Content bans won’t just eliminate “bad” speech online

[vc_row][vc_column][vc_column_text]Social media platforms have enormous influence over what we see and how we see it.

We should all be concerned about the knee-jerk actions taken by the platforms to limit legal speech and approach with extreme caution any solutions that suggest it’s somehow easy to eliminate only “bad” speech.

Those supporting the removal of videos that “justify discrimination, segregation or exclusion based on qualities like age, gender, race, caste, religion, sexual orientation or veteran status” might want to pause to consider that it isn’t just content about conspiracy theories or white supremacy that will be removed.

In the wake of YouTube’s announcement on Wednesday 5 June, independent journalist Ford Fischer tweeted that some of his videos, which report on activism and extremism, had been flagged by the service for violations. Teacher Scott Allsopp had his channel featuring hundreds of historical clips deleted for breaching the rules that ban hate speech, though it was later restored with some videos still flagged.

It’s not just Google’s YouTube that has tripped over the inconsistent policing of speech online.

Twitter has removed tweets for violating its community standards as in the case of US high school teacher and activist Carolyn Wysinger, whose post in response to actor Liam Neeson saying he’d roamed the streets hunting for black men to harm, was deleted by the platform. “White men are so fragile,” the post read, “and the mere presence of a black person challenges every single thing in them.”

In the UK, gender critical feminists who have quoted academic research on sex and gender identity have had their Twitter accounts suspended for breaching the organisation’s hateful conduct policy, while threats of violence towards women often go unpunished.

Facebook, too, has suspended the pages of organisations that have posted about racist behaviours.

If we are to ensure that all our speech is protected, including speech that calls out others for engaging in hateful conduct, then social media companies’ policies and procedures need to be clear, accountable and non-partisan. Any decisions to limit content should be taken by, and tested by, human beings. Algorithms simply cannot parse the context and nuance sufficiently to distinguish, say, racist speech from anti-racist speech.

We need to tread carefully. While an individual who incites violence towards others should not (and does not) enjoy the protection of the law, on any platform, or on any kind of media, tackling those who advocate hate cannot be solved by simply banning them.

In the drive to stem the tide of hateful speech online, we should not rush to welcome an ever-widening definition of speech to be banned by social media.

This means we – as users – might have to tolerate conspiracy theories, the offensive and the idiotic, as long as it does not incite violence. That doesn’t mean we can’t challenge them. And we should.

But the ability to express contrary points of view, to call out racism, to demand retraction and to highlight obvious hypocrisy depend on the ability to freely share information.[/vc_column_text][vc_basic_grid post_type=”post” max_items=”4″ element_width=”6″ grid_id=”vc_gid:1560160119940-326df768-f230-4″ taxonomies=”4883″][/vc_column][/vc_row]

The actions of the Russian Federation are jeopardising online freedoms everywhere

[vc_row][vc_column][vc_single_image image=”100082″ img_size=”full”][vc_column_text]The following statement signed by 52 international organisations was delivered by Article 19 at the UN Human Rights Council on 27 June 2018.[/vc_column_text][vc_column_text]Thank you Mr. President,

The Russian Federation is pursuing policies that are significantly and rapidly encroaching online freedoms affecting not only the rights of people living in Russia but Internet users everywhere. Through the steady adoption of a raft of regressive legislation contravening international standards on freedom of expression, including access to information and the right to privacy, as well as placing unjustified pressure on Internet intermediaries, the Russian Federation is creating a framework, which, if fully implemented, would not only severely limit the free flow of information online but potentially give them access to the personal communication data of anyone, anywhere.

Last month, ARTICLE 19 together with 56 international and Russian human rights, media and Internet freedom organisations condemned the mass Internet disruption caused by the Russian Federation’s attempts to block the Internet messaging service Telegram, which resulted in extensive violations of freedom of expression including access to information. Almost 20 million Internet Protocol (IP) addresses were ordered to be blocked causing an unprecedented level collateral website blocking.

