21 Jun 2019 | Azerbaijan, Europe and Central Asia, Monitoring and Advocating Coverage, News
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Leyla Mustafayeva (Photo: RFERL)
Leyla Mustafayeva is an Azerbaijani journalist and the wife of investigative journalist Afgan Mukhtarli, who was kidnapped in Georgia in May 2017 and later imprisoned in Azerbaijan.
Mustafayeva left Georgia along with her daughter Nuray after being followed by the same individual who was following her husband before his abduction. Today she lives in Germany and continues to campaign for the release of her husband.
When Mukhtarli fled to Georgia, Azerbaijani authorities were shutting down NGO’s and independent media outlets. In Georgia, he continued to openly criticise the Azerbaijani regime as a journalist and arranged protests to demand the release of journalists and political prisoners.
Mukhtarli, who had investigated the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic, was stalked by employees and later kidnapped. The company has been repeatedly linked to corrupt activity and human rights violations. The oil and gas sector in Azerbaijan is also well known for its lack of transparency and is considered the greatest source of corruption in the country.
Mustafayeva has put her career on hold. Today, she dedicates herself to learning German, integrating into German society and campaigning for her husband’s release.
Index on Censorship: What were the official reasons for your husband being abducted from Georgia and extradition to Azerbaijan, and how does this compare with why he was actually taken
Leyla Mustafayev: In January 2015 we were in Qazax, Azerbaijan. If my memory doesn’t betray me, it was midday. Afgan decided to flee to Georgia after he received information from one of the sources in the Chief-Prosecutor’s Office in Azerbaijan. As soon as he received the leaked information from the General Prosecutor’s office he fled to Georgia.
In 2014 he had been interrogated once about the criminal case which had been launched against Radio Liberty. In December 2014 journalist Khadija Ismayilova was arrested. It was the continuation of a crackdown by the Azerbaijani authorities’ against NGOs and the independent media.
After settling in Georgia he started investigating Azerbaijani state money that they had been invested in Georgia. It was obvious that the president’s spouse Mehriban Aliyeva, and his daughters Leyla and Arzu Aliyeva, had invested enough into banking, tourism and the cargo sector in Tbilisi and Batumi. Along with their Azerbaijani business partners, the family-owned big hotels in Tbilisi and Batumi.
Afgan was also very critical of the government in his posts on social media. At that time Afgan was not the only one who had fled to Georgia. Before his arrival to Tbilisi, some activists and journalists had already moved there. He fled to Georgia so that he could avoid being arrested, continue his professional activity, and fight for the release of his colleagues who had been imprisoned.
Along with his friends, he organised protests in front of the Azerbaijani Embassy in Tbilisi and demanded the release of political prisoners, which included journalists.
The investigation was not the only reason he was kidnapped. Imagine one journalist organising a protest in front of the Azerbaijani embassy and demanding for the release of political prisoners while the president’s family is spending millions in European countries trying to build up their image. All of his activities were negatively impacting the reputation of the Azerbaijani government.
Index: What was Afgan working on when he was abducted?
Mustafayev: Afgan was working on similar topics that he had worked on before. He was visiting different places with regard to his investigation and was being stalked by plainly clothed people intensively. The State Oil Company of Azerbaijan (SOCAR) has a security section in Georgia. Afgan told me that the Security Committee of Azerbaijan had replaced their employees in the Georgian branch of SOCAR and that they had been told to stalk activists and journalists in Tbilisi, collect information about the places that they visited, and identify the people who they were meeting. One of the topics that Afgan was investigating was related to SOCAR.
Index: How have you been campaigning for the release of your husband, and what have been the major developments in that campaign?
Mustafayev: After Afgan was kidnapped I decided to stay in Georgia and campaign against both governments. Georgia is responsible for protecting the safety of all the people living within its borders. The Georgian Dream government not only failed to protect our safety but also collaborated with its authoritarian neighbour, the Azerbaijani government, so that it could silence the voice of one critical journalist.
Afgan’s kidnapping was the so-called “victory” of the authoritarian coalition in Georgia.
When I was living in Georgia, Afgan had not yet been convicted. I was hoping that our campaign with the civil society members and journalists would force the authorities to drop the charges against him in Azerbaijan, and reveal to the Georgian people and the world that the Georgian government was responsible for Afgan’s kidnapping.
Until that time, Georgia had been known as an island of democracy in South Caucasus. After Afgan was kidnapped in Tbilisi, it was obvious that it was no longer a place of democracy. When it comes to political interests, the Georgian government ignores fundamental freedoms and human rights.
Index: How has Azerbaijan responded to this campaign?
Mustafayev: Azerbaijani government officials kept repeating that Afgan had been detained while crossing the border illegally. Prior to and after his arrest, pro-Azerbaijani government websites were publishing articles that accused him of collaborating with an “anti-Azerbaijani network”. Elman Nasirov, one of the Azerbaijani MPs, said in an interview with Radio Liberty that Afgan had been taken to Azerbaijan as the result of a successful security services operation between Georgia and Azerbaijan.
