who may not have round-the-clock access to computers with internet connectivity — can still get some of their coursework done via smartphones or tablets,” reported Forbes.
But this won’t be of much help to students affected by the sanctions, as their access is being restricted not by technological shortcomings, but by misguided policy. Education plays a vital part in helping provide people with the tools to speak out, play an active part in their society and challenge the powers that be. Taking an education opportunity away from people in Cuba, Iran and Sudan is another blow to freedom of expression in countries with already poor records in this particular field.
Furthermore, these sanctions are in part enforced in a bid to stand up for human rights. This loses some of its power, when the people on the ground in the sanctioned countries are being denied a chance to further educate themselves, gaining knowledge that could help them be their own agents of change and stand up for their own rights.
Ironically, this counterproductive move comes not long after a Sudanese civil society group called for a change to US technology sanction.
“We want to be clear that this is not an appeal to lift all sanctions from the Sudanese regime that continues to commit human rights atrocities. This is an appeal to empower Sudanese citizens through improved access to ICTs so that they can be more proactive on issues linked to democratic transformation, humanitarian assistance and technology education — an appeal to make the sanctions smarter,” said campaign coordinator Mohammed Hashim Kambal.
Digital freedom campaigners from around the world have also spoken against the US position
Coursera says they are working to “reinstate site access” to the users affects, adding that: “The Department of State and Coursera are aligned in our goals and we are working tirelessly to ensure that blockage is not permanent.”
For now, students in Iran, Cuba and Sudan could access Coursera through a VPN network.
Hopefully this barrier to freedom of expression in countries where it is sorely needed, will soon be reversed.
This article was posted on 31 January 2014 at indexoncensorship.org
29 Jan 14 | Digital Freedom, Europe and Central Asia, News and features, Turkey
Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan (Photo: Philip Janek / Demotix)
A few weeks ago, internet privacy activists in Turkey began expressing alarm over newly proposed amendments to the law already governing the country’s internet activity.
If implemented, the changes would serve to increase the government’s already strong hold over the internet. Taking to social media and posting critical declarations on their websites, opponents of the law braced themselves for another debate over censorship in Turkey. Protests held on 18 January drew the attention of the riot police, who responded with pepper spray and water cannons. Despite this, some freedom of speech activists insist that the most effective resistance to censorship will be promoting internet security.
Law number 5651 was passed in 2007 and has since regulated freedom of expression on the internet in Turkey by censoring thousands of websites, including a two-year ban on YouTube. There has even been a European Court of Human Rights ruling against it. Opponents of the new, amended, bill have criticised its ability to collect and store internet users’ personal data and its increased censorship of websites deemed offensive. Others have cited its potential to slow down internet connections and damage Turkey’s beleaguered economy. The bill has already been redrafted this month, with a recent version extending the time period during which the Directorate of Telecommunication (TİB) would decide on banning websites from four to twenty-four hours. However, the previous time limit remains in “emergency” cases. This could also potentially change, as the bill will be redrafted again before it’s voted upon. While it is unclear when the vote will take place, it is expected soon.
The bill’s nebulous drafting process has prompted uproar among Turkey’s internet activists. Zeynep Karahan Uslu, the member of parliament who presented the draft bill, first tweeted last month that amendments were being prepared. Members of the Pirate Party of Turkey reacted by starting a public Google doc and encouraging their followers on Twitter and Facebook to contribute information about the law. At the beginning of this month, the Pirates posted a twelve-page declaration on their website, and news of the amendments spread through social media. Serhat Koç, a telecommunications lawyer and spokesperson for the Pirate Party, says people outside the party began editing and tweeting the declaration. Eventually, an aide for the recently formed People’s Democratic Party (HDP) approached Koç to ask if he would draft an opposing bill for their party. Koç remains pessimistic about what efforts to oppose the amendments can achieve. “I think nobody can change that draft bill,” he said.