The basis of the authorities’ action was Telegram’s noncompliance with the highly problematic 2016 so-called ‘Yarovaya Law’, justified on the grounds of “countering extremism”, which requires all communications providers and Internet operators to store metadata about their users’ communications activities, to disclose decryption keys at the security services’ request, and to use only encryption methods approved by the Russian government – in practical terms, to create a backdoor for Russia’s security agents to access internet users’ data, traffic, and communications. In July 2018, other articles of the ‘Yarovaya Law’ will come into force requiring companies to store the content of all communications for six months and to make them accessible to the security services without a court order. This would affect the communications of both people in Russia and abroad, violating their right to privacy and creating a further chilling effect to freedom of expression and access to information.  

Such attempts by the Russian authorities to restrict online communications and violate privacy, supposedly for the protection of national security, are neither necessary nor proportionate. The Russian Government must repeal ‘Yarovaya Law’ and refrain from pressuring Internet intermediaries to comply with requests that will violate their users’ rights or face having their services blocked inside the country.

Since 2012, Russia has operated a blacklist of Internet websites and incrementally extended the grounds upon which websites can be blocked, including without a court order. The permanent blocking of several online media outlets and also LinkedIn – are completely unjustified and can only be seen as examples to intimidate others into compliance. Individual Internet users have also been persecuted for online expression or even simply liking or sharing content on social media platforms.

Legislation currently under consideration includes further social media regulation (Proposed Bill № 223849-7) which would among other concerns eradicate the possibility of online anonymity and pressure companies to take down “unverifiable” information; as well as proposed amendments to the Criminal Code (Article 284.2) (Proposed Bill № 464757-7) that would criminalise information leading to ‘international sanctions’, which could be used to prevent the media reporting on public interest matters or NGOs conducting international advocacy. Both pieces of legislation, if adopted, would have a negative impact on the free flow of information and should not be brought into law.

Signed by

  1. ARTICLE 19
  2. Agora International
  3. Access Now
  4. Amnesty International
  5. Asociatia pentru Tehnologie si Internet – ApTI
  6. Associação D3 – Defesa dos Direitos Digitais
  7. Centre for the Development of Democracy and Human Rights
  8. Committee to Protect Journalists
  9. Citizens’ Watch
  10. Civil Rights Defenders
  11. Electronic Frontier Foundation
  12. Electronic Frontier Norway
  13. Electronic Privacy Information Centre (EPIC)
  14. European Federation of Journalists
  15. FIDH – International Federation for Human Rights
  16. Freedom House
  17. Free Word Association
  18. Glasnost Defence Foundation
  19. Human Rights House Foundation
  20. Human Rights Watch
  21. The Independent Historical Society
  22. Index on Censorship
  23. International Media Support
  24. International Partnership for Human Rights
  25. International Youth Human Rights Movement (YHRM)
  26. Internet Protection Society
  27. Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group
  28. Mass Media Defence Centre
  29. Moscow Helsinki Group
  30. Movement ‘For Human Rights’
  31. Norwegian Helsinki Committee
  32. Open Media
  33. Open Rights Group
  34. OVD-Info
  35. PEN America
  36. PEN International
  37. PEN St Petersburg
  38. People in Need
  39. Press Development Institute-Siberia
  40. Privacy International
  41. Reporters without Borders
  42. RosKomSvoboda
  43. Russia Beyond Bars
  44. Russian Journalists’ and Media Workers’ Union
  45. Russian LGBT Network
  46. Sakharov Center 
  47. SOVA Center
  48. Team 29
  49. Transparency International Russia
  50. Webpublishers Association (Russia)
  51. World Wide Web Foundation
  52. Xnet

 

Background Information

New Legislation

  • On 15 May 2018, Russia’s State Duma approved in the first reading proposed amendments (Proposed Bill № 464757-7) to the Criminal Code (Article 284.2), amendments that would criminalise ‘the provision of recommendations and transfer of information that has lead or might have led to the introduction’ of international sanctions, providing for up to three years’ imprisonment and fines of $8,000.  (see ARTICLE 19, 17 May 2018, Russia: Proposed amendments to Criminal Code threaten media freedomhttps://www.article19.org/resources/russia-proposed-amendments-to-criminal-code-threaten-media-freedom/  )
  • On 12 April 2018, a new draft law (Proposed Bill № 223849-7) on social media regulation was adopted in the first reading by the Russian State Duma. The law draws inspiration from the German 2017 NetzDG law and would require social media companies to remove information that violated Russian law (within 24 hours) or face huge fines (up to 50 million RUB). In addition, social media companies would be required to establish representation in Russia and identify their users by their telephone numbers effectively preventing online anonymity (as all phone numbers are registered with the owner’s passport in Russia).
  • Both bills are awaiting their second and third readings in the State Duma.