During one of the court trials in Azerbaijan, Afgan had recognised the Azerbaijani border official that the Georgian kidnappers had delivered him to. Although Afgan was blindfolded after being kidnapped, he could remember the voice of senior border official Azar Shirinov, who had given a testimony in the court.
It has been two years since his kidnapping, and the criminal case that was launched in regard to his abduction in Georgia is still open. Within the last two years, Georgian law enforcement has erased all the facts that confirm his kidnapping from Georgia.
Georgia’s responsible government organisations failed to investigate the case. In this situation, the Georgian parliament needed to set up a special investigation group. However, they refused to do so. I believe that the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Chief Prosecutor’s Office of Georgia, and the Georgian parliament are still protecting the senior Georgian government officials who were complicit in the adduction. I believe that this is the case because Afgan told me that his Georgian kidnappers were reporting to someone “on the top” about the steps that they had taken during the operation. CCTV in the Ministry of Internal Affairs was also not operating along the streets where the kidnappers abducted him. Law enforcement in both countries has mobilised their administrative power to bury this case. The police and security forces have entered private enterprises, obtained CCTV footage, and deleted all of the evidence. There was only one piece of footage that showed Afgan taking the mini-bus that takes a route to our home. The lawyer noticed one person in the footage who was following Afgan. Our lawyer asked the prosecutor’s office to clarify the identity of that person. The CD containing the video has not been opened since then.
Index: How did your husband’s abduction affect your own sense of security in Georgia and why did you leave the country?
Mustafayev: It was very stressful to live under surveillance. My daughter was asking each evening why her dad did not come home. She had heard about the kidnapping on the news and knew that something bad had happened to her father. She cried each morning when she got up, which she never did before. Once I realised that the person who had stalked Afgan the day before he was kidnapped was stalking me as well, I decided to leave Georgia. I recognised the person from footage on the Rustavi 2 TV channel. Although I had delivered photos and videos of the person who was stalking me and my daughter to the police and the Chief Prosecutor’s office, they did not investigate my complaints and failed to protect our safety. That is why I decided to leave Georgia.
Index: How has all of this affected your own work as a journalist?
Mustafayev: I started a new life in Germany. I have been integrating myself into society by learning the language and continuing my campaign for him. However, it has been extremely demanding. As a result, I have not been able to pursue my professional career like I had hoped after I graduated from journalism school in Tbilisi.
Index: How do you view the state of media freedom in Azerbaijan?
Mustafayev: The main critical and independent websites have been blocked in Azerbaijan. They are the websites of OCCRP, Radio Liberty, exile-based Meydan TV, Turan TV, the Azerbaijan hour TV programme, and the website of opposition newspaper Azadliq. There are around 70 political prisoners in Azerbaijan and five of them are journalists. There is no independent television in the country. The government has taken control of the mass media by blocking the main media platforms that criticised it. About 15 journalists have been involved in the criminal case that was launched against Meydan TV in 2015. In 2017 the president gifted 255 apartments to journalists to mark National Press Day on 22 July 22. During the last 14 years, three journalists have been murdered in Azerbaijan. Those who killed Elmar Huseynov and Rafig Tagi remain free. Azerbaijan has gone down three ranks and is now ranked 166th among 180 countries for media freedom, and is famous for the imprisonment and habitual intimidation of journalists.
Index: What are your hopes for Azerbaijan?
Mustafayev: The Azerbaijani government poses the biggest threat to media freedom in the country. It has already been 26 years since the ruling New Azerbaijan Party took power. They have established deep roots throughout these 26 years by ordering the authorities to “strengthen” their censorship of the media. The Chief Prosecutor’s Office lifted the travel ban that it imposed on journalists in 2015. Sevinj Vagifqizi, the journalist collaborating with the exile-based Meydan TV, was one of them. Shortly after the travel ban was lifted, she was sued for filming election fraud. The presidential elections were held in April 2018. The timing of the case soon after the travel ban was lifted led us to question the true motivation behind the lawsuit. All of this leaves very little space for hope. It shows that Azerbaijani authorities have no intention of pursuing fundamental reforms, and will always silence criticism from the media by any means they deem necessary. [/vc_column_text][/vc_column][/vc_row][vc_row][vc_column][vc_basic_grid post_type=”post” max_items=”4″ element_width=”6″ grid_id=”vc_gid:1562165207475-534f6dfb-857d-2″ taxonomies=”7145″][/vc_column][/vc_row]
25 Jun 2018 | Global Journalist, Media Freedom, News, Pakistan
[vc_row][vc_column][vc_column_text]This article is part of Index on Censorship partner Global Journalist’s Project Exile series, which has published interviews with exiled journalists from around the world.[/vc_column_text][vc_single_image image=”101034″ img_size=”full” add_caption=”yes”][vc_column_text]
Jumping out of a car to escape being abducted at gunpoint by the Pakistani military isn’t exactly how journalist Taha Siddiqui planned to start his trip to London.