Lawmakers and supporters of the new bill have argued that it serves to protect internet users’ privacy with regulations safeguarding their reputations against obscenity or defamation. But opponents have drawn attention to the dangers posed by the amendment’s blocking of URLs. While lawmakers have promoted this measure by saying URLs can be banned more selectively, critics argue the extent of censorship will be less visible to internet users. İsmail Alpen, a founder of the online campaign Sansürü Durdur, says that while court orders were previously displayed on blocked websites, “in the new system you won’t be able to see any warning,” leaving visitors to speculate about why they cannot access a website. “People won’t be notified about what has been censored,” Alpen said.
Other opponents of the bill see the proposed URL-based banning as means for legalising increased data collection. Ahmet Sabancı, a member of the Alternative Informatics Association, explains that blocking URLs instead of entire websites requires TİB to use deep package inspection. “URL-based page blocking forces ISPs to keep all logs for two years, putting all of our information into their hands,” he said. But according to Sabancı, most internet users aren’t concerned about data retention: “They think they can change their domain name server (DNS) numbers and surpass most censorship.” A few weeks ago, the Alternative Informatics Association launched the website kem gözlere şiş, which features guides explaining how to use tools for internet anonymity or circumventing censorship, like Tor, VPNs or encryption. Sabancı said most feedback he’s received since the site’s launch has been from political activists, and that most are excited about Tor because it’s the easiest to use.
In 2013, average user numbers of the Tor browser in Turkey remained low, at just a few thousand a month, according to statistics published on the anonymity network’s website. But if the amendments to law 5651 are passed, the potential increase in website censorship could see a surge in Tor and VPN use. “In general, as soon as a government starts talking about censorship, the populace responds by finding ways to circumvent the censorship,” Tor executive director Andrew Lewman wrote in an email.
Koç and other Pirate Party members are developing projects for secure communication, including a local mesh network and a whistleblowing platform for journalists. Currently, whistleblowers barely ever leak to journalists because anonymity software is not widely used, Koç says. Both Koç and Sabancı say many internet users’ disinterest in government surveillance has made it difficult to raise awareness about the new amendments to 5651 and the likely effects on internet censorship and data collection. But interest in anonymity has been growing since last year’s protests in Gezi Park were met with police brutality, Koç says.
Recently, more people have been contacting both Koç and Sabancı through social media to seek advice on using the internet anonymously. At a recent workshop held by Pirate Party members, on instruction on internet security, drew diverse visitors. “There were activists from the Turkish Green Party, citizen journalists, people who used Ustream in Gezi Park, some leftists associations. Censorship is not the thing for lots of people, but anonymity is necessary,” Koç said. “They want to be anonymous.”
This article was posted on 29 January 2014 at indexoncensorship.org
24 Jan 14 | Digital Freedom, News and features, Religion and Culture, United Kingdom
Illustration: Shutterstock
I had arranged to meet ‘Emma’ in a cafe, at the behest of a mutual friend. As a student of forensic computing informatics, I was asked to help educate Emma about online privacy, a particular passion of mine.
Emma is an unassuming 24-year-old. Nothing about her physical appearance or mannerisms would divulge anything of the abuse she was subjected to at the hands of a former boyfriend.
She explained that she had experienced on-going violence while in a three-year relationship. Her partner had physically, verbally and emotionally abused her. In addition, her former boyfriend monitored and restricted her access to the Internet.
“I didn’t have anything private. I couldn’t do anything without him asking something about my behaviour, or my intentions, or whatever else I was doing. It was physical and psychological entrapment at its worst.” she said.
For Emma, our meeting was about learning to use tools to take control of her privacy in an age of mass monitoring. She was taking back the capabilities that were torn from her by her abusive boyfriend, by becoming empowered to protect herself in the on-line sphere.
During our conversation, I shared various techniques and tools she could use to browse sites anonymously, and I explained the concepts and principles of privacy-enhancing technologies – software including Tor and I2P (Invisible Internet Project), which would enable her to protect her identity.
Unsurprisingly, Emma has become extremely protective of her access to the Internet; a residual scar of the control she found herself being subjected to.