Yarovaya Law

  • Various requirements of the ‘Yarovaya Law’ are plainly incompatible with international standards on encryption and anonymity as set out in the 2015 report of the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression report (A/HRC/29/32). The UN Special Rapporteur himself has written to the Russian government raising serious concerns that the ‘Yarovaya Law’ unduly restricts the rights to freedom of expression and privacy online (see http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Opinion/Legislation/RUS_7_2016.pdf )

Telegram Case

  • In October 2017, a magistrate found Telegram guilty of an administrative offense for failing to provide decryption keys to the Russian authorities – which the company states it cannot do due to Telegram’s use of end-to-end encryption. The company was fined 800,000 rubles (approx. 11,000 EUR). Telegram lost an appeal against the administrative charge in March 2018, giving the Russian authorities formal grounds to block Telegram in Russia, under Article 15.4 of the Federal Law “On Information, Information Technologies and Information Protection”.
  • For Russian users, apps such as Telegram and similar services that seek to provide secure communications through the use of encrypted messages are crucial for users’ safety and, inter alia, rights to freedom of expression and privacy. They provide an important source of information on critical issues of politics, economics and social life, free of undue government interference.
  • Between 16-18 April 2018, almost 20 million Internet Protocol (IP) addresses were ordered to be blocked by Russia’s communications regulator, Roskomnadzor, as it tried to restrict access to Telegram. The majority of the blocked addresses are owned by international Internet companies, including Google, Amazon and Microsoft and had a detrimental effect on a wide range of web-based services that have nothing to do with Telegram, including media. For more details see:

Russia: 50+ international and Russian NGOs condemn Telegram block and Russia’s assault on Internet freedom, 15 May 2018 – https://www.article19.org/resources/russia-international-and-russian-ngos-condemn-telegram-block-and-russias-assault-on-freedom-of-expression-online/[/vc_column_text][/vc_column][/vc_row][vc_row full_width=”stretch_row_content”][vc_column][three_column_post title=”Digital Freedom” full_width_heading=”true” category_id=”4883″][/vc_column][/vc_row]

Russia: Telegram block leads to widespread assault on freedom of expression online

[vc_row][vc_column][vc_column_text]We, the undersigned 53 international and Russian human rights, media and Internet freedom organisations, strongly condemn the attempts by the Russian Federation to block the internet messaging service Telegram, which have resulted in extensive violations of freedom of expression and access to information, including mass collateral website blocking.

We call on Russia to stop blocking Telegram and cease its relentless attacks on internet freedom more broadly. We also call the United Nations (UN), the Council of Europe (CoE), the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the European Union (EU), the United States and other concerned governments to challenge Russia’s actions and uphold the fundamental rights to freedom of expression and privacy online as well as offline. Lastly, we call on internet companies to resist unfounded and extra-legal orders that violate their users’ rights.

Massive internet disruptions

On 13 April 2018, Moscow’s Tagansky District Court granted Roskomnadzor, Russia’s communications regulator, its request to block access to Telegram on the grounds that the company had not complied with a 2017 order to provide decryption keys to the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB). Since then, the actions taken by the Russian authorities to restrict access to Telegram have caused mass internet disruption, including:

  • Between 16-18 April 2018, almost 20 million internet Protocol (IP) addresses were ordered to be blocked by Roskomnadzor as it attempted to restrict access to Telegram. The majority of the blocked addresses are owned by international internet companies, including Google, Amazon and Microsoft. On 30 April, the number of blocked IP addresses was 14.6 million. As of 16 May 2018, this figure is currently 10.9 million.
  • This mass blocking of IP addresses has had a detrimental effect on a wide range of web-based services that have nothing to do with Telegram, including, but not limited to, online banking and booking sites, shopping, and flight reservations.
  • Within a week, Agora, the human rights and legal group, representing Telegram in Russia, reported it received requests for assistance with issues arising from the mass blocking from about 60 companies and website owners, including online stores, delivery services, and software developers. The number of requests has now reached 100.
  • At least six online media outlets (Petersburg Diary, Coda Story, FlashNord, FlashSiberia, Tayga.info, and 7×7) found access to their websites was temporarily blocked.
  • On 17 April 2018, Roskomnadzor requested that Google and Apple remove access to the Telegram app from their App stores, despite having no basis in Russian law to make this request. At the time of publication, the app remains available, but Telegram has not been able to provide upgrades that would allow better proxy access for users.
  • Virtual Private Network (VPN) providers – such as TgVPN, Le VPN and VeeSecurity proxy – have also been targeted for providing alternative means to access Telegram. Federal Law 276-FZ bans VPNs and internet anonymisers from providing access to websites banned in Russia and authorises Roskomnadzor to order the blocking of any site explaining how to use these services.
  • On 3 May 2018, Rozkomnadzor stated that it had blocked access to around 50 VPN services and anonymisers in relation to the Telegram block. On the same day, the Russia’s Communications Minister refused to rule out that other messaging services, including Viber, could potentially be blocked in Russia if they do not hand over encryption keys upon request. The minister had previously warned, during an interview on 6 April 2018, that action could be taken against Viber, as well as WhatsApp and Facebook Messenger.

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Dataset: Media freedom violations in Russia reported to Mapping Media Freedom

[/vc_column_text][/vc_column][/vc_row][vc_row][vc_column][vc_column_text]Background on restrictive internet laws

Over the past six years, Russia has adopted a huge raft of laws restricting freedom of expression and the right to privacy online. These include the creation in 2012 of a blacklist of internet websites, managed by Roskomnadzor, and the incremental extension of the grounds upon which websites can be blocked, including without a court order.

The 2016 so-called ‘Yarovaya Law’, justified on the grounds of “countering extremism”, requires all communications providers and internet operators to store metadata about their users’ communications activities, to disclose decryption keys at the security services’ request, and to use only encryption methods approved by the Russian government – in practical terms, to create a backdoor for Russia’s security agents to access internet users’ data, traffic, and communications.

In October 2017, a magistrate found Telegram guilty of an administrative offense for failing to provide decryption keys to the Russian authorities – which the company states it cannot do due to Telegram’s use of end-to-end encryption. The company was fined 800,000 rubles (approx. 11,000 EUR). Telegram lost an appeal against the administrative charge in March 2018, giving the Russian authorities formal grounds to block Telegram in Russia, under Article 15.4 of the Federal Law “On Information, Information Technologies and Information Protection”.

The Russian authorities’ latest move against Telegram demonstrates the serious implications for people’s freedom of expression and right to privacy online in Russia and worldwide:

  • For Russian users apps such as Telegram and similar services that seek to provide secure communications are crucial for users’ safety. They provide an important source of information on critical issues of politics, economics and social life, free of undue government interference. For media outlets and journalists based in and outside Russia, Telegram serves not only as a messaging platform for secure communication with sources, but also as a publishing venue. Through its channels, Telegram acts as a carrier and distributor of content for entire media outlets as well as for individual journalists and bloggers. In light of direct and indirect state control over many traditional Russian media and the self-censorship many other media outlets feel compelled to exercise, instant messaging channels like Telegram have become a crucial means of disseminating ideas and opinions.
  • Companies that comply with the requirements of the ‘Yarovaya Law’ by allowing the government a back-door key to their services jeopardise the security of the online communications of their Russian users and the people they communicate with abroad. Journalists, in particular, fear that providing the FSB with access to their communications would jeopardise their sources, a cornerstone of press freedom. Company compliance would also signal that communication services providers are willing to compromise their encryption standards and put the privacy and security of all their users at risk, as a cost of doing business.
  • Beginning in July 2018, other articles of the ‘Yarovaya Law’ will come into force requiring companies to store the content of all communications for six months and to make them accessible to the security services without a court order. This would affect the communications of both people in Russia and abroad.