Siddiqui, then a Pakistan correspondent for the network France 24 and the Indian news site WION, had angered the South Asian nation’s military with his reporting on national security issues and critical posts on social media.
On 10 January the problems caught up with him as he rode to the airport in a Careem, a popular ride-hailing service in the capital Islamabad. A car with armed men in it forced Siddiqui’s driver to stop. He was beaten by the side of the highway and the men forced him into the back of a vehicle and started to drive off with him.
Pakistani media is noted for its lively and diverse news coverage. Yet reporters in the country face threats not just from extremist groups like the Taliban but from the military and intelligence agencies.
The country ranks 139th out of 180 countries on Reporters Without Borders’ World Press Freedom Index, and in recent months independent media like Geo TV and Dawn newspaper have been blocked from distribution. Earlier this month two reporters were attacked in Lahore shortly after a military spokesman condemned “anti-state” remarks made by journalists on social media.
As Siddiqui told Global Journalist, he was able to escape from his captors and report the attack to the police. The kidnapping attempt wasn’t the first time Siddiqui had problems with Pakistan’s military. In 2015, he was threatened after he co-wrote a lengthy New York Times article detailing how the military had disappeared dozens of suspected Pakistani Taliban members. The article included allegations that some of those disappeared were starved, tortured and killed.
He was also threatened after helping produce a France 24 report critical of the Pakistani army’s handling of a 2014 school massacre in Peshawar that left over 150 dead. Siddiqui had also faced pressure last year after posting tweets critical of the military’s “glorifying” of past dictators and its whitewashing of its role in fomenting a 1965 war with India.
In May 2017 he was summoned for questioning by the federal police’s counter-terrorism department despite a court order banning them from harassing him. In September, Siddiqui was called to meet with the military’s spokesman, Gen. Asif Ghafoor. In an interview, Siddiqui says Ghafoor told him that if he didn’t stop his criticism, “I would get myself into trouble.”
Ghafoor did not respond to messages seeking comment from Global Journalist. Yet trouble didn’t come until the January attack, and Siddiqui can’t point to one specific incident as a cause.
“I don’t know what specific story, article or video triggered it,” he says in an interview with Global Journalist. “Or was it just my social media activity?”
Weeks after the attack, Siddiqui, decided to leave Pakistan for France for security reasons. Before he left, he says he met with Pakistan’s then interior minister, Ahsan Iqbal. Iqbal, Siddiqui says, told the journalist he should write a letter to Gen. Qamar Bajwa, Pakistan’s army chief, and beg for forgiveness. Neither Iqbal nor Bajwa responded to requests for comment.
Now 34, Siddiqui lives with his wife and 4-year-old son in Paris, where he is working part-time with the media company Babel Press and looking for a full-time job. He spoke with Global Journalist’s Rosemary Belson about his attack and flight from his homeland.
Global Journalist: Can you tell us about the reporting that landed you in hot water?
Siddiqui: The military is politically-involved in Pakistan. They have businesses, they are involved in human rights abuses, education.
When reporting in Pakistan about any particular issue, usually you end up tracking it back to the military in some way or another. It’s impossible to report without talking about the military and its involvement in a wide range of issues in Pakistan.
I refer to a story that I did for the New York Times. It came out on the front page of the International New York Times in 2015. It was a story about military secret prisons where they were killing suspected militants. They were extrajudicially killing them inside the jails. I uncovered about 100 to 250 cases across Pakistan, especially in the Tribal Belt [in northwest Pakistan].
Even at that time, the New York Times thought it was quite risky for my name to go on it. But I wanted my byline on it and that was the first time I started receiving direct threats.
There were always indirect messages coming in through friends in the journalism business or friends in the government saying that I should be careful… Constantly on and off these threats would come. Even to the extent where my friends and people I socialized with were told to stay away from me.
GJ: Walk us through the attempted abduction.
Siddiqui: On 10 January I was headed to the airport to catch a flight to London for work. The week before that I was working on a story about missing persons. I was supposed to file the story from the airport because I didn’t have [time] to file it before, so I took [my] hard drive and laptop.
My Careem came around 8 a.m. for my flight at noon. Halfway to the airport on the main Islamabad highway, a car swerved in front of me and stopped. Armed men got out of the vehicle with pistols and AK-47s.
At first, I thought it was a case of road rage or robbery, but one of them approached from my side and pointed his gun towards me and said something along the lines of: “Who do you think you are?”
I got out and assumed that this had something to do with the threats I had been receiving. I tried to run away but they pinned me down on the road. That’s when I noticed there was another car behind me with people coming out of it as well. They made a barricade around me, and this was [on] the main highway at 8:30 in the morning, with traffic…they started beating me and wanted to take me away.
I was resisting and they kept hitting me with the butts of their guns…and kicking me. Finally, one of them said, “Shoot him in the leg if he doesn’t stop resisting because we have to take him.”