I was mindful also that it was the first opportunity I’d had which humanised a subject I’m deeply passionate about – often ascribed crypto-anarchism – to effect meaningful, beneficial change to someone else’s life. It also acted as a sobering realisation of the technological capabilities and opportunities available to ordinary citizens to thwart mass surveillance perpetrated by the National Security Agency, GCHQ and their ilk.
Technology has shifted traditional notions of personal privacy in unforeseen ways. We’ve entered a new world order, in which tools of oppression and exploitation are often pointed inward by a state acting as the abusive partner.
I couldn’t help but be reminded of Duncan Campbell’s Secret Society episode We’re All Data New: Secret Data Banks, broadcast 26 years ago. It detailed swathes of information being held on the entire populace of Britain in private sector databases; specifically I recalled the horror on the faces of unwitting participants, as Campbell accessed sensitive personal information from a computer terminal with minimal effort.
Councils sell copies of that data for a pittance nowadays; it’s the electoral register. In comparison to today’s data brokers, behemoth custodians of in-depth data held about each and every one of us, the private databases of yesteryear seem almost quaint. Surveillance is as ubiquitous as ever, and so pervasive that it is has merged into an almost indecipherable cacophony from data-mining business models to gluttonous mass surveillance by the government and its agents. Each has a thread in common, a fundamental component.
You.
Or, of most concern to me during our meeting, Emma.
Often the stakes and associated risk of using modern technologies are magnified considerably for those suffering from physical harm, psychological abuse or harassment. This is especially true in those fearful of seeking information or resources in genuine confidence – a capability cherished by those in such strained circumstances. As I listened to her experiences, I grasped from Emma’s tone she was afraid of exposing herself to potential further abuse.
“In some countries,” I told her, “I’d be considered dangerous. The skills I’m teaching you wouldn’t be tolerated, much less encouraged.”
In the aftermath of Edward Snowden’s disclosures, spearheaded by Glen Greenwald, Laura Poitras and The Guardian, of the activities of the United States’ NSA and United Kingdom’s GCHQ, it has become imperative that the sociological impacts of surveillance be recognised and addressed directly, if societies are to protect each and every one of its participants from such endemic spying.
But, too often, the insipid encroachment is interpreted solely as a technological problem, by which it is assumed surveillance must be countered wholly by the same. While technology is a component of a solution, it cannot derail the potential for abuse on its own.
Ultimately, the answer to surveillance on a personal or societal level demands a radical overhaul of attitudes and perceptions. People must share information, techniques and tools to help one-another protect their civil liberties. People must encourage each other to cherish their online and offline privacy. Technological mutual solidarity if you will. Ecosystems and privacy-enhancing technologies such as Tor and I2P, amongst a plethora of others, cater for this exact idealism; privacy by design, rather than by public policy.
Because it isn’t just about personal privacy anymore; nor was it, in fact, ever. It too is about dignity, morality and using technology as a vehicle to emancipate, to facilitate, and to embellish an underlying respect for individuals as citizens, and – especially in Emma’s circumstance – their sanctity as human beings.
Actively manage YOUR online privacy
Tor Project
Privacy-enhancing technology ecosystem, which enables users to communicate and browse anonymously, and circumvent internet censorship by routing traffic via intermediate nodes before transmitted to the intended site; prevents third parties from discovering a user’s location or their browsing habits.
I2P
Software that has similar capabilities to Tor in permitting anonymous or pseudonymous browsing. Can be used as standalone or in conjunction with other pieces of software to enhance a user’s ability to ensure communications remain as confidential as possible. Also contains web-based email among other features within its operating environment, which is accessible only via I2P itself.
TAILS
A Live CD-based operating system, comprising of an entire operating environment, and contains both the aforementioned tools and additional software without disclosing evidence of its use, as it is self-contained on a DVD-R and operates in RAM, erasing evidence of its presence once a machine is switched off.
Off-the-Record Messaging
An instant messenger plug-in, and cryptographic protocol which is used to create secure instant messaging sessions between users in such a manner that conversations are plausibly deniable and affords for confidential, private communication between participants.
This article was published on 24 January 2014 at indexoncensorship.org