Such attempts by the Russian authorities to control online communications and invade privacy go far beyond what can be considered necessary and proportionate to countering terrorism and violate international law.

International Standards

  • Blocking websites or apps is an extreme measure, analogous to banning a newspaper or revoking the license of a TV station.  As such, it is highly likely to constitute a disproportionate interference with freedom of expression and media freedom in the vast majority of cases, and must be subject to strict scrutiny. At a minimum, any blocking measures should be clearly laid down by law and require the courts to examine whether the wholesale blocking of access to an online service is necessary and in line with the criteria established and applied by the European Court of Human Rights. Blocking Telegram and the accompanying actions clearly do not meet this standard.
  • Various requirements of the ‘Yarovaya Law’ are plainly incompatible with international standards on encryption and anonymity as set out in the 2015 report of the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression report (A/HRC/29/32). The UN Special Rapporteur himself has written to the Russian government raising serious concerns that the ‘Yarovaya Law’ unduly restricts the rights to freedom of expression and privacy online. In the European Union, the Court of Justice has ruled that similar data retention obligations were incompatible with the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Although the European Court of Human Rights has not yet ruled on the compatibility of the Russian provisions for the disclosure of decryption keys with the European Convention on Human Rights, it has found that Russia’s legal framework governing interception of communications does not provide adequate and effective guarantees against the arbitrariness and the risk of abuse inherent in any system of secret surveillance.

We, the undersigned organisations, call on:

  • The Russian authorities to guarantee internet users’ right to publish and browse anonymously and ensure that any restrictions to online anonymity are subject to requirements of a court order, and comply fully with Articles 17 and 19(3) of the ICCPR, and articles 8 and 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, by:
      • Desisting from blocking Telegram and refraining from requiring messaging services, such as Telegram, to provide decryption keys in order to access users private communications;
  • Repealing provisions in the ‘Yarovaya Law’ requiring internet service providers (ISPs) to store all telecommunications data for six months and imposing mandatory cryptographic backdoors, and the 2014 Data Localisation law, which grant security service easy access to users’ data without sufficient safeguards.
  • Repealing Federal Law 241-FZ, which bans anonymity for users of online messaging applications; and Law 276-FZ which prohibits VPNs and internet anonymisers from providing access to websites banned in Russia
    • Amending Federal Law 149-FZ “On Information, IT Technologies and Protection of Information” so that the process of blocking websites meets international standards. Any decision to block access to a website or app should be undertaken by an independent court and be limited by requirements of necessity and proportionality for a legitimate aim. In considering whether to grant a blocking order, the court or other independent body authorised to issue such an order should consider its impact on lawful content and what technology may be used to prevent over-blocking.
  • Representatives of the United Nations (UN), the Council of Europe (CoE), the Organisation for the Cooperation and Security in Europe (OSCE), the European Union (EU) the United States and other concerned governments to scrutinise and publicly challenge Russia’s actions in order to uphold the fundamental rights to freedom of expression and privacy both online and-offline, as stipulated in binding international agreements to which Russia is a party.
  • Internet companies to resist orders that violate international human rights law. Companies should follow the United Nations’ Guiding Principles on Business & Human Rights, which emphasise that the responsibility to respect human rights applies throughout a company’s global operations regardless of where its users are located and exists independently of whether the State meets its own human rights obligations.

 

Signed by

 