That’s when I realized they were serious about shooting me. Earlier, [when] they didn’t shoot me right away, I thought perhaps it means they want to take me alive. In my mind I was thinking that resistance would give me some lifeline. I saw a military vehicle passing by. I called out for help but it didn’t stop.
After being threatened by being shot in the leg, they put me in the taxi, and took out the driver. One person drove while two people sat with me in the back and one in the front. They were holding me in a headlock with a gun pointing to the left side of my body on my stomach.
I told him, “I’m going with you. Can you relax for a little bit and let me relax also, [and] sit up straight?”
The guy relaxed his arm and gun. That’s when I realized the right back door of the car was unlocked. I went for it, opened it. I jumped out, ran to the other side of the road with oncoming traffic. I tried to look for a taxi. I could hear behind me they were shouting and saying, “Shoot him!”
But I just ran and finally I found a taxi. I got into it while it was moving. I opened the door, jumped into it. The taxi took me 700 or 800 meters before realizing there was something wrong and [the driver] didn’t want to help me anymore. So they asked me to get out because it was already occupied by some women.
I got out of the taxi. On the side of the road, there were some ditches and a marsh area, so I jumped into that and hid there for a bit. I took off my red sweater because I was worried they’d see me…we later recovered the sweater with the police.
I found another taxi. I asked to use [the driver’s] phone. I called a journalist friend and asked him what to do. He suggested I go to the nearest police station and the taxi driver took me. I filed a report where I named the Pakistan military as a suspect. I also tweeted about it from a friend’s account because they had taken my phone, passport, suitcase, laptop, bag. I only had my wallet left on me.
GJ: How did you make the decision to leave Pakistan?
Siddiqui: The police investigation found that the [surveillance] cameras in the area weren’t working. They found one of the cars that stopped me was following me from my house but they couldn’t identify any of the faces inside the car because [the windows] were tinted and the license plate was fake.
I was invited [to a meeting] by the Interior Minister of Pakistan [Ahsan Iqbal]. He suggested that I should write a letter to the Pakistan Army Chief [Gen. Qamar Bajwa]. That’s when I realized the government was totally helpless.
People suggested that I go away for awhile because they didn’t finish the job and they might come again. Especially since I wasn’t going silent, as was suggested by some senior journalist friends who later turned their back to me during this ordeal.
It was really disappointing and depressing seeing my own journalist community not supporting me. The international media supported me, some local journalists supported me, but some people that I knew personally thought I was going the wrong way by being vocal about the attack.
Me, my wife…we sat down together and discussed. We didn’t tell my kid at the time but now I’ve gently told him how there’s a safety issue for me and we had to move.
We decided that we should get out. If we are getting out, it wasn’t going to be a three or six-month thing, because I’m fighting invisible forces in my country. I will not know if I’ve won or lost or whether they’re still after me or not.
We decided on Paris because I had been working with the French media for the last seven or eight years as a journalist for France 24. I also received the French equivalent of the Pulitzer prize [the Albert Londres prize] in 2014, so I have strong journalistic support and community here.
GJ: How has media freedom changed over time in Pakistan?
Siddiqui: Press freedom has always been under attack. We’ve gone through military dictatorships in Pakistan…through the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s.
Two things have changed in recent years. One, we as journalists don’t know what the red lines are. In my case, I don’t know what specific story, article or video triggered it. Or was it just my social media activity?
Secondly, non-state actors are now being activated against journalists so [the military] can hide behind those non-state actors and get the job done.
The military has ensured that unity among journalists is not as it used to be. They have done that through financial coercion or financial rewards…it’s further shrunk the space for journalists. The military is becoming more intolerant and its tactics to control the media are becoming more violent. I see the situation becoming worse in the coming days.
This all needs to be put in context. It’s an election year in Pakistan. The Pakistani military wants all of this room to manipulate elections for strategic gains. They don’t want the ruling party [Pakistan Muslim League – Nawaz] to come into power again with a similar majority to what they enjoy right now. So to make sure they can easily manipulate the elections, they are trying to develop an environment of fear where independent reporting can’t happen.
[/vc_column_text][/vc_column][/vc_row][vc_row][vc_column width=”1/2″][vc_video link=”https://youtu.be/6BIZ7b0m-08″][/vc_column][vc_column width=”1/2″][vc_column_text]Index on Censorship partner Global Journalist is a website that features global press freedom and international news stories as well as a weekly radio program that airs on KBIA, mid-Missouri’s NPR affiliate, and partner stations in six other states. The website and radio show are produced jointly by professional staff and student journalists at the University of Missouri’s School of Journalism, the oldest school of journalism in the United States. [/vc_column_text][/vc_column][/vc_row][vc_row][vc_column][vc_custom_heading text=”Don’t lose your voice. Stay informed.” use_theme_fonts=”yes”][vc_separator color=”black”][vc_row_inner][vc_column_inner width=”1/2″][vc_column_text]Index on Censorship is a nonprofit that campaigns for and defends free expression worldwide. We publish work by censored writers and artists, promote debate, and monitor threats to free speech. We believe that everyone should be free to express themselves without fear of harm or persecution – no matter what their views.
Join our mailing list (or follow us on Twitter or Facebook). We’ll send you our weekly newsletter, our monthly events update and periodic updates about our activities defending free speech. We won’t share, sell or transfer your personal information to anyone outside Index.[/vc_column_text][/vc_column_inner][vc_column_inner width=”1/2″][gravityform id=”20″ title=”false” description=”false” ajax=”false”][/vc_column_inner][/vc_row_inner][/vc_column][/vc_row][vc_row full_width=”stretch_row_content”][vc_column][three_column_post title=”Global Journalist / Project Exile” full_width_heading=”true” category_id=”22142″][/vc_column][/vc_row]
16 May 2018 | Campaigns -- Featured, Digital Freedom, Digital Freedom Statements, Russia, Statements
[vc_row][vc_column][vc_column_text]We, the undersigned 53 international and Russian human rights, media and Internet freedom organisations, strongly condemn the attempts by the Russian Federation to block the internet messaging service Telegram, which have resulted in extensive violations of freedom of expression and access to information, including mass collateral website blocking.
We call on Russia to stop blocking Telegram and cease its relentless attacks on internet freedom more broadly. We also call the United Nations (UN), the Council of Europe (CoE), the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the European Union (EU), the United States and other concerned governments to challenge Russia’s actions and uphold the fundamental rights to freedom of expression and privacy online as well as offline. Lastly, we call on internet companies to resist unfounded and extra-legal orders that violate their users’ rights.
Massive internet disruptions
On 13 April 2018, Moscow’s Tagansky District Court granted Roskomnadzor, Russia’s communications regulator, its request to block access to Telegram on the grounds that the company had not complied with a 2017 order to provide decryption keys to the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB). Since then, the actions taken by the Russian authorities to restrict access to Telegram have caused mass internet disruption, including:
- Between 16-18 April 2018, almost 20 million internet Protocol (IP) addresses were ordered to be blocked by Roskomnadzor as it attempted to restrict access to Telegram. The majority of the blocked addresses are owned by international internet companies, including Google, Amazon and Microsoft. On 30 April, the number of blocked IP addresses was 14.6 million. As of 16 May 2018, this figure is currently 10.9 million.
- This mass blocking of IP addresses has had a detrimental effect on a wide range of web-based services that have nothing to do with Telegram, including, but not limited to, online banking and booking sites, shopping, and flight reservations.
- Within a week, Agora, the human rights and legal group, representing Telegram in Russia, reported it received requests for assistance with issues arising from the mass blocking from about 60 companies and website owners, including online stores, delivery services, and software developers. The number of requests has now reached 100.
- At least six online media outlets (Petersburg Diary, Coda Story, FlashNord, FlashSiberia, Tayga.info, and 7×7) found access to their websites was temporarily blocked.
- On 17 April 2018, Roskomnadzor requested that Google and Apple remove access to the Telegram app from their App stores, despite having no basis in Russian law to make this request. At the time of publication, the app remains available, but Telegram has not been able to provide upgrades that would allow better proxy access for users.
- Virtual Private Network (VPN) providers – such as TgVPN, Le VPN and VeeSecurity proxy – have also been targeted for providing alternative means to access Telegram. Federal Law 276-FZ bans VPNs and internet anonymisers from providing access to websites banned in Russia and authorises Roskomnadzor to order the blocking of any site explaining how to use these services.
- On 3 May 2018, Rozkomnadzor stated that it had blocked access to around 50 VPN services and anonymisers in relation to the Telegram block. On the same day, the Russia’s Communications Minister refused to rule out that other messaging services, including Viber, could potentially be blocked in Russia if they do not hand over encryption keys upon request. The minister had previously warned, during an interview on 6 April 2018, that action could be taken against Viber, as well as WhatsApp and Facebook Messenger.
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[/vc_column_text][/vc_column][/vc_row][vc_row][vc_column][vc_column_text]Background on restrictive internet laws
Over the past six years, Russia has adopted a huge raft of laws restricting freedom of expression and the right to privacy online. These include the creation in 2012 of a blacklist of internet websites, managed by Roskomnadzor, and the incremental extension of the grounds upon which websites can be blocked, including without a court order.
The 2016 so-called ‘Yarovaya Law’, justified on the grounds of “countering extremism”, requires all communications providers and internet operators to store metadata about their users’ communications activities, to disclose decryption keys at the security services’ request, and to use only encryption methods approved by the Russian government – in practical terms, to create a backdoor for Russia’s security agents to access internet users’ data, traffic, and communications.
In October 2017, a magistrate found Telegram guilty of an administrative offense for failing to provide decryption keys to the Russian authorities – which the company states it cannot do due to Telegram’s use of end-to-end encryption. The company was fined 800,000 rubles (approx. 11,000 EUR). Telegram lost an appeal against the administrative charge in March 2018, giving the Russian authorities formal grounds to block Telegram in Russia, under Article 15.4 of the Federal Law “On Information, Information Technologies and Information Protection”.