  • ARTICLE 19
  • Agora International
  • Access Now
  • Amnesty International
  • Asociatia pentru Tehnologie si Internet – ApTI
  • Associação D3 – Defesa dos Direitos Digitais
  • Centre for the Development of Democracy and Human Rights
  • Committee to Protect Journalists
  • Citizens’ Watch
  • Civil Rights Defenders
  • Electronic Frontier Foundation
  • Electronic Frontier Norway
  • Electronic Privacy Information Centre (EPIC)
  • European Federation of Journalists
  • Freedom House
  • Free Word Association
  • Glasnost Defence Foundation
  • Human Rights House Foundation
  • Human Rights Watch
  • The Independent Historical Society
  • Index on Censorship
  • International Media Support
  • International Memorial
  • International Partnership for Human Rights
  • Internet Society Bulgaria
  • International Youth Human Rights Movement (YHRM)
  • Interregional Human Rights Group
  • Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group
  • Mass Media Defence Centre
  • Memorial Human Rights Center
  • Moscow Helsinki Group
  • Movement ‘For Human Rights’
  • Norwegian Helsinki Committee
  • Open Media
  • Open Rights Group
  • OVD-Info
  • PEN America
  • PEN International
  • PEN St Petersburg
  • People in Need
  • Press Development Institute-Siberia
  • Privacy International
  • Reporters without Borders
  • RosKomSvoboda
  • Russian Journalists’ and Media Workers’ Union
  • Sakharov Center
  • SOVA Center
  • Team 29
  • Transparency International
  • Transparency International Russia
  • Webpublishers Association (Russia)
  • World Wide Web Foundation
  • Xnet

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Letter: Hands off our data

[vc_row][vc_column][vc_column_text]Originally published on The Telegraph letters page

SIR – We wish to highlight concerns with “information sharing” provisions in the Digital Economy Bill.

The Bill puts government ministers in control of citizens’ personal data, a significant change in the relationship between citizen and state. It means that personal data provided to one part of government can be shared with other parts of government and private‑sector companies without citizens’ knowledge or consent.

Government should be strengthening, not weakening, the protection of sensitive information, particularly given the almost daily reports of hacks and leaks of personal data. Legal and technical safeguards need to be embedded within the Bill to ensure citizens’ trust. There must be clear guidance for officials, and mechanisms by which they and the organisations with whom they share information can be held to account.

The Government’s intention is to improve the wellbeing of citizens, and to prevent fraud. This makes it especially important that sensitive personal details, such as income or disability, cannot be misappropriated or misused – finding their way into the hands of payday-loan companies, for example. Information sharing could exacerbate the difficulties faced by the most vulnerable in society.

The Government should be an exemplar in ensuring the security and protection of citizens’ personal data. If the necessary technical and legal safeguards cannot be embedded in the current Bill and codes of practice, we respectfully urge the Government to remove its personal data sharing proposals in their entirety.

Dr Jerry Fishenden
Co-Chairman, Cabinet Office Privacy and Consumer Advisory Group (PCAG)

Renate Samson
Chief Executive, Big Brother Watch

Ian Taylor
Director, Association of British Drivers

Jo Glanville
Director, English PEN

Jodie Ginsberg
Chief Executive Officer, Index on Censorship

Dr Edgar Whitley
Co-Chairman, Cabinet Office PCAG and London School of Economics and Political Science

David Evans
Director of Policy, BCS – The Chartered Institute for IT

Dr Gus Hosein
Executive Director, Privacy International and Member of Cabinet Office PCAG

Rachel Coldicutt
Chief Executive Officer, Doteveryone

Roger Darlington
Chairman, Consumer Forum for Communications

Dr Kieron O’Hara
Associate Professor Electronics and Computer Science, University of Southampton.

Professor Angela Sasse
Head of Information Security Research, University College London and Member of Cabinet Office PCAG

Dr Judith Townend
Lecturer in Media and Information Law, University of Sussex

Dr Louise Bennett
Chairman, BCS Security Group and Member of Cabinet Office PCAG

StJohn Deakins
Chief Executive Officer, CitizenMe

Rory Broomfield
Director, The Freedom Association

Sarah Gold
Director and Founder, Projects by IF

Jim Killock
Director, Open Rights Group

Guy Herbert
General Secretary, NO2ID and Member of Cabinet Office PCAG

Dr George Danezis
Professor of Security and Privacy Engineering, University College London and Member of Cabinet Office PCAG

Jamie Grace
Senior Lecturer in Law, Sheffield Hallam University

Eric King
Visiting Professor, Queen Mary University

Josie Appleton
Director, Manifesto Club

Jen Persson
Co-ordinator, Defend Digital Me

Dr Chris Pounder
Director, Amberhawk and Member of Cabinet Office PCAG

Sam Smith
medConfidential and Member of Cabinet Office PCAG[/vc_column_text][/vc_column][/vc_row][vc_row][vc_column][/vc_column][/vc_row]