The Russian authorities’ latest move against Telegram demonstrates the serious implications for people’s freedom of expression and right to privacy online in Russia and worldwide:
- For Russian users apps such as Telegram and similar services that seek to provide secure communications are crucial for users’ safety. They provide an important source of information on critical issues of politics, economics and social life, free of undue government interference. For media outlets and journalists based in and outside Russia, Telegram serves not only as a messaging platform for secure communication with sources, but also as a publishing venue. Through its channels, Telegram acts as a carrier and distributor of content for entire media outlets as well as for individual journalists and bloggers. In light of direct and indirect state control over many traditional Russian media and the self-censorship many other media outlets feel compelled to exercise, instant messaging channels like Telegram have become a crucial means of disseminating ideas and opinions.
- Companies that comply with the requirements of the ‘Yarovaya Law’ by allowing the government a back-door key to their services jeopardise the security of the online communications of their Russian users and the people they communicate with abroad. Journalists, in particular, fear that providing the FSB with access to their communications would jeopardise their sources, a cornerstone of press freedom. Company compliance would also signal that communication services providers are willing to compromise their encryption standards and put the privacy and security of all their users at risk, as a cost of doing business.
- Beginning in July 2018, other articles of the ‘Yarovaya Law’ will come into force requiring companies to store the content of all communications for six months and to make them accessible to the security services without a court order. This would affect the communications of both people in Russia and abroad.
Such attempts by the Russian authorities to control online communications and invade privacy go far beyond what can be considered necessary and proportionate to countering terrorism and violate international law.
International Standards
- Blocking websites or apps is an extreme measure, analogous to banning a newspaper or revoking the license of a TV station. As such, it is highly likely to constitute a disproportionate interference with freedom of expression and media freedom in the vast majority of cases, and must be subject to strict scrutiny. At a minimum, any blocking measures should be clearly laid down by law and require the courts to examine whether the wholesale blocking of access to an online service is necessary and in line with the criteria established and applied by the European Court of Human Rights. Blocking Telegram and the accompanying actions clearly do not meet this standard.
- Various requirements of the ‘Yarovaya Law’ are plainly incompatible with international standards on encryption and anonymity as set out in the 2015 report of the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression report (A/HRC/29/32). The UN Special Rapporteur himself has written to the Russian government raising serious concerns that the ‘Yarovaya Law’ unduly restricts the rights to freedom of expression and privacy online. In the European Union, the Court of Justice has ruled that similar data retention obligations were incompatible with the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Although the European Court of Human Rights has not yet ruled on the compatibility of the Russian provisions for the disclosure of decryption keys with the European Convention on Human Rights, it has found that Russia’s legal framework governing interception of communications does not provide adequate and effective guarantees against the arbitrariness and the risk of abuse inherent in any system of secret surveillance.
We, the undersigned organisations, call on:
- The Russian authorities to guarantee internet users’ right to publish and browse anonymously and ensure that any restrictions to online anonymity are subject to requirements of a court order, and comply fully with Articles 17 and 19(3) of the ICCPR, and articles 8 and 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, by:
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- Desisting from blocking Telegram and refraining from requiring messaging services, such as Telegram, to provide decryption keys in order to access users private communications;
- Repealing provisions in the ‘Yarovaya Law’ requiring internet service providers (ISPs) to store all telecommunications data for six months and imposing mandatory cryptographic backdoors, and the 2014 Data Localisation law, which grant security service easy access to users’ data without sufficient safeguards.
- Repealing Federal Law 241-FZ, which bans anonymity for users of online messaging applications; and Law 276-FZ which prohibits VPNs and internet anonymisers from providing access to websites banned in Russia
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- Amending Federal Law 149-FZ “On Information, IT Technologies and Protection of Information” so that the process of blocking websites meets international standards. Any decision to block access to a website or app should be undertaken by an independent court and be limited by requirements of necessity and proportionality for a legitimate aim. In considering whether to grant a blocking order, the court or other independent body authorised to issue such an order should consider its impact on lawful content and what technology may be used to prevent over-blocking.
- Representatives of the United Nations (UN), the Council of Europe (CoE), the Organisation for the Cooperation and Security in Europe (OSCE), the European Union (EU) the United States and other concerned governments to scrutinise and publicly challenge Russia’s actions in order to uphold the fundamental rights to freedom of expression and privacy both online and-offline, as stipulated in binding international agreements to which Russia is a party.
- Internet companies to resist orders that violate international human rights law. Companies should follow the United Nations’ Guiding Principles on Business & Human Rights, which emphasise that the responsibility to respect human rights applies throughout a company’s global operations regardless of where its users are located and exists independently of whether the State meets its own human rights obligations.
Signed by
- Asociatia pentru Tehnologie si Internet – ApTI
- Associação D3 – Defesa dos Direitos Digitais
- Centre for the Development of Democracy and Human Rights
- Committee to Protect Journalists
- Electronic Frontier Foundation
- Electronic Frontier Norway
- Electronic Privacy Information Centre (EPIC)
- European Federation of Journalists
- Glasnost Defence Foundation
- Human Rights House Foundation
- The Independent Historical Society
- International Media Support
- International Partnership for Human Rights
- Internet Society Bulgaria
- International Youth Human Rights Movement (YHRM)
- Interregional Human Rights Group
- Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group
- Mass Media Defence Centre
- Memorial Human Rights Center
- Movement ‘For Human Rights’
- Norwegian Helsinki Committee
- Press Development Institute-Siberia
- Reporters without Borders
- Russian Journalists’ and Media Workers’ Union
- Transparency International
- Transparency International Russia
- Webpublishers Association (Russia)
- World Wide Web Foundation
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30 Apr 2018 | Campaigns -- Featured, Europe and Central Asia, Russia, Statements
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We, the undersigned 26 international human rights, media and internet freedom organisations, strongly condemn the attempts by the Russian Federation to block the internet messaging service Telegram, which have resulted in extensive violations of freedom of expression and access to information, including mass collateral website blocking.
We call on Russia to stop blocking Telegram and cease its relentless attacks on internet freedom more broadly. We also call the United Nations (UN), the Council of Europe (CoE), the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the European Union (EU), the United States and other concerned governments to challenge Russia’s actions and uphold the fundamental rights to freedom of expression and privacy online as well as offline. Lastly, we call on internet companies to resist unfounded and extra-legal orders that violate their users’ rights.
Massive internet disruptions
On 13 April 2018, Moscow’s Tagansky District Court granted Roskomnadzor, Russia’s communications regulator, its request to block access to Telegram on the grounds that the company had not complied with a 2017 order to provide decryption keys to the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB). Since then, the actions taken by the Russian authorities to restrict access to Telegram have caused mass internet disruption, including:
- Between 16-18 April 2018, almost 20 million internet Protocol (IP) addresses were ordered to be blocked by Roskomnadzor as it attempted to restrict access to Telegram. The majority of the blocked addresses are owned by international internet companies, including Google, Amazon and Microsoft. Currently 14.6 remain blocked.
- This mass blocking of IP addresses has had a detrimental effect on a wide range of web-based services that have nothing to do with Telegram, including, but not limited to, online banking and booking sites, shopping, and flight reservations.
- Agora, the human rights and legal group, representing Telegram in Russia, has reported it has received requests for assistance with issues arising from the mass blocking from about 60 companies, including online stores, delivery services, and software developers.
- At least six online media outlets (Petersburg Diary, Coda Story, FlashNord, FlashSiberia, Tayga.info, and 7×7) found access to their websites was temporarily blocked.
- On 17 April 2018, Roskomnadzor requested that Google and Apple remove access to the Telegram app from their App stores, despite having no basis in Russian law to make this request. The app remains available, but Telegram has not been able to provide upgrades that would allow better proxy access for users.
- Virtual Private Network (VPN) providers – such as TgVPN, Le VPN and VeeSecurity proxy – have also been targeted for providing alternative means to access Telegram. Federal Law 276-FZ bans VPNs and internet anonymisers from providing access to websites banned in Russia and authorises Roskomnadzor to order the blocking of any site explaining how to use these services.
Background on restrictive internet laws
Over the past six years, Russia has adopted a huge raft of laws restricting freedom of expression and the right to privacy online. These include the creation in 2012 of a blacklist of internet websites, managed by Roskomnadzor, and the incremental extension of the grounds upon which websites can be blocked, including without a court order.
The 2016 so-called ‘Yarovaya Law’, justified on the grounds of “countering extremism”, requires all communications providers and internet operators to store metadata about their users’ communications activities, to disclose decryption keys at the security services’ request, and to use only encryption methods approved by the Russian government – in practical terms, to create a backdoor for Russia’s security agents to access internet users’ data, traffic, and communications.
In October 2017, a magistrate found Telegram guilty of an administrative offense for failing to provide decryption keys to the Russian authorities – which the company states it cannot do due to Telegram’s use of end-to-end encryption. The company was fined 800,000 rubles (approx. 11,000 EUR). Telegram lost an appeal against the administrative charge in March 2018, giving the Russian authorities formal grounds to block Telegram in Russia, under Article 15.4 of the Federal Law “On Information, Information Technologies and Information Protection”.
The Russian authorities’ latest move against Telegram demonstrates the serious implications for people’s freedom of expression and right to privacy online in Russia and worldwide:
- For Russian users apps such as Telegram and similar services that seek to provide secure communications are crucial users’ safety. They provide an important source of information on critical issues of politics, economics and social life, free of undue government interference. For media outlets and journalists based in and outside Russia, Telegram serves not only as a messaging platform for secure communication with sources, but also as a publishing venue. Through its channels, Telegram acts as a carrier and distributor of content for entire media outlets as well as for individual journalists and bloggers. In light of the direct and indirect control the state has over many traditional Russian media and the self-censorship many other media outlets feel compelled to exercise, instant messaging channels like Telegram have become a crucial means of disseminating ideas and opinions.
- Companies that comply with the requirements of the ‘Yarovaya Law’ by allowing the government a back-door key to their services jeopardise the security of the online communications of their Russian users and the people they communicate with abroad. Journalists, in particular, fear that providing the FSB with access to their communications would jeopardize their sources, a cornerstone of press freedom. Company compliance would also signal that communication services providers are willing to compromise their encryption standards and put the privacy and security of all their users at risk, as a cost of doing business.
- Beginning in July 2018, other articles of the ‘Yarovaya Law’ will come into force requiring companies to store the content of all communications for six months and to make them accessible to the security services without a court order. This would affect the communications of both people in Russia and abroad.
Such attempts by the Russian authorities to control online communications and invade privacy go far beyond what can be considered necessary and proportionate to countering terrorism and violate international law.
International Standards
- Blocking websites or apps is an extreme measure, analogous to banning a newspaper or revoking the license of a TV station. As such, it is highly likely to constitute a disproportionate interference with freedom of expression and media freedom in the vast majority of cases and must be subject to strict scrutiny. At a minimum, any blocking measures should be clearly laid down by law and require the courts to examine whether the wholesale blocking of access to an online service is necessary and in line with the criteria established and applied by the European Court of Human Rights. Blocking Telegram and the accompanying actions clearly do not meet this standard.
- Various requirements of the ‘Yarovaya Law’ are plainly incompatible with international standards on encryption and anonymity as set out in the 2015 report of the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression report (A/HRC/29/32). The UN Special Rapporteur himself has written to the Russian government raising serious concerns that the ‘Yarovaya Law’ unduly restricts the rights to freedom of expression and privacy online. In the European Union, the Court of Justice has ruled that similar data retention obligations were incompatible with the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Although the European Court of Human Rights has not yet ruled on the compatibility of the Russian provisions for the disclosure of decryption keys with the European Convention on Human Rights, it has found that Russia’s legal framework governing interception of communications does not provide adequate and effective guarantees against the arbitrariness and the risk of abuse inherent in any system of secret surveillance.
We, the undersigned organisations, call on:
- The Russian authorities to guarantee internet users’ right to publish and browse anonymously and ensure that any restrictions to online anonymity are subject to requirements of a court order, and comply fully with Articles 17 and 19(3) of the ICCPR, and articles 8 and 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, by:
- Desisting from blocking Telegram and refraining from requiring messaging services, such as Telegram, to provide decryption keys in order to access users private communications;
- Repealing provisions in the ‘Yarovaya Law’ requiring internet service providers (ISPs) to store all telecommunications data for six months and imposing mandatory cryptographic backdoors, and the 2014 Data Localisation law, which grant security service easy access to users’ data without sufficient safeguards.
- Repealing Federal Law 241-FZ, which bans anonymity for users of online messaging applications; and Law 276-FZ which prohibits VPNs and internet anonymisers from providing access to websites banned in Russia;
- Amending Federal Law 149-FZ “On Information, IT Technologies and Protection of Information” so that the process of blocking websites meets international standards. Any decision to block access to a website or app should be undertaken by an independent court and be limited by requirements of necessity and proportionality for a legitimate aim. In considering whether to grant a blocking order, the court or other independent body authorised to issue such an order should consider its impact on lawful content and what technology may be used to prevent over-blocking.
- Representatives of the United Nations (UN), the Council of Europe (CoE), the Organisation for the Cooperation and Security in Europe (OSCE), the European Union (EU) the United States and other concerned governments to scrutinise and publicly challenge Russia’s actions in order to uphold the fundamental rights to freedom of expression and privacy both online and offline, as stipulated in binding international agreements to which Russia is a party.
- Internet companies to resist orders that violate international human rights law. Companies should follow the United Nations’ Guiding Principles on Business & Human Rights, which emphasise that the responsibility to respect human rights applies throughout a company’s global operations regardless of where its users are located and exists independently of whether the State meets its own human rights obligations.
Signed by
- Article 19
- Agora International
- Access Now
- Amnesty International
- Asociatia pentru Tehnologie si Internet – ApTI
- Associação D3 – Defesa dos Direitos Digitais
- Committee to Protect Journalists
- Civil Rights Defenders
- Electronic Frontier Foundation
- Electronic Frontier Norway
- Electronic Privacy Information Centre (EPIC)
- Freedom House
- Human Rights House Foundation
- Human Rights Watch
- Index on Censorship
- International Media Support
- International Partnership for Human Rights
- ISOC Bulgaria
- Open Media
- Open Rights Group
- Pen America
- Pen International
- Privacy International
- Reporters without Borders
- WWW Foundation
- Xnetin
